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INTRODUCTION

Capitalism: concept, idea, image
Peter OsbOrne 
 
 
‘The experience of our generation’, Walter Benjamin famously 
wrote in a note for his Arcades project during the 1930s, ‘is that 
capitalism will not die a natural death.’1 It is the experience of 
the generations reading this book that capitalism is unlikely to 
die any kind of death during their lifetimes, unless it is a death 
of all. Indeed, on the historical scale of transitions between 
modes of production, it is still only recently – a mere thirty years 
– that the first world-historically significant experiment with a 
non-capitalist political-economic system, in Russia and Eastern 
Europe, came to its dismal end; while the second was beginning 
to embrace an explicitly capitalistic economic form. (China 
began negotiations to join the World Trade Organization in 1986, 
although it was fifteen years before it was accepted, in 2001.) 
‘Globalization’, in the specific sense of a digitally based global ex-
pansion of capital markets in the wake of the demise of ‘actually 
existing socialism’, giving rise to a new, financially based regime 
of capital accumulation – ‘supercapitalism’ (Überkapitalismus), we 
might call it – is just three decades old. That regime experienced 
its first major crisis in 2008, from which its recovery remains 
1. Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, 
Cambridge MA and London: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 1999, [X11a,3], p. 667.
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slow and uneven. But while the effects of the crisis have given 
sustenance to the idea that capitalism must surely end, somehow, 
at some point within historical sight2 – even, in fact, to the idea 
that it has already begun to end – anticipatory announcements 
of ‘postcapitalism’ nonetheless remain wholly wishful, based on 
technological grounds that ignore the social relations at the heart 
of the system.3 
As the emergence of a new, globally financialized super-
capitalist regime began to sink in on the Left towards the end 
of the 1990s, there was a marked revival of academic interest in 
Marx’s critique of political economy, turning back the tide of the 
previous decade’s political flight from Marxism.4 While Lenin 
and Stalin were being relocated, as political memorabilia, to the 
post-Soviet culture garden, Marx’s Capital increasingly appeared 
as the one text capable of grasping the fundamental social struc-
ture and dynamics of the historical present. Indeed, as a theo-
retical account of the fundamental processes of the production 
and circulation of capital, the social relation that is constitutive 
of capitalist societies, Capital appears to be of ever-increasing 
relevance as the capital relation becomes ever more extensively 
generalized and intensively overdetermining of the rest of social 
life, on a global scale, driven on by the subjugation of national 
state forms to the reterritorializing logics of transnational 
capital. (Transnational forms are the internal articulation of the 
asymmetrically structured whole commonly referred to as ‘the 
global’.) The 2008 financial crisis – and the revival of previously 
2. Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, London and New York: Verso, 2016.
3. See, for example, Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek, #accelerate manifesto for an 
Accelerationist Politics (2013), https://syntheticediﬁce.wordpress.com/2014/03/13/
accelerate-manifesto-for-an-accelerationist-politics; Paul Mason, Postcapitalism: A Guide 
to Our Future, London: Penguin, 2016. More cautiously Streeck writes of a crisis-ridden 
‘post-capitalism interregnum’ prior to the purported emergence of some ‘new order’ (How 
Will Capitalism End?, p. 46). However, quite what is ‘post-capitalist’ about this crisis-ridden 
situation remains unclear.
4. The UK-based journal Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory was 
launched in 1997. In 2003 its earlier US counterpart, Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of 
Economics, Culture and Society (launched 1988), moved to a major academic publisher. 
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discredited Marxist theories of crisis that it occasioned – served 
to reinforce the recognition of this fact.5 Capital is once again 
being widely read and discussed, especially in the English 
language.6 In fact, if there is one ideological victory that the Left 
in advanced capitalist societies can claim, in the decade since the 
financial crisis of 2008, it is the restoration in public conscious-
ness of the concept of capitalism as a conflictual form of society, 
in opposition to the naturalized individualism of the generic 
discourse of ‘markets’, pursued to the point of auto-destruction 
by neoliberalized state forms (although this is perhaps more of a 
direct effect of the inequalities exacerbated and laid bare by the 
crisis than of any particular political struggle).7 In the UK, the 
revival of Labour as a party of the Left can in large part be put 
down to an end to the ‘commonsensical’ acceptance of various 
basic inequalities, which are defended by economic liberals as 
‘natural’ consequences of otherwise ‘beneficial’ markets – the 
displacement into xenophobic nationalism of the popular affects 
associated with this shift notwithstanding.
The 150th anniversary of the publication of the first volume 
of Marx’s Capital, in September 2017, thus fell at a propitious 
moment. Of the conferences held to celebrate it, the one from 
which the essays in this book derive was unusual for being 
organized by a Philosophy research centre;8 albeit one orientated 
5. See Peter Osborne, ‘A Sudden Topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis’, 
Radical Philosophy 160 (March/April 2010), pp. 19–26, www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/
article/a-sudden-topicality.
6. One catalyst for this reading was the online posting, in 2010, of the autumn 2007 
iteration of David Harvey’s lectures on Capital at City University New York: http://
davidharvey.org/reading-capital. For problems associated with the overwhelmingly 
English-language mediation of this revival of Capital reading, see the discussions by Boris 
Buden and Keston Sutherland in Chapters 7 and 10, respectively, below.
7. The international success of Thomas Piketty’s 2013 Le Capital au XXI Siècle (Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge MA and London: 
Belknap, Harvard University Press, 2014) was both symptom and further catalyst of this 
restoration. A methodologically conventional piece of economic history, its combination 
of a relentlessly statistical focus on the growth of inequality and the use of the word 
‘capital’ inadvertently served to help legitimate the reintroduction of a Marxian 
perspective into public debates.
8. ‘Capitalism: Concept & Idea – 150 Years of Marx’s Capital: The Philosophy and 
Politics of Capital Today’, organized by the Centre for Research in Modern European 
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towards post-Kantian European Philosophy, rather than the 
mainstream ‘analytical’ variant, within which a notoriously 
bowdlerized reading of Marx was briefly marginally fashionable 
in the 1980s. This is not because we take Marx to be a ‘philoso-
pher’ in any academic disciplinary sense, or Capital to be a book of 
‘philosophy’, in that sense, or even that we follow the Althusserian 
path, ‘From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy’,9 since that project 
problematically retained the illusory conceptual self-sufficiency 
of philosophy in the displaced form of a de-historicized ‘Theory’. 
Rather, it is because the continuation of the deeper history of 
post-Kantian European philosophy appears to us best pursued 
today as a transdisciplinary practice of critique and concept construc-
tion, at the highest levels of generality and abstraction, including 
critique of the prevailing intellectual division of labour, with its 
idealistic reification of concepts as self-sufficiently ‘philosophical’; 
and modes of concept construction that are attentive to their 
own social and historical conditions – of which Marx’s critique of 
political economy is exemplary, in each case. 
Concept (capital and capitalism)
In insisting that the study of ‘economy’ (the historical social 
forms of the system of needs) focus on the conditions of the ac-
cumulation of wealth as capital, rather than just upon labour or 
market exchange, Marx’s Capital transformed economic analysis 
from a theory about the actions of human individuals into a 
theory of social relations: specifically, a ‘social labour theory of 
value’ (see Chapter 1, below). This is a theory that conceptualizes 
capitalistic accumulation as exploitation, across the whole range 
Philosophy (CRMEP), Kingston University London; held at Conway Hall and the London 
School of Economics, 13 and 14 October 2017, with additional ﬁnancial support from the 
Philosophy Department at the University of Paris 8, Saint-Denis.
9. This is the title of the opening part of Louis Althusser et al., Reading Capital (1965), 
written by Althusser himself. Reading Capital: The Complete Edition, trans. Ben Brewster 
and David Fernbach, London and New York: Verso, 2016, pp. 9–72.
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of different kinds of particular or ‘concrete’ labours, through its 
theory of surplus value. Indeed, it was the demonstration of the 
independence of surplus-value from ‘its specific incarnations 
as profit, interest, land rents, etc.’ – and hence, we might say, 
the peculiar status of value as a social abstraction – that Marx 
himself took to be one of the two ‘best things’ about his work.10 
The other was the discovery of the ‘double-nature’ of labour in 
capitalist societies as at once ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’, expressed 
as use-value and exchange-value, respectively. Étienne Balibar 
has suggested that these two discoveries lead to two separate 
conceptions of capitalism: one focused on generalized commod-
ification, the other on different ways of exploiting labour- 
power.11 Yet it is hard to separate them, analytically, since the 
concrete–abstract labour distinction underlies Marx’s concept of 
value itself. Historically, however, a focus on one or the other has 
given rise to two separate tendencies in Western Marxism: one 
associated with Lukács and the Frankfurt School, the other with 
Tronti, Italian Workerism and post-Workerism. These are the 
‘torn halves’ of an integral Marxism, one might say (borrowing 
an image from Adorno), to which they ‘do not add up’.12 
In emphasizing the historically specific social character 
of wage-labour as ‘abstract’ labour, Capital shifted economic 
analysis from the domain of moral and behavioural psychology 
(dating back to Adam Smith’s 1759 The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments) – lively once again today in (neo-)neoclassical economics 
– to what appeared in the period after World War II, in discipli-
nary terms, as sociology. This was true even in those contexts 
in which the philosophical aspects of Capital as A Critique of 
10. Marx, letter to Engels, 24 August 1867, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected 
Works, Volume 42: Letters 1864–1868, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, p. 407.
11. See Étienne Balibar, ‘Marx’s “Two Discoveries”’, trans. Cadenza Academic 
Translations, www.cairn-int.info/article-E_AMX_050_0044--marx-s-two-discoveries.
htm, from Actuel Marx 50 (2011/12), pp. 44–60.
12. Cf. Adorno to Benjamin, 18 March 1936, in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter 
Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence, 1928–1949, trans. Nicholas Walker, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999, p. 130.
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Political Economy (the main subtitle of all three volumes) were 
explicitly acknowledged. The history of the Institute for Social 
Research in Frankfurt, in exile and return – from 1931 up the 
end of the 1960s – for example, is in large part the history of a 
struggle with the issue of disciplinarity in the wake of Marx’s 
critique of political economy, in the dual sense of disciplinarity 
as both intellectual and institutional form.13 It is notable in this 
respect that one of the most explicitly philosophical readings of 
Capital, the German Neu Marx-Lektüre, derived from a lecture 
by Adorno entitled ‘Marx and the Basic Concepts of Sociological 
Theory’, in the summer of 1962.14 And, for all its Hegelianism, 
that reading remains dogged, in a certain way, by the concept 
of ‘society’.15 That there are philosophical aspects to Capital – in 
the plural – though, and that these aspects cannot be artificially 
separated from the rest of the book, as ‘Marx’s philosophy’, is 
now widely acknowledged. Indeed, the main competing critical 
schools of Capital interpretation in Europe, dating back to the 
early 1960s, are differentiated broadly philosophically: with the 
‘French’ (Althusserian/structuralist) and the ‘Italian’ (Trontian/
vitalist) ones joining the ‘German’ (Adornian/Critical Hegelian) 
one.16 Each has developed distinctive insights into Marx’s great 
13. See Peter Osborne, ‘Problematizing Disciplinarity, Transdisciplinary Problematics’, 
Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 32, nos 5–6 (September–November 2015), pp. 3–35, 18–21, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263276415592245.
14. ‘Theodor W. Adorno on “Marx and the Basic Concepts of Sociological Theory” from 
a Seminar Transcript in the Summer Semester of 1962’, Historical Materialism, vol. 26, no. 1 
(2018), pp. 154–64.
15. For the Neu Marx-Lekture (the ‘New Reading of Marx’ – new in the 1960s, that is), 
see Hans-Georg Backhaus, ‘On the Dialectics of the Value-Form’ (1969), trans. Michael 
Eldred and Mike Roth, Thesis Eleven 1 (1980); and, more generally, Riccardo Belloﬁore 
and Thommaso Redolﬁ Riva, ‘The Neue Marx-Lektüre: Putting the Critique of Political 
Economy back into the Critique of Society’, Radical Philosophy 189 (January/February 
2014), pp.24–36, www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/the-neue-marx-lekture. 
Along with Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason (1983; trans. Michael Eldred, 
London and New York: Verso, 1988), the Neu Marx-Lektüre represents one of the two 
main non- (and anti-) Habermasian, post-Adornian trajectories of Frankfurt Critical 
Theory. 
16. For the difference between these ‘French’ and Italian’ readings, see Étienne 
Balibar, ‘A Point of Heresy in Western Marxism: Althusser’s and Tronti’s Antithetic 
Readings of Capital in the Early 1960s’, in Nick Nesbitt (ed.), The Concept in Crisis: 
‘Reading Capital’ Today, Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, 2017, pp. 93–112. 
National situations are, of course, internally more complicated, as Michel Henri’s French 
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work and they coexist now – in often unstable or contradictory 
combinations – in the international English-language transla-
tional culture of ‘critical theory’.
Understanding economic value, and capital in particular, as 
a social relation between commodified labour-power, on the 
one hand, and the ownership of other means of production, on 
the other (rather than neoclassically, as simply a durable good 
that is used in the production of goods or services, including 
money), transforms the political understanding of capitalist 
societies. Historical transformations in the development of 
capital as a social relation (including labour-power as ‘variable’ 
capital) become historical transformations in the most basic and 
constitutively conflictual – antagonistic – structures of practices 
of capitalist societies. A conception of capitalism grounded 
in the Marxian concept of capital is thus quite different from 
any based on the notion of markets; although markets (and 
exchange relations more generally) are, of course, central to the 
expression and modes of appearance of the fundamental social 
relations of capital, as legally regulated forms of exchange. 
Today, this conception tends to include the ongoing character of 
those forms of ‘expropriation through dispossession’ that Marx 
himself relegated to the historically formative role of ‘so-called 
primitive or originary [ursprünglich] accumulation’, in the final 
part of Capital, Volume 1;17 alongside renewed emphasis on the 
relations of violence (Gewalt) intrinsic to the social relations of 
capital itself (see Chapter 9, below), and a growing sense of the 
‘re-feudalization’ of capitalism itself (see Chapter 7, below). 
phenomenological reading shows, for example. Michel Henri, Marx: I, Une Philosophie 
de la réalité; II, Une Philosophie de l’économie, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1976; in English 
in an abridged form as Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin, 
Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1983.
17. See Claudia von Werlhof, ‘Why Peasants and Housewives Do Not Disappear in the 
Capitalist World-System’, Working Paper No. 68, Sociology of Development Research 
Center, University of Bielefeld, 1985; and ‘Globalization and the Permanent Process 
of Primitive Accumulation: The Example of the MAI, the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment’, Journal of World Systems Research, vol. 6, no. 3 (Fall–Winter 2000), pp. 728–47.
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Marx’s concept of capitalism is that of a type of society 
in which the capital relation is socioeconomically dominant. 
But what is the relation of the structural totality of the system 
of capitalistic social relations to the (total) historical actuality of 
capitalist societies? This is perhaps the main question at stake 
in Marx’s conception of capitalism, and it has been contested 
anew – figured as the site of a contradiction between ‘theory’ 
and ‘history’, on the one hand, or ‘theory’ and ‘politics’, on the 
other – since the revival of theoretical debates within Marxism 
in Europe in the 1960s. E.P. Thompson’s polemical essay ‘The 
Poverty of Theory’ (1978) formulated it, at its extreme, like this: 
[T]he whole society comprises many activities and relations … 
which are not the concern of Political Economy, and for which it 
has no terms. … [Capital] is the study of the logic of capital, not of 
capitalism, and the social and political dimensions of the history, 
the wrath and the understanding of the class struggle arose from a 
region independent of the closed system of economic logic.18
At one level, the controversy between Thompson and 
Althusser (who is the more pointed object of Thompson’s ire) was 
the latest manifestation of a philosophical antinomy between 
empiricism and idealism that has characterized European 
philosophy since the seventeenth century. In another, it pitted 
two aspects of Marx’s Capital against each other, antithetically, 
which are, in fact, integrally dialectically connected: history and 
socio-economic system. The problem to which it points, though 
– how to grasp this relation, across the conceptual difference 
of capital and capitalism – remains. This is both a (theoretical) 
problem about thinking mediation and a (historical) problem 
internal to the development of capitalist societies themselves.19 In 
18. E.P. Thompson, ‘The Poverty of Theory, or An Orrery of Errors’, in The Poverty of 
Theory and Other Essays, London: Merlin Press, 1978, pp. 62, 65.
19. Thompson focused on the period of the formation of industrial capitalism, on the 
‘making’, rather than the development, of the English working class. It is not so clear that 
in established capitalist societies it can be said that class struggle ‘arises from a region 
independent of the … system of economic logic’. Thompson’s sleight of hand lies in the 
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the years since Thompson’s polemic, the Marxist literature has 
addressed this problem of the capital–capitalism relation in two 
seemingly contradictory directions. However, while it does not 
strain the concept of dialectics too much to suggest that each of 
them carries a truth that becomes such only in its relations to 
the other, the political implications of the truth structured by 
this fundamental contradiction remain hard to glean.
In one direction, in the spirit of Karl Polanyi’s 1949 The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 
there has been an emphasis on the extra-capitalistic aspects 
and conditions of capitalistic societies – be they construed as 
‘social’ (as in Polanyi), anthropological, or ontological (Negri, 
Chapter 4 below). The social interpretation has taken two main 
forms. First, there has been a new emphasis on what Marx called 
‘formal subsumption’, as the mode of integration of pre- or non-
capitalist productive practices into the process of the production 
of value; in distinction from the ‘real subsumption’ of labour to 
capital, through transformations within the production process 
itself. 20 This functions in two ways: (1) to explain the dynamics 
of the ‘combined and uneven development’ of recently and still 
only emergently capitalist societies (demographically, still the 
majority of the world), which retain myriad non-capitalistic 
practices at various levels of the social both alongside and within 
circuits of reproduction of capital that have come to dominate 
the reproduction of those societies; and (2) to posit an imaginary 
limit to the capitalistic character of even the most capitalist 
societies, as something like the limit of ‘the human’ as a residu-
ally autonomous social being. 
attribution of ‘closure’ to a dynamically open, historically developing socioeconomic 
system.
20. See, for example, Harry Harootunian, Marx After Marx: History and Time in the 
Expansion of Capitalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, and my review, 
‘Marx after Marx after Marx after Marx’, Radical Philosophy 200 (November/December 
2016), pp. 47–51, www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/reviews/individual-reviews/
marx-after-marx-after-marx-after-marx. 
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Second, there has been a decisive shift beyond the standpoint 
of production of the value (adopted in the first volume of Capital) 
to that of reproduction and social reproduction in particular, 
convergent with the arguments about ‘permanent primitive 
accumulation’ (see Chapters 5, 6 and 8, below). Volume 2 of Capital 
is about the circuits through which capital circulates in order 
to reproduce itself, in an expanded form, but it pays no heed to 
either the ‘extra-economic’ reproduction of variable capital – that 
is, to the social reproduction of the labour force, including the 
production of new people – or the broader social conditions of 
the reproduction of the capitalist relations of production, referred 
to by Marx as the ’superstructure’. This shift has been the result 
of two main impulses: (1) the theoretical interest in the social 
conditions of the reproduction of the relations of production 
shown by Althusser, summed up by him in the idea of ‘ideological 
state apparatuses’ (ISAs), and presented fragmentarily in the 
post humously published text of 1969–72, Sur la reproduction;21 and 
(2) the feminist critique of Marx’s restrictedly value-based produc-
tivism, which emphasizes the kinship relations of working-class 
families as the site of the production and reproduction of labour-
power.22 The results of these literatures are combined in Nancy 
Fraser’s comprehensively neo-Polanyian approach to the recent 
global financial crisis, rendering more complex Marx’s conception 
of capitalism as a socio-historical form.23
21. In English as Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G.M. Goshgarian, London and New York: Verso, 2014. 
The famous ISAs essay of 1970 was extracted from this manuscript. This perspective has 
its source in Gramsci’s expanded conceptions of hegemony and the state.
22. See Lisa Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Towards a Unitary Theory, 
New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983; in broader anthropological terms, see 
Gayle Rubin, ‘The “Traffic in Women”: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex’, in Rayna 
R. Reiter (ed.), Towards an Anthropology of Women, New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1975, pp. 157–210; and, more recently, Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, 
Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle, New York: PM Press, 2012. 
23. See Nancy Fraser, ‘Marketization, Social Protection Emancipation: Toward a 
Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derlugian 
(eds), Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown, New York: NYU Press, 
2011, pp. 137–58; Nancy Fraser, ‘A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after 
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In the other direction, however, there has been an emphasis 
on the progressive historical fulfilment of capital’s inherent 
tendency, identified by Marx, for the universalization of its social 
relation, and its displacement (and/or refunctionalization) of all 
other social forms.24 This notion of a self-completing capitalism 
has various names and takes various theoretical forms: from 
the Tronti/Negri version of ‘total subsumption’ (the ‘real’ sub-
sumption to capital of the social itself), via Rancière’s ‘absolute’ 
capitalism (as a bureaucratic state-like form) to Balibar’s ‘pure’ 
or ‘absolute’ capitalism,25 now reconceived as a more Marxian 
version of ‘total subsumption’ (see Chapter 2, below). It is the 
split between history and ontology in Negri’s work that allows it 
to point in each of these two directions at once: positing both an 
achieved universalization of capital and an ontologically resistant 
and creative non-capitalist residue. Philosophically, this positing 
of the total or absolute actualization of the capital relation as 
total or absolute capitalism marks a transition from Marx’s 
explanatory concept of capitalism to capitalism as idea.
Idea (Hegel or Plato?)
The notion of capitalism (rather than capital) as an idea, in one of 
the classical philosophical senses carried by that term from Plato 
to Kant, Hegel and beyond, comes in two politically diametrically 
Polanyi’, New Left Review 81 (May–June 2013), pp. 119–32; Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi, 
Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018, chs 1 and 2.
 One should also mention here the sociological literature on ‘varieties of capitalism’, 
often geographical nominated: so-called ‘Asian’ capitalism, ‘East European’ capitalism, 
‘South American’ capitalism, etc. See Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. However, this is largely about the differential economic value of 
inherited cultural, legal and political forms; it is piecemeal, rather than being integrated 
into a history of capitalism.
24. For the problematic of the capitalistic refunctionalization of pre-/non-capitalist 
social relations and ideological forms, see Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, London and New York: Verso, 1991.
25. Étienne Balibar, ‘Critique in the 21st Century: Political Economy Still, and Religion 
Again’, Radical Philosophy 200 (November/December 2016), pp. 11–21, 12–13, www.
radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/critique-in-the-21st-century.
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opposed forms. On the one hand, we have what is for the Left 
the dystopian conception of capitalism as the self-actualization 
of the idea of capital – in the Hegelian sense of ‘idea’ as ‘the 
unity of concept and reality’: ‘everything actual is only in so 
far as it possesses the idea and expresses it’, Hegel wrote.26 
Philosophically, this would be a kind of absolutely Hegelian 
Marxian political economy, in which the alienated objectivity 
of the subjectivity of the value-form had achieved a socially 
absolutized, ideal actuality. Historical materialism as absolute 
idealism. It is hard to see ‘history’ recovering from that. On the 
other hand, we have the more Platonic right-wing projection of 
this dystopia as a utopia: whether it be Ayn Rand’s ‘capitalism as 
unknown ideal’ or Nick Land’s nihilist-accelerationist version 
of capitalist fundamentalism, in which capital plays the role of 
subject in a proto-Nietzschean liberation of self-annihilation.27 
Rand’s capitalist Platonism appears here as the direct ideological 
counterpart and opponent to Alain Badiou’s ‘idea of communism’, 
on the same philosophical terrain.28 (‘Plato, Today!’ was the title 
of the course in ‘Contemporary Philosophy’ that until recently 
Badiou taught in Paris.)
To raise the spectre of capitalism as idea, on the 150th 
anni versary of Capital, Volume 1, is thus to raise the spectre of 
the current political meaning of another event that celebrated 
an emblematic (100th) anniversary in the autumn of 2017: the 
Russian Revolution of ‘October 1917’. This is not the spectre of 
communism in Marx’s sense of 1845 and after, which would come 
to ‘haunt Europe’ from 1848 all the way up until the mid-1970s 
26. Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 
1989, pp. 757, 756.
27. Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, New York: New American Library, 1967; 
‘Ideology, Intelligence and Capital: An Interview with Nick Land’, https://vastabrupt.
com/2018/08/15/ideology-intelligence-and-capital-nick-land. It should be remembered 
that Land’s accelerationism was always an anti-left project. It is close to the pure culture 
of death of some other ‘fundamentalisms’.
28. Alain Badiou, ‘The Idea of Communism’, in The Communist Hypothesis (2008), 
London and New York: Verso, 2010, ch. 4.
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(the Portuguese Revolution of 1974–5): the spectre of commu-
nism as ‘the real movement that abolishes the present state of 
things’.29 It is its very opposite: the spectre of communism as an 
idea in that transcendent sense familiar from Plato and ‘modern-
ized’ (rendered subjectively universal) by Kant; as something 
eternal that constantly returns, identical to itself. The spectre 
of communism in the Badiouian sense is that of an idea because 
the spectre of communism in Marx’s (historically actual) sense is 
no longer haunting Europe. As a politically organized existence, 
it is no current threat. Communism has retreated to the realm of 
ideas, disconnected from the historical actuality of twenty-first-
century capitalism. This is the idea of communism that has been 
rolled out by Žižek as a roadshow franchise.30
It is in this regard that the brief for the conference from 
which these essays derive spoke of ‘asking the question of the 
meanings of the concepts of “capital” and “capitalism” today as 
a counterpoint to the retreat of radical left politics from history 
to idea’. Pursuit of the emancipatory political possibilities 
connected to the historical actualities of the current forms of 
capitalist societies requires pursuit of the theoretical meanings 
of Marx’s concepts of capital and capitalism and their political 
meanings in particular.
If communism has retreated to the realm of ideas – in the 
pejorative sense of having become disconnected from historical 
actuality, in the deep, world-historically processual sense – such 
a separation nonetheless carries with it the production of a 
critical distance from that actuality; a distance that appears 
only more attractive as that actuality becomes, increasingly, 
developmentally self-transformative only in the direction of a 
29. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, ‘The German Ideology’ (1845), in Collected Works, 
Volume 5: 1845–1847, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, p. 49.
30. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (eds), The Idea of Communism, London and New 
York: Verso, 2010; Slavoj Žižek (ed.), The Idea of Communism 2: The New York Conference, 
London and New York: Verso, 2013; Alex Taek-Gwang Lee and Slavoj Žižek (eds), The Idea 
of Communism 3: The Seoul Conference, London and New York: Verso, 2016. 
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more pure or ‘absolutely’ capitalistic society. In this context, the 
Badiou–Žižek flight to the metaphysically extreme outside of a 
competing pure ideality makes a certain logical sense. However, 
it makes no social or human sense at all. Since, to maintain the 
Kantian figure of the concept–idea opposition, while the flight 
to a place that is in principle ‘beyond possible experience’ may 
be comforting to some intellectual sensibilities, it is not a place 
from which a politics, which is a necessarily social practice, can 
be constructed.31 
Image (affect and absence)
In fact, a critical distance from actuality, produced Platonically 
by the metaphysical exteriority of the idea, is also produced 
immanently to the actual by the relationship between affect 
and the absence of the object within the dual structure of the 
image. Classically, an image is a mode of presence of an absent 
thing and hence a designation of that presence as in some sense 
‘unreal’. This mode of presence has an affective force that belies 
the absence of the thing that it images, which nonetheless retains 
its critical distance from the real. Indeed, it can be argued that 
‘the image is (has the structure of) the subject’ itself.32 But what 
has this got to do with Capital? Wherein lies the significance to 
Capital of the concept of image?
The question of the image bears on our topic in two main 
ways. First, at the level of the poetics of Marx’s Capital – the 
extraordinary imagistic power of Marx’s writing, the dense 
31. The chair in the Philosophy Department at the University of Paris–8 currently 
associated with the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Kingston is 
a Professorship in Problematizations of Real History and of Social Thought (in homage 
to the previous incumbent Daniel Bensaïd). It was in the spirit of that formulation that 
we proposed ‘capitalism and capital, the historical social relation’, as the topic for our 
conference and this collection.
32. See Peter Osborne, ‘The Image is the Subject: Once More on the Temporalities of 
Image and Act’, in The Postconceptual Condition: Critical Essays, London and New York: 
Verso, 2018, ch. 14. 
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integrity of his text (Chapter 10, below). Second, with respect 
to the development of capitalist societies and the by-now-
overfamiliar predominance of images of various kinds within 
the social experience of commodification and money, and in 
the self-reflection of capitalist culture upon itself, the culture 
industries (Chapters 3 and 11). It is here, in each of these respects, 
that the history of the reception of Capital has often been at its 
most creative. On the one hand, the standard oppositions of 
the methodological debates about Capital – theory or history? 
economics or politics? Hegelian or Kantian? structuralist or 
phenomenological? – are largely dissolved, or at least more 
complexly refigured, in any close analysis of the singularity of 
the text. Like all the great books of eighteenth-, nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century European philosophy, Capital is a radically 
open (and also unfinished) text; open, internally, to constant 
reflective re-argumentation. On the other hand, this openness 
is exponentially intensified by the diversity of the contexts, 
and corresponding modes of address, into which it has been 
and continues to be received, in what Gayatri Spivak, following 
Derrida, calls Capital’s ‘destinerrance’ (Chapter 8). 
*
The 150th anniversary of Capital was the occasion for the 
conference that gave rise to the essays in this book, but it was 
not their object. This is not a book about the history of the 
reception of Marx’s Capital. Nor is it a series of scholarly exami-
nations and analyses of its text and arguments, in the sense of 
a commentary. Nor is it a series of introductory essays. Rather, 
it offers the reader a snapshot of a variety of aspects of Marx’s 
Capital today: a range of reactions to its current relevance to the 
comprehension of the often very different capitalist societies in 
which we live, from a range of philosophical and political stand-
points on the Marxist and post-Marxist Left. 

VALUE-FORM,  
ONTOLOGY  
& POLITICS

1Form analysis and critique:  
Marx’s social labour theory of value
elena lOuisa lange 
 
Marx’s radical break with the science of political economy 
consists in laying the foundation for a specific new object of 
investigation under the capitalist mode of production: the social 
form of labour. His theory is therefore not merely an ‘extension’ or 
a ‘rearrangement’ of the economic theory of the classics, but the 
invention of a completely new horizon for the critical analysis of 
the capitalist mode of production. Marx’s self-understanding of 
his intervention as the Critique of Political Economy is where his 
radical revolution – indeed, his ‘communist Copernican turn’ – is 
embedded. Therefore, Marx’s project cannot be understood in 
abstraction from his critique of the classics. It is Marx’s reading of 
both political economists, notably Smith and Ricardo, and vulgar 
economists – Say, Bailey, Malthus, James Mill, McCulloch, Destutt 
de Tracy and others – but also socialists like Proudhon, Owen and 
others, that formed the condition of possibility for the theoretical 
development that resulted in his magnum opus, Capital.
Understanding the social form of labour is precisely what 
Marx found wanting in his predecessors:
Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, 
however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed 
within these forms. But it has never once asked the question why the 
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content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour 
is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its 
duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product.1
[C]lassical political economy in fact nowhere distinguishes explicitly 
and with clear awareness between labour as it appears in the value 
of a product, and the same labour as it appears in the product’s 
use-value.2
What Marx critically discerns as the specific lack in the theories 
of the classics is the problem of the fetishism of the bourgeois 
relations of production – a problem not even fathomed to 
exist before Marx’s mature critique. The distinction between 
abstract and concrete labour is the crucial critical distinction 
to clear the path to a thoroughgoing critique of the capitalist 
relations of production and its inverted self-representations. By 
determining the social form of labour under these relations as 
value-producing abstract-general human labour and distinguish-
ing it from concrete labour as manifested in the commodity’s 
use-value, Marx also pierced the problem of form and content 
– the problem of fetishism.
The specificity of abstract labour as the substance of value 
for Marx consists in the fact that it always appears in a specific 
form – namely the value-forms of the commodity, money, capital, 
wage, profit, price, interest and rent, categories that comprise the 
‘science’ of political economy – in which it is always systemati-
cally obfuscated. Yet, it is precisely this phenomenological state 
of things – that the essence or substance itself cannot appear but 
in an inverted, distorting and altogether spurious form – that 
goes unnoticed in the elaborations of classical political economy 
(not to speak of neoclassical theories after the demise of the 
Ricardian School). In other words, before Marx the science of 
political economy was solely concerned with the forms of value 
1. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1: The Process of Production of Capital, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1976, p. 174.
2. Ibid., p. 173.
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as value’s mere appearance, without giving a thought to the 
specific substance – the general social form of labour – that gives 
rise to these categories at all. Indeed, without giving any thought 
to an ‘epistemological cleft’ between the appearance and the 
essence of specific value forms at all, the classics had to remain 
on a level of abstraction that tautologically resorts to explaining 
form by form itself.3
The question of form in Marx, which is the topic of this 
essay, can only be addressed as the method of form analysis. 
Marx’s method of form analysis dissolves the fetishized 
objective dimension of a category like ‘exchange-value’ or ‘the 
commodity’ as only appearing to be simple, ‘given’ and indeed 
presupposition less. The analysis of their form shows that they 
can be fully grasped only as the result of a very specific social 
process, presupposing both the relations of (re)production and 
class. The beginning of Marx’s analysis in Capital is therefore 
already an ideology critique in the strict sense, as a critique 
of the self-representations and legitimations of the sphere of 
simple circulation, which constitutes the only object of bourgeois 
economy and its science.
However, not unlike the classical and vulgar political 
economists Marx attacked, many present-day Marxian theorists 
reinitialize and repeat the tautological convolutions of Marx’s 
predecessors. This essay will therefore argue that, under the 
heading of ‘value-form theory’, Marxian scholars of the last 
decades have initiated an apotheosis of ‘form’ while conferring 
a much lesser status to ‘substance’ or content, an intervention 
that is not only quite contrary to Marx’s critical intention, but 
3. A longer, more detailed version of this essay will appear as the ﬁrst chapter in my 
forthcoming monograph Value Without Fetish: Uno Kōzō’s Theory of Pure Capitalism 
in Light of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy, Historical Materialism series, Leiden: 
Brill, 2019. In it, I discuss the aporia and conceptual conflations in Smith’s and Ricardo’s 
respective value theories in detail. This allows me to show – in contrast to common 
understanding – that they had no labour theory of value to begin with.
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regresses to the ‘fetishisms of the bourgeois relations of produc-
tion’ that Marx was precisely out to deconstruct.
Marx’s critique of his predecessors, most notably Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, gave rise to what I term Marx’s ‘social labour 
theory of value’. The social labour theory of value presents the 
methodological framework for the analysis of Marx’s central 
question: why and how all products of labour assume the form of 
value under the conditions of the capitalist mode of production, 
in which form of value is understood as money, capital, profit, 
price, interest, rent – the objects of political economy. The social 
labour theory of value is therefore the theoretical-methodical 
tool for analysing the process of constitution of the very objects 
of classical political economy
I will thus critically deal with recent criticisms of Marx’s 
method and the offered alternative assumptions, namely (1) the 
methodological preference of (value-) form over the substance of 
value as guiding principle; (2) the hypostasis of simple circulation 
(‘exchange’ or ‘the market’) as the foremost feature of the capital 
relation and the locus of value constitution; and (3) the call for 
the necessity of an ‘unmediated’ or ‘presuppositionless’ begin-
ning of the exposition.
 
Misunderstanding Marx
In his work, self-defined as the ‘new’ or ‘systematic’ dialectic, 
Chris Arthur, for example, insists that in the architecture of 
Capital the ‘pure forms’ of capital should be studied first – and 
especially ‘the value form (as the germ of capital)’ before its 
‘grounding in labour’ is analysed. He claims that ‘the question 
of form is so crucial that the presentation starts with the form 
of exchange, bracketing entirely the question of the mode of 
production [sic], if any, of the objects of exchange. Arthur also 
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thinks that Marx was unjustified in introducing the concept of 
(abstract) labour prematurely:
It is notorious that Marx dives down from the phenomena of 
exchange value to labour as the substance of value in the first three 
pages of Capital and people rightly complain they do not find  any 
proof there. So I argue … that we must first study the development 
of the value form and only address the labour content when the 
dialectic of the forms itself requires us to do so.
Arthur insists that for the analysis of the capital, ‘an absolute 
beginning without imposed conditions is needed’.4 We will see 
how misinformed such a claim is as to the critical character of 
Marx’s own method.
Geert Reuten sings the same tune when he claims the 
value-form of money as a ‘constituent of value’ – and therefore 
begs the question, because we want to know precisely why it is 
that money represents value, why money can indeed buy all the 
other commodities. Surprisingly, Reuten does not seem to find it 
necessary to engage with Marx’s analysis. Instead, he meanders 
in tautological ‘clarifications’ (and ‘proofs’ of the dispensability 
of the concepts of ‘abstract labour’ and ‘substance’ based on 
word counts!) that serve rather to obscure than to illuminate 
the problem. 5 This becomes especially telling when Reuten 
denounces Marx’s concept of the substance of value in abstract 
labour as a mere ‘metaphor’.6 Yet, at no point in the text does he 
state what substance is a metaphor for. At the same time, Reuten 
4. Christopher J. Arthur, ‘Money and Exchange’, Capital and Class 90 (Autumn 2006), 
p. 10; The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, Leiden: Brill, 2004, pp. 86, 12, 158. For a full 
analysis and critique of Arthur’s The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, see Elena Louisa 
Lange, ‘The Critique of Political Economy and the “New Dialectic”: Marx, Hegel, and the 
Problem of Christopher J. Arthur’s “Homology Thesis”’, Crisis and Critique, vol. 3, no. 3 
(2016), pp. 235–72.
5. Geert Reuten, ‘Money as Constituent of Value’, in F. Moseley (ed.), Marx’s Theory of 
Money: Modern Appraisals, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 78–92.
6. Geert Reuten, ‘The Difficult Labor of a Theory of Social Value: Metaphors and 
Systematic Dialectics at the Beginning of Marx’s Capital ’, in F. Moseley (ed.), Marx’s 
Method in Capital: A Reexamination, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1993, pp. 
89–113; here, pp. 89, 106, 110.
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claims that the ‘classics’ held a ‘real embodiment’ of labour 
theory of value, of which a ‘remnant’ existed in Marx: ‘Marx … 
was enmeshed in the physical substance-embodiment metaphor 
inherited from Hegel (substance) and classical political economy 
(embodiment).’7 However, either labour as the substance of value 
is regarded as a mere ‘metaphor’ or it is, indeed, ‘embodied’ in 
the commodity. But it cannot be both. It is all the more strange 
that Reuten concludes that Marx suffered from ‘unclarity’, or 
a ‘lack of clarity’ as to his own abstractions, a judgment more 
appropriate for Reuten’s own argument. Reuten therefore not 
only misrepresents Marx’s theory and is himself, indeed, unclear 
about Marx’s straightforward fetishism-critical method; he goes 
on to explain that ‘value has no existence prior to the market.’8 
This is indeed counterfactual to Marx’s own analysis, as we shall 
soon see.
In the same vein, the Marxist theorists of money and finance 
Costas Lapavitsas and Itoh Makoto of the Uno School see 
no reason to have to refer to abstract labour at all when they 
try to explain how money becomes the universal equivalent 
of exchange.9 Especially Itoh entangles himself in circularity 
7. Ibid., p. 110. The unintentional humour of this assertion consists in its implication 
that Hegel and Smith held more or less the same theory.
8. Ibid., p. 108. Especially unclear is the differentia specifica for what Reuten terms ‘two 
meanings’ of ‘value form’: one deﬁning ‘value’ as a ‘form itself ’ (or ‘genus’), the other 
one restricting the ‘form of value’ to the species (ibid., pp. 100–101). Marx was, to the 
contrary, very aware of the crucial distinction between value and its form(s), especially 
viewed against his critique of Samuel Bailey. ‘The process of exchange gives to the 
commodity which it has converted into money not its value but its speciﬁc value-form. 
Confusion between these two attributes has misled some writers into maintaining that 
the value of gold and silver is imaginary’ (Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 185). In passing, Marx 
here also implies that value is not something that ‘exists’ only in exchange, as Reuten and 
others do.
9. See Costas Lapavitsas, ‘The Emergence of Money in Commodity Exchange, or 
Money as Monopolist of the Ability to Buy’, Review of Political Economy, vol. 17, no. 
4 (October 2005), pp. 549–69; ‘Money’, in David M. Brennan et al. (ed.), Routledge 
Handbook of Marxian Economics, London and New York: Routledge, 2017, pp. 69–80; 
Makoto Itoh, ‘A Study of Marx’s Theory of Value’, Science and Society, vol. 40, no. 3 (Fall 
1976), pp. 307–40. For a critique of Lapavitsas’s theory of ‘Money as a Monopolist of 
the Ability to Buy’, see Elena Louisa Lange, ‘Geldtheorie ohne Fetischcharakter. Zur 
problematischen Rezeption des ersten Kapitalbandes bei Uno Kōzō und der Uno-Schule’ 
[‘Money Theory Without Fetish Character. On the Problematic Reception of the First 
Volume of Capital in Uno Kōzō and the Uno School’], Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie 
und Philosophie, vol. 4, nos 1–2, pp. 177–208. I argue that Lapavitsas presents a nominalist 
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and truisms when he tries to explain the money form without 
recourse to abstract human labour. Long before them, Uno Kōzō 
himself has expressed a strict preference for form over substance 
in explaining the value-forms, thereby directly inviting a petitio 
principii: 
Labour as ‘value forming substance’ abstracted (shashō) from every 
form and was so to speak nothing more than something passive and 
abstract (chūshōteki). As such, we cannot make it the foundation of 
value form. In other words, [labour] is developed by the value form in 
the first place. The value form of the commodity is rather grasped 
through the forms that this substance itself passes through that is 
nothing else but the process of commodity economic development. 
However, the formal determination alone clarifies the fact of the 
assumption of ‘the physical form in the equal objectivity of the 
products of labour as values’ (Capital, Volume 1, p. 164).10
Regarding the analysis of the value form, two crucial inter-
ventions Marx aimed at go completely unnoticed (or even 
rejected) by these authors: the necessity of presupposing the 
totality of the capital relation from the beginning, in which 
the category of the ‘commodity’ with which the analysis starts 
signifies by no means the ‘simplest’ but the most complex deter-
mination, a ‘relation of totality’,11 and the function of value-form 
analysis as deducing the fetishistic semblance of simple circula-
tion from the development of the commodity into money in their 
common ground of abstract labour. By refusing to see the critical 
theory of money with the implication that ‘money is what money does’ – unlike Marx, 
who develops the functions of money from its being the ‘direct incarnation of all human 
labour’ (Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 187), i.e. money does what money is.
10. Uno Kōzō, Kachiron [Value Theory], 1947, in Uno Kōzō Chosakushū [Collected Works 
of Uno Kōzō], vol. 3, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1973, pp. 361–2.
11. ‘Totalitätsverhältnis’. Helmut Brentel, Soziale Form und ökonomisches Objekt. Studien 
zum Gegenstands-und Methodenverständnis der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [Social 
Form and Economic Object: Studies in the Understanding of the Object and Method of the 
Critique of Political Economy], Wiesbaden: Springer, 1989. p. 264. Reuten fails to see both 
the speciﬁc character and function of the commodity: ‘is this, the commodity, the most 
abstract all-embracing concept for the capitalist mode of production? I doubt it. For 
example, does it embrace in itself a notion of the activity of creation of useful objects in 
capitalist form?’ Reuten, ‘The Difficult Labor’, p. 96. That, in fact, it does seems to escape 
Reuten’s comprehension, which is a consequence of his failure to understand Marx’s 
method.
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intent already inherent in Marx’s very first, allegedly ‘innocuous’ 
analysis – that of the commodity – the commentators mentioned 
above become accomplices to an ideological approach, legitimiz-
ing the mere appearance of the capital relations.
The forensic investigation of political economy:  
presupposing totality
The reason for the ideological predicament of some approaches 
in value-form theory hence lies in the ignorance of the fact that 
already at the stage of value-form analysis the totality of capital 
– the ‘whole system of bourgeois production’12 – is presupposed: 
the exchange between 20 yards of linen and one coat does not 
denote a ‘simple exchange’, but the most abstract sphere of bour-
geois self-presentation. Consequently, the real and by no means 
simple requirements which always already have to be fulfilled, so 
that simple circulation can appear as the paradigmatic form of 
capitalist intercourse, and exchange value can appear as a simple, 
presuppositionless economic form, do not immediately present 
themselves ‘from an examination of the simple circulation’, but 
‘lie behind it as economic relations enclosed in the division of 
labour’.13 Like investigators in a criminal case, we must therefore 
reconstruct the sphere of simple circulation from what lies behind 
it. What is ‘forgotten’ in the examination of simple circulation, 
on the one hand, is the ‘objective basis of the whole system of 
production’, that it is not autonomous individuals who meet ‘on 
the market’ to exchange their respective goods, but a relation 
that ‘already in itself implies compulsion over the individual’, 
in which the individual is ‘entirely determined by society; that 
this further presupposes a division of labour etc., in which the 
12. Karl Marx, Economic Works, 1857–1861, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected 
Works, vol. 29, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, p. 466.
13. Ibid., p. 467.
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individual is already posited in relations other than that of mere 
exchanger.’14 The presentation of simple exchange as the point of 
departure of the analysis of capitalist exchange relations itself 
conveys a critical intent in that it prepares the re-examination of 
the formal validity of the law of equivalent exchange in the case 
of capital and wage labour. It is therefore both presupposed and 
‘overlooked’ (‘obliterated’15) in the formal characteristics of simple 
circulation:
What is overlooked, finally, is that already the simple forms of 
exchange value and of money latently contain the opposition 
between labour and capital etc. Thus, what all this wisdom comes 
down to is the attempt to stick fast to the simplest economic 
relations, which, conceived by themselves, are pure abstractions; but 
these relations are, in reality, mediated by the deepest antithesis, 
and represent only one side, in which the full expression of the 
antitheses [between labour and capital] is obscured.16
Elsewhere, I have shown the methodological assumptions that 
Marx’s critique of capital owe to Hegel’s method of constituting 
the object through the inner relation of its parts at the level 
of the ‘Logic of Reflection’ (Reflexionslogik).17 The totality pre-
supposed for developing the categories from the ‘poorest’ (being/
nothingness) to the ‘richest’ (the concept/the idea) is therefore 
constitutive of the object, a totality understood as ‘overgrasping 
subjectivity’ (übergreifende Subjektivität). It must therefore begin 
with mere semblance, with what is untrue.18 This also means 
14. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 248.
15. Marx, Economic Works, 1857–1861, p. 466.
16. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 248. The context in which the quotation appears is the critique 
of Proudhon, who is attacked as a deeply ‘bourgeois’ thinker in believing that exchange 
represents a ‘system of universal freedom’ which has only been ‘perverted by money, 
capital, etc.’.
17. Elena Louisa Lange, ‘The Critique of Political Economy and the “New Dialectic”: 
Marx, Hegel, and the Problem of Christopher J. Arthur’s “Homology Thesis”’, Crisis and 
Critique, vol. 3, no. 3 (2016), pp. 235–72.
18. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic. With the Zusätze. Part I of the Encyclopedia of 
Philosophical Studies with the Zusätze (1830), Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 1991, p. 290. ‘At this 
point, we could at once raise the question why, if that is the case, we should begin with 
what is untrue and why we do not straightaway begin with what is true. The answer is 
that the truth must, precisely as such, validate itself [muss sich bewähren], and here, within 
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that the independence and ‘immediate truth’ of the categories 
will be shown to be a wrong assumption. Being and nothingness 
are absolutely mediated categories that cannot even be meaning-
fully determined when their ‘purity’ is assumed: taken in isola-
tion, they cannot account for their own constitution.19 The same 
goes for the commodity and the semblance of simple circulation: 
we are here only confronted with a distorted version of truth. 
The deeply problematic truth of capital can only be elucidated as 
a complete critique of its constitutive categories, those of political 
economy.
It is therefore all the more strange that Marxist authors claim 
that Hegel started from the premiss of presuppositionlessness.20 
The contrary is true: like Marx’s presentation, Hegel’s develop-
ment of the idea deliberately starts from a completely mediated 
nexus that, in the beginning, must show itself to be wrong 
precisely by taking the categories in isolation, without presup-
position, in the manner of ‘outer reflection’. One must even 
concede that in the bourgeois economists, like the philosophers 
Hegel criticized (we must, of course, think of Kant), because 
their own categories were conceptualized as unrelated, they were 
contradictory. 
We must here return to the question of form. We have 
already sketched the function of form analysis as the specific 
logical thinking itself, validation consists in the Concept’s showing itself to be what 
is mediated through and with itself, so that it shows itself to be at the same time the 
genuinely immediate’ (ibid., p. 134).
19. This has to do with the semantic-pragmatic surplus meaning/cleft necessary 
for the dialectical presentation. For more details, see Lange, ‘The Critique of Political 
Economy and the “New Dialectic”’.
20. The matter is complicated by the fact that there are supporters (Arthur, Reuten) 
and opponents (Murray) of Hegel’s alleged ‘presuppositionlessness’, but the claim itself 
is never doubted. Murray, for example, says: ‘Marx does not leave the circle of Hegelian 
systematic dialectics unbroken; he objects to the “presuppositionlessness” of Hegelian 
systematic dialectics and insists that science has premises, which he and Engels sketched 
in The German Ideology’ (Patrick Murray, ‘Marx’s “Truly Social” Labour Theory of Value: 
Part I, Abstract Labour in Marxian Value Theory’, Historical Materialism, vol. 1, no. 7 
(2000), p. 38). But at the time of The German Ideology Marx has not yet developed a 
theory of value at all! This early work is set within a radically different methodological 
framework and has different objectives than Marx’s later, economy-critical work.
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method that reveals the obliterated genetic construction of the 
conventional categories (or ‘forms’) – that is, money, capital, 
wage, profit, rent, and so on – in their form. Marx’s impetus is 
indeed very Hegelian: his concept of form coincides with Hegel’s 
concept of the concept, namely in that it resolutely rejects a mere 
‘formal’ understanding of form. The concept of ‘overgrasping 
subjectivity’ (mediation) entails a concept of form as form-
content (Formgehalt) which no longer stands in opposition to the 
content or ‘substance’ it designates. The object of investigation 
(the social form of labour that generates the capital relation) 
is given as a processual total structure of economic forms and 
changes of form (Formwechsel) whose ‘inner cord’ presents a uni-
versal common to all the individual forms, as an ‘overgrasping’ 
relation.21 This is no easy task: because the form-determinations 
only exist as moments of the total nexus, Marx – and we as his 
readers – must position ourselves as the forensic investigators of 
political economy who reconstruct the nexus from its mere (and 
sometimes outright inverted) appearance.
The general nexus of the totality of forms is therefore simul-
taneously the content of this process, and in this sense form is 
also content. Any analysis that proclaims a systematic scientific 
approach must therefore account for the mutual ‘overturning’ 
(Umschlagen) of form into content, and content into form.22 Let 
us see how this understanding can be made fruitful for a precise 
view of the critical functions of value-form analysis. 
The functions of value-form analysis
Generally speaking, the foremost function of the analysis of the 
value-form is the critique of fetishism of the bourgeois relations 
21. Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Volume 1, Book 1: Der 
Produktionsprozess des Kapitals, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 2008, p. 27.
22. Cf. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, pp. 225–6.
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of production. In the analysis of the value-form, Marx confronts 
this fetishism on different levels of abstraction: (a) in a logical-
systematic reconstruction of the transition from the sphere of 
simple circulation as the abstract and ideological sphere of 
bourgeois production to the actual basis of that mode of produc-
tion; (b) in a theory of value constitution through the analysis 
of form and content of the universal equivalent that appears 
as money (form) (against premonetary theories of value); (c) in 
the demonstration of the ‘law of value’ in terms of a successive 
detachment from the intentions, wants and personal desires of 
the owners of commodities as a law of ‘autonomization’. We have 
already covered (a) in the previous analysis of the commodity 
as a ‘mediation of totality’ in which the confrontation between 
capital and labour is obscured. Here, for reasons of space, our 
evaluation limits itself to (b).
The deduction of the value-form of money from the sem-
blance of the simple exchange of commodities to its constitutive 
content in human labour in the abstract does not mean that the 
form of value is arbitrary, or even dispensable. To the contrary: 
value has its necessary form of appearance in money. In other 
words, in its ‘palpable’, material, objective and therefore fetish-
ised form, value has no other existence than in money. Yet this 
does not mean that it is money: it must however appear as such.23
In Forms II–IV of value-form analysis, Marx has shown that 
money as the universal equivalent is the specific form in which 
value functions as the synthesis of the mediation of private 
labours in a social context. However, the relation of content 
or substance (human labour in the abstract) and form is not 
23. ‘It is not money that renders the commodities commensurable. Quite the contrary. 
Because all commodities, as values, are objectiﬁed human labour, and therefore in 
themselves commensurable, their values can be communally measured in one and the 
same speciﬁc commodity, and this commodity can be converted into the common 
measure of their values, that is into money. Money as a measure of value is the necessary 
form of appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in commodities, namely 
labour time’ (Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 188; emphasis added).
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exhausted in a simplistic antagonism between essence and 
appearance. Essence must appear (in the Hegelian sense), but in a 
form in which its own fetishistic obliterations can still be identi-
fied as such. The analysis of the form must therefore identify 
the content that grounds the form in the form itself – against 
its semblance – and make it appear. This is the case when the 
legitimization strategies of simple circulation become entangled 
in self-contradictions, and this only happens when money is 
treated as an entity external to the exchange process: a mere 
means of the facilitation of exchange, as means of circulation. 
However, money as the palpable form of abstract labour is the 
conditio sine qua non of general social exchange, so that theories 
that suggest the dispensability of money in order to realize ‘equal 
exchange’ contradict their own premisses.24
But while the specific content is indicative of a specific form, 
the reverse is also true: the form must indicate a specific content. 
Saying that there is no such thing as value without a general 
equivalent implies that only in the equivalent form is the real 
reduction of the different labours to abstract-general human 
labour always-already posited. Value-form analysis therefore also 
entails a theory of the constitution of value. This is already clear 
in the specificity of the simple form of value (x commodity A = y 
commodity B) that consists in its polarity – that is, not indicat-
ing merely a reversible relation, but a mutually exclusive function 
– and that, as such, indicates a specific content of the equivalent 
form. In it, not specific concrete human labour but human 
labour in the abstract is the ground or content that enables all 
the specific and concrete labours to mirror themselves in it, 
to ‘stand in’ for it. Money therefore has the double function to 
represent all the commodities, but none of them specifically. As 
a ‘thing’, it therefore represents human labour in the abstract, all 
24. This is, of course, Marx’s main point against Proudon’s ‘People’s Bank’.
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labours, but none of them specifically. This is indeed the ‘joint 
contribution of the whole world of commodities’.25
In this context, the proposition that Marx’s analysis 
‘prematurely’ introduced a ‘posited ground’ for value in labour 
becomes meaningless. The requirement of the forms of value 
to be ‘studied first’ is equally absurd: the forms of value are not 
self-explanatory. A method that hypothesizes the forms of value 
instead of analysing them towards their obfuscated content 
‘sticks fast to the simplest economic relations’. 
While our previous considerations have somewhat avoided the 
‘million-dollar question’ – namely whether value is constituted 
in production or in exchange – it should be clear by inference 
that value as a social totality can never be constituted in a mere 
Formwechsel of C–M–C or M–C–M. The forms of circulation 
and exchange are never constitutive of economic objectivity. As 
Brentel puts it, ‘Simple circulation is not the autonomous sphere 
of the economic constitution of objectivity – as such, it exists 
only in the ideological semblance of legitimisation of bourgeois 
self-interpretation.’26 They are the mere illusory forms with 
regard to the real basis of value constitution in the real subsump-
tion of labour under capital. We are already witness to this in the 
‘Contradictions in the General Formula’ in chapters 5 and 6 of 
Capital, Volume 1. The Marxian authors I have discussed above, 
whose impetus lies in distancing themselves from ‘traditional’ 
– that is, ‘embodied labour’ – theories of value have overstated 
their case, by resorting to formalistic theories of value that are, 
at best, tautological like the theories of the classics (with which 
they do not even engage) and, at worst, an uncanny invitation 
to marginalist assumptions into Marxian theory. Marx’s Social 
Labour Theory of Value was designed as an antidote to these 
views. The social form of labour whose economic form-character 
25. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 159.
26. Brentel, Soziale Form und ökonomisches Objekt, p. 256.
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has been overlooked by ‘traditionalists’ and their opponents 
alike surpasses the problematic of a mere antagonism between 
form and substance to open the horizon for a fundamental 
critique of the real semblance, the fetishism, of the capitalist 
self-presentation of value. 
2Towards a new critique of  
political economy: from generalized 
surplus-value to total subsumption
Étienne balibar 
In the formula ‘a new critique of political economy’, everything 
is problematic.1 It clearly alludes to Marx, reproducing the title 
or subtitle of the works in which he proposed his revolutionary 
theory of the capitalist mode of production. But other criticisms 
are thinkable, diverging at a certain point or based on antithetic 
assumptions. The term ‘political economy’ is being reintroduced 
today, with the perception that a more specialized formula such 
as ‘economics’, far from securing greater scientificity, in fact 
covers specific political interests. However, it harbours consider-
able enigmas, in particular with respect to the delimitation of 
its object. Does it refer, here, to a discourse, since we know that 
Marx distinguished between ‘classical political economy’, where 
he found some of the foundations of his own theory of capital-
ism, and a ‘vulgar economy’, which in fact prefigured what would 
become mainstream economic theory in the twentieth century? 
Or does it refer to the project of a political economy in general, 
1. This essay forms part of ongoing research. Another part will appear in the volume 
Neoliberal Remains: Market Rules and Political Ruptures, ed. William Callison and Zachary 
Manfredi, New York: Fordham University Press. Both essays arise from a seminar taught 
in 2017 at the University of California, Irvine, with the general title ‘Absolute Capitalism’. 
Although complementary, they remain autonomous and can be read separately. For the 
broader background, see Étienne Balibar, ‘Critique in the 21st Century: Political Economy 
Still, and Religion Again’, Radical Philosophy 200 (November/December 2016), pp. 11–21, 
www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/critique-in-the-21st-century.
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in which case Marxism itself might become at the same time the 
subject and the object of criticism? 
The issue can also be addressed from a different angle. The 
so-called ‘vulgar economy’ has survived the Marxian sentence 
of death very well, not only for reasons having to do with power 
relations in academia, but also because it could appear that 
Marxism was dismissive of central determinations of the actual 
capitalist economy – an impression that gained strength from ob-
servation of the failure of Marxist-socialist economic policies. But 
here, again, we should remember that things are more compli-
cated than a simple partisan choice, because certain ‘heterodox’ 
currents of Marxism did actually take into account questions and 
categories that had been invented by post-classical economists, 
and it can be shown that mainstream economists are in many 
respects replying to Marx, and therefore use him in a dialectical 
manner. Hence the questions that are latent in the use of the 
adjective ‘new’. Does the new critique of political economy refer to 
the critique of a new (or relatively new) ‘political economy’, which 
Marx did not know or that, because of the blindness inherent in 
his own lucidity, he made it difficult for Marxists to take seriously 
as an expression of certain structures and tendencies of capital-
ism? Would such a new or renewed critique consist in a continu-
ation of the Marxian critique, addressing the continuation of 
the discourse of economic theory? Or would it try to invent a 
different critique, albeit bearing an analogy with the Marxist 
critique in its relationship to contemporary economic discourse? 
Or should it represent an altogether new kind of critique, given 
the fact that the modality of the Marxian critique depended on 
philosophical and sociological assumptions that have become 
part of the problem? And, finally, what would be the articulation, 
in this ‘new’ critique, of the critical dimension which addresses 
discourses, and the critical dimension which addresses institu-
tions, social structures, historical tendencies? 
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These dilemmas are abstract, and they are not exhaustive. I 
will keep them in mind while I propose some elements that are 
suggested by current debates and conditions. I submit that the 
weaknesses, aporias or points of stress of Marx’s own critique of 
political economy as a critique of capitalism are always located 
in the immediate vicinity of its strengths, or what we could call 
the ‘truths’ of Marxism.2 They act like a shadow of those truths, 
which in different circumstances makes everything obscure. 
This explains why I shall discuss first the core category of Marx’s 
argument in Capital, which connects the analysis of exploitation 
to the analysis of accumulation, namely the category of surplus-
value. I will propose a notion of generalized surplus-value which 
is liberated from the restrictions imposed by Marx’s dependency 
upon Smith and Ricardo, to reach a problematic of ‘total sub-
sumption’, which I hope makes it possible to better understand 
the domination of financial capital over everyday life in the era 
of ‘neoliberal’ globalization.
Capital as social relation
As we know – this is the ‘common good’ of the various critical 
readings of Marx’s Capital in the twentieth century – the core of 
Marx’s critique resides in introducing the ‘structural’ category 
of social relation instead of the fetishism of commodities and 
persons. ‘Capital’ is not a ‘thing’, not even a thing handled 
and processed by capitalists and other agents, or a ‘symbolic’ 
– therefore intrinsically social – ‘thing’, such as an amount of 
money, a deposit or a bank account that can be appropriated 
and invested in various manners. It is in itself a ‘social relation’, 
therefore a relationship among social agents, individuals and 
2. I am borrowing the category of points of stress in Marx from David Harvey, who 
uses it extensively in the two published volumes of his A Companion to Marx’s ‘Capital’, 
London: Verso, 2010 and 2013. 
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above all classes, in which they perform specific roles, which are 
complementary, but also antagonistic. This immediately shows 
that the category ‘social relation’ cannot become separated from 
the category of process. The social relation is constituted in the 
course of a process, made of several intertwined processes, where 
moments of exchange alternate with moments of consumption 
and production. And the process is supposed to perpetuate, more 
technically to reproduce, the social relation and all its conditions, 
material, financial, institutional. But, as Marx soon reveals, a 
reproduction, especially if it is an ‘expanded reproduction’, must 
be also a transformation. Capital is a process that cannot realize 
itself socially and historically without transforming itself, within 
or beyond certain structural limits.
All this becomes clear only if we specify the kind of relation 
– therefore the kind of ‘society effect’ – we are talking about, 
in order to endow the ‘process’ with its orientation and driving 
force. Let us say that the orientation of the process is accumula-
tion, an objective that is always already set as a prerequisite 
when the process starts again, in the form of money capital 
seeking places and modalities of investment. And the specific 
nature of the relation is characterized by the fact that, however 
multiple they may appear at the level of society at large, social 
interdependencies subjected to the ‘law’ of accumulation ulti-
mately rely on, or are reducible to, an antagonistic relationship 
of exploitation of wage labour within the production processes. 
This is of course not a simple notion, because we need to explain 
how a relationship of antagonism can also be a complementarity, 
without which it could not serve the life, the reproduction of 
the society as such, even at the cost of more or less dynamic 
contradictions. And we also need to explain how we articulate 
the ‘immediate’ forms of a social relationship, in which wage 
labourers confront their antagonists (the direct and indirect 
owners and managers of capital) with global relations at the level 
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of society, which are relations among classes, a general distribu-
tion of property and incomes, and a distribution of power where 
many social functions and differences are involved: no longer 
‘intersubjective’ relations of exploitation and domination, but 
‘objective’ relations of ‘society’ with itself, which are continuously 
evolving. 
Using the Althusserian expression, I take this to be, in 
general terms, the philosophical core of Marx’s epistemological 
break. The ‘break’ is not only a rejection of previous ideological 
representations of capital (which, in Marx’s dialectical theory, 
goes along with explaining why these ideological representations 
are necessary, even functional in certain conditions; in other 
words, they are part of the social relation itself). The ‘break’ is a 
breakthrough, opening problems whose solution is not possible 
by just developing the premisses. The very same formulas that 
express the invention involve obstacles which become apparent 
retrospectively, in the course of the confrontation with actual 
historical transformations of capitalism. This is where a strategy 
of deconstruction becomes necessary, which identifies obstacles 
and difficulties at the very core of the theoretical invention, 
tracing their origin in the way its ‘fundamental concepts’ have 
been defined. Nothing must remain untouched, but nothing 
must be rejected or rectified without understanding at the same 
time what it explained, as well as what consequences (in particu-
lar political consequences) any rectification will have.
Epistemological obstacles in Marx
The main epistemological obstacles in Marx, from our contem-
porary point of view, are located at the intersection of the two 
great ways of defining ‘capital’ in a Marxist sense, which for 
Marx are complementary, in fact two sides of the same model: 
capital is a process of exploitation relying (normally) on the 
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hiring of wage labour, which Marx sometimes calls in Hegelian 
fashion the ‘essential relation’, and capital is a process of unlim-
ited accumulation in monetary form through the maximization 
of profits whose main part must be re-created (if it can, always of 
course a big problem and a potential contradiction).3 These two 
notions are not synonymous, far from it: in a sense they refer 
to different ‘social relations’, or different aspects of the social 
mechanism, but in Marx’s view they are strictly correlative. 
If you have the first, you have the second, and if you have the 
second, you have the first. Why are there problems arising at this 
intersection? They arise in particular, first, from the fact that, 
for Marx, ‘capital’ ultimately is nothing other than capitalized 
labour, therefore ‘labour’ is not just one production factor among 
many others, as mainstream economic theory would explain; 
second, from the way in which Marx relates labour to the money 
form; and third, from the way in which he attributes ‘productiv-
ity’ to labour.4
The key concept on which Marx’s argument about exploita-
tion and accumulation completely relies in Capital is ‘valoriza-
tion’. However, if we return to the German text, we see that 
two words can be translated in this manner, corresponding to 
different ideas.5 Of course they are articulated but the question 
is, how? One is Wertbildung, which means literally ‘formation of 
value’. The underlying idea is that, in every society where goods 
3. In German das wesentliche Verhältnis, the central category in Hegel’s Logic of the 
Essence (section 2, ‘Appearance’, ch. 3). Marx uses it literally (without naming Hegel) 
in Capital, Volume 1, ch. 19, ‘The Transformation of the Value (and Respective Price) 
of Labour-Power into Wages’. I discuss the two deﬁnitions of ‘capital’ as ‘formal’ and 
‘substantial’ relations in Marx’s Capital in the entry ‘Mehrwert’, in Historisch-Kritisches 
Wörterbuch des Marxismus, ed. W.F. Haug, Berlin: InKrit, Das Argument Verlag, vol. 9, 
2018. French translation in Actuel Marx 63 (2018), Paris: PUF: ‘L’exploitation aujourd’hui’.
4. I refer to the ‘Trinity Formula’ (Land, Labour, Capital as ‘sources’ of revenues/
proﬁts), critically discussed by Marx in Capital, Volume 3 (ch. 48), originating in Adam 
Smith and still used by mainstream economists as ‘primary factors of production’ 
entering ‘production functions’. Since Frank H. Knight (who used the phrase ‘Trinity 
Formula’ without reference to Marx in his Ethics of Competition, 1935), the Chicago 
School has introduced ‘human capital’ as a ‘fourth primary factor’. 
5. See my entry ‘Mehrwert’ for a detailed discussion.
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are produced in the commodity form, their exchange value must 
be determined by some common ‘substance’ of which it is the 
expression. Marx knows from the classical economists that this 
substance is labour, but he adds the precision that the labour 
here is an ‘abstract social labour’: not an observable empirical 
magnitude, but the implicit or ‘immanent’ result of the ‘equaliza-
tion’ taking place behind the market, or in its interstices, as a 
result of the exchange itself. There is thus a kind of circle here, 
because abstract labour exists if commodities are exchanged in a 
proportion that more or less directly depends on the amount of 
abstract labour that they embody. The main difficulty, however, 
arises when it comes to articulating ‘valorization’ in this sense of 
Wertbildung with ‘valorization’ in its properly capitalist sense, as 
Verwertung: the ‘valorization of value’, as it were, in other words 
the addition of new value or the emergence from within the 
circulation process itself of additional value.6 Capitalists invest 
money and measure value or calculate prices only because they 
want to maximize that ‘surplus’, to generate surplus-value, and 
in fact it is not the case that value is ‘formed’ on the market 
before values enter a process of their own increase: the reverse is 
true – there is valorization in the first sense (formation of value) 
because there is valorization in the second sense (generation of 
surplus-value). This means, in other words, that the market of 
commodities is already a capitalist market, and, ultimately, the 
‘abstract’ social labour is an exploited social labour, in the form of 
wage labour. It is wage-labour, therefore capitalism, that homog-
enizes and ‘equalizes’ labour… 
Other difficulties are linked to this axiomatic circle. In order 
to explain how the ‘increment’ arises, Marx must explain that 
the value of the means of production is already there, like a 
6. Marx’s quasi-mathematical terminology, Das Inkrement, or the ‘differential’, is 
inspired by early-nineteenth-century expositions of the differential calculus, also 
interpreted ‘dialectically’ in Hegel’s Logic. See D.J. Struik, ‘Marx and Mathematics’, 
Science and Society 12 (1948), pp. 181–96.
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treasure or a stock constituted by ‘past’, ‘materialized’ labour, to 
which ‘living’ labour – that is, labour in the present – will add 
new value in a given proportion. Two conditions are required, 
which form the ‘secret’ of the productivity of labour: that, as 
‘concrete’ labour, it preserves (or, rather, re-creates) the value of 
machinery and raw material used in the process, and that, as 
‘abstract’ labour, it creates new value in a measurable quantity. 
But, in fact, none of this is determined: it makes sense only as an 
anticipation of the value ‘realized’ on the market; that is, when 
the product is sold and converted into money, in a completely 
aleatory manner. Hence a considerable aporia: namely the fact 
that Marx, who more than any other theorist insists on the fact 
that value only exists in monetary form, also has a tendency to 
neutralize the function of money, and return to a ‘real’ represen-
tation of the economic circuit, in which – contrary to capitalist 
logic – it is not money that commands the circulation of com-
modities, but commodities that relate to themselves, and express 
their relations in the fetishistic form of money operations.7 
This leads, ultimately, to the fact that Marx, in the unfinished 
Volume 3 of Capital (ch. 25), called the operations of credit, and 
therefore the whole financial process, a ‘fictitious capital’. This is 
a terribly ambiguous formula, in which one may understand that 
capitalism really operates through the use of ‘fictions’ – that is, 
symbolic instruments with a conventional, institutional founda-
tion – or that the ‘real’ capitalism, with its historical tendencies 
and transformation, must be explained purely in terms of labour 
relations (an ‘organic composition’ of past and present labour), by 
abstracting from the fact that they are subjected to the monetary 
constraint of ‘realization’.8
7. David Harvey and others (Belloﬁore, Heinrich, Milios) have rightly insisted on this. 
See Riccardo Belloﬁore, ‘A Monetary Labor Theory of Value’, Review of Radical Political 
Economics, vol. 21, no. 1/2 (1989), pp. 1–25.
8. The terminology of ‘ﬁction’ is linked with Marx’s double idea that, in the reciprocity 
of the two ‘circuits’ C–M–C and M–C–M, the second only expresses the ﬁrst in ‘inverted 
form’; and that the autonomization of credit is intrinsically ‘speculative’, opening 
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This is a dramatic difficulty when it comes to discussing con-
temporary developments of financialized capitalism, and it runs 
the risk of throwing us into the opposite discourse: thinking 
capitalism as a pure financial process, where credit-money and its 
derivatives unfold their own autonomous productivity, generate 
profits, without any apparent relation to a production process, 
or more generally to a social relation where the value becomes 
‘metamorphosed’ successively in its different forms – the money 
form, the commodity form – a metamorphosis without which 
there would be no valorization in either sense. For the valoriza-
tion of value to take place, value must change form. It must 
even, as Marx also says, permanently shift from one ‘scene’ onto 
another, from the scene of monetary exchanges onto the scene of 
productive consumption.9
A symmetric difficulty concerns labour. Starting from the idea 
of the ‘double character of labour’ (which explains the double 
aspect of valorization), there remain two ways of identifying 
‘labour’ in Marx’s argument. The tension is made apparent by 
the very polysemic use of the category ‘productivity’ (Produktiv-
kraft). On the one hand, ‘productive labour’ refers to any activity 
transformed into a field of investment for capital: in my previous 
terminology, any metamorphosis of monetary value into its 
polar opposite, a material or immaterial elaboration of the use 
value of commodities, will produce surplus-value. It generates 
an increment that can become capitalized or accumulated, or it 
is ‘productive’ in the capitalist sense of the term. On the other 
hand, ‘productive labour’ refers to the specific actions that are 
performed in the sphere of production in the material sense, 
which essentially include industry and agriculture. To which (as 
the possibility of crises – ideas which are widely shared by non-Marxist economists, 
especially Keynes. 
9. This was essentially the position of Suzanne de Brunhoff in her seminal 1973 work 
Marx on Money, London: Verso, 2015, expanded in the later book Les rapports d’argent, 
Grenoble: PUG, 1979, which I am closely following here.
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Marx himself suggested in Capital, Volume 2, when discussing the 
interpenetration of cycles of production and circulation in the 
‘rotation’ of capital) you can of course add transportation, com-
munication, and so on. But that does not change the fact that 
‘productive labour’ is taken here in a narrow sense which limits 
the first, ‘formally’ linked to the variety of fields of investment 
of money capital. The reasons for this restriction are clearly 
political: they make it possible to identify the ‘working class’ or 
the ‘proletariat’ as a social product of the Industrial Revolution, 
which at the same time ‘creates’ the material wealth of modern 
societies, and potentially challenges the domination of capital, 
and therefore the continuity of capitalist accumulation.10 But, I 
insist, this is a narrow definition of the ‘sources’ of valorization: 
it does not include every salaried activity, and above all it does 
not include every exploited labour, especially that exploited 
labour which, by definition, is not paid by wages or compen-
sated in monetary terms, namely domestic labour, essentially 
performed by women, by way of the historical combination of 
capitalism in all our societies with patriarchy.11 And finally it 
does not include other broad ranges of activity which are not 
exactly ‘labour’ in any direct sense, but nevertheless acquire an 
important function of valorization, and are ‘productive’ therefore 
from a capitalist point of view.
Rather than deducing anything from a purely conceptual ar-
gument, I will proceed here in an experimental manner, discuss-
ing examples. I will examine two such processes which, certainly, 
may rely on the exploitation of labour, but, more centrally, 
10. The controversy on the question of ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour begins 
with the Physiocrats (who identify productive labour solely with agriculture), continues 
with Smith (who imposes a generalization to every activity that ‘adds to the value of the 
subject upon which it is bestowed’), and leads to Marx’s new deﬁnition of the ‘productive 
class’ (any worker who produces commodities under capitalist relations). Although Marx 
is aware that the three categories ‘productive class’, ‘proletariat’ and ‘wage labourers’ are 
analytically distinct, he nonetheless tends to identify them historically and sociologically.
11. See the feminist critiques by Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Silvia Federici, Nancy Fraser, 
Harriet Fraad, Frigga Haug and others. See also my article ‘Exploitation’ in Political 
Concepts: A Critical Lexicon, www.politicalconcepts.org/balibar-exploitation. 
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‘valorize’ other dimensions of human life and consumption, 
where surplus-value is also generated, albeit in a ‘generalized 
sense’. In dealing with these examples, we must keep in mind the 
idea that no money, therefore no capital, is valorized if it is not 
metamorphosed into its polar opposite, a commodity that can be 
consumed ‘productively’ in the capitalist sense. But we must also 
keep in mind that labour is not the only form of such a ‘produc-
tive consumption’ (in the terminology of the 1857 Introduction to 
the Critique of Political Economy). Therefore we must challenge 
something essential in Marx’s understanding of exploitation, and 
face all the political consequences of that rectification. However, 
the result I propose will not necessarily amount to an erasure of 
the antagonistic dimension of capitalism.
Surplus-health and the accumulation of bio-capital
My first example is ‘surplus health’. I believe that the term was 
coined by Joe Dumit in a series of studies, concluding with his 
book Drugs for Life.12 This concept is modelled on ‘surplus-value’ 
and ‘surplus-labour’, reversing the perspective from production 
to a certain consumption – a consumption that is vital since it is 
the individual’s capacity to survive, to live an ‘acceptable’ life in a 
given environment, that is at stake. This leads to introducing, in 
symmetry with Marxian labour-power, something like a capacity 
to ‘suffer’ and to take the drugs and the medical services that 
restore or simply produce ‘health’.13 What Dumit pursues is a 
12. Joseph Dumit: Drugs for Life: How Pharmaceutical Companies Define Our 
Health, Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, 2012. There are interesting 
convergences with the work of Melinda Cooper, which I cannot discuss here. See her 
Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism, New York: Zone 
Books, 2017.
13. There are in fact two terms in Marx which designate different aspects and 
functions of this notion: a physical and mental labour force (Arbeitskraft) and a socially 
recognized capacity to work or to be employed professionally (Arbeitsvermögen). See 
Pierre Macherey, Le Sujet des normes, Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2014. Interestingly, the 
‘workerist’ (operaista) tradition in Italy uses forza-lavoro in a manner that collapses the 
idea of a workforce and the idea of a political subject (class). 
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triple phenomenological, statistical and economic inquiry, about 
the changing definition of health and illness, the continuous 
increase in consumption of drugs per capita, and finally the cor-
relative growth of health costs and profits of the pharmaceuticals 
industry. 
On the one hand, you have a progressive transformation in 
the definition of ‘illness’, shifting from a pathology that is expe-
rienced by subjects as pain or handicap or disorder or disease, 
diagnosed by a doctor in a ‘clinical’ relationship to a patient, to 
an invisible objective condition that is measured or indicated by 
‘biomarkers’, such as cholesterol level, whose quantitative defini-
tions are periodically revised, more or less automatically calling 
for the prescription of permanent drugs (such as statins). This 
could be described as a form of exploitation of illness as a lived 
experience, which of course subjects may demand themselves, or 
cannot refuse and transform into a demand. On the other hand, 
you have the transition from a situation where illness is a dis-
continuous state (with huge differences in gravity, duration and 
emergency, of course) into a continuous state, where the majority 
of ‘illnesses’ are chronic conditions, and the fact that the im-
manent tendency, measured by statistics, is towards a situation 
where, with advancing age, individuals consume a maximum 
number of different drugs as frequently as possible for as long as 
possible.14 Hence the ironic play on words in the title Drugs for 
Life: drugs to live, or to survive, and drugs for life, permanently. 
Life then becomes, for better or worse, what we can call a ‘pros-
thetic life’, which is of course a dependent life.15 This is the third 
aspect: supply precedes demand, and in fact creates it, according 
to a forceful extension of the ‘liberal’ law of markets (Say’s Law). 
14. The parallel with Marx’s ‘relative surplus-value’, combining a rise in productivity 
with intensiﬁcation, is striking here.
15. Needless to say, every human life was always dependent on relations to others, 
on conditions, on techniques: it was always ‘vulnerable’. But this is a new type of 
dependency that is at the same time more passive and controlled by forces that belong 
to the economic-technological complex of the pharmaceuticals industry.
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Health costs are continuously growing, at least in ‘developed’ 
countries, for part of the population (but an important part of 
the population). They are distributed among public expenses and 
private expenses (often covered by insurance, therefore involving 
a form of credit), and this growth is geared to the growth of 
profit of the pharmaceuticals industry, which influences labora-
tories through the determination of ‘conditions at risk’, choosing 
which drugs to develop in a preferential manner, following a 
calculus of investments and returns. 
The profits here do not come essentially, or not only, from 
production – that is, from valorization in the Marxian sense – 
although these costs have to be minimized; they come from a 
different kind of valorization, which directly articulates innova-
tion with increased consumption. This is exactly ‘surplus-health’, 
which we may also call a generalized form of surplus-value. 
Kaushik Sunder Rajan adds another dimension, which illustrates 
a new kind of population law at the level of the global economy, 
and therefore a very important element in understanding the 
articulation of globalization and financialization.16 The drugs are 
mainly consumed in the USA and other developed countries, and 
they are conceived for this market; but they are tested – that is, 
subjected to experimental trial – in India and other ‘Southern’ 
countries. This is not only because it is in India, where an 
important population of unemployed poor make a living in this 
manner, that pharmaceuticals industries can find ‘volunteers’ (i.e. 
contractual patients, who give ‘informed consent’); it is above 
all for scientific socio-biological reasons, because it is only in a 
region where an important population has not yet entered the 
process of chronic consumption of drugs that you find so-called 
‘innocent subjects’ for trials, subjects whose organism is not 
already transformed, and whose physiological reactions to the 
16. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, Pharmocracy: Value, Politics and Knowledge in Global 
Biomedicine, Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, 2017.
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drugs thus provide an experimental model for the understanding 
and adjustment of their effects. With this crucial new set of 
analyses, we understand that generalized surplus-value is a social 
relation with, at the same time, a local market function and a 
global system of conditions.
Human capital or ‘labour theory of value’ reversed
‘Human capital’, which is my second example, works differently. 
As we know, this category acquired its strategic function in 
neoliberal economic theory as an extension of neoclassical 
reasoning to certain domains which were supposed to be located, 
by ‘nature’, outside the realm of economic calculus: educa-
tion, marriage, law and punishment, philanthropy, and so on. 
Education is especially relevant for our subject. In the work of 
Gary Becker and others, models are devised which qualitatively 
correlate an analysis of the component parts of any individual’s 
capacity to be employed at a maximally profitable rate (for him- 
or herself and/or for an employer who hires him/her), an equa-
tion of the costs for the ‘production’ of such capacities through 
expenses which can be either public or private (i.e. ‘personal’ or, 
most of the time, coming from the family), and which, ideally, 
must be minimized in comparison to a maximized return.17 
Hence the attempt at evaluating the ‘economic’ correlation 
between investments and returns, which justifies the idea that 
an economic strategy of ‘rational anticipations’ can be applied, 
where you define ‘production functions’ for individual capacities, 
define the optimal strategy that links time spent in formation 
(how many years to study and where to study), costs, personal 
17. My main reference is Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (1964), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993. A useful short presentation is given in Gary S. Becker, Human Capital and the 
Personal Distribution of Income: An Analytical Approach, Ann Arbor MI: Institute of Public 
Administration, 1967.
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or collective, and benefits in terms of personal earnings over a 
lifetime. I am not discussing here whether such models are really 
‘effective’ or ‘predictive’. But I want to insist on three aspects 
which I believe should be articulated.
First, it is important to know that the category ‘human 
capital’ was not invented in an individualistic perspective. It 
emerged, in fact, in the 1950s, within discussions and plans 
for the development of newly independent colonies, or ‘under-
developed’ countries in Asia and Latin America, where it was 
a question of securing national independence at the economic 
level, through the indigenous development of educational, scien-
tific and medical resources to improve the ‘productivity’ and the 
‘competitiveness’ of the population on the world market.18 The 
principle was linked to competition not among individuals, but 
among nations, and it was linked to a certain ‘socialist’ articula-
tion of decolonization and development. What neoliberalism 
has achieved here is an appropriation and a transformation of a 
notion with a social content into a notion with a different social 
content, linked to the decline of the idea of planning and its 
replacement by the generalization of models of competition.
Second, one of the main objectives of Becker’s theory is to 
provide instruments for a quantitative evaluation of the respec-
tive merits, in terms of costs and returns for individuals, of 
alternative strategies of education, which he calls respectively 
elitist (more investments for those who predictably will be more 
successful) and egalitarian (massive investments for institutions 
which are accessible to all, offering services that, according to 
their capacities and their ambition or obstinacy, individuals will 
more or less ‘valorize’).19 This is clearly a political confrontation, 
and not surprisingly the result is that elitist systems are more 
18. See D. Cogneau et al., ‘Développement des pays du Sud’, Encyclopædia Universalis, 
www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/developpement-economique-et-social-developpement-des- 
pays-du-sud.
19. Becker, Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income.
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efficient globally than egalitarian systems. Add to this that, 
again as a formal consequence of the model, the privatization 
of educational services, their transference from public institu-
tions to private corporations (or to public institutions which 
apply the same managing strategies as private corporations), is 
deemed more efficient, provided you keep an ‘optimal’ proportion 
between the common education and the professional one. This 
seems to have a clear class intention, especially if you think that 
personal investments in the education of children require already 
existing capital. But it is immediately compounded by the fact 
that theorists of human capital introduce credit as an essential 
investment to broaden the range of possibilities for individuals 
without a patrimony, which is presented as a democratic correc-
tive. Democracy then goes along with mass indebtedness, which 
is not just an ideological masquerade but an effective instrument 
to include a growing number of people in the process of valoriza-
tion through training. 
Finally, such a theory, and the accompanying tendency in our 
capitalist societies, has a perverse but highly intelligible relation-
ship to the Marxian discourse about the exploitation of labour-
power and the accumulation of capital. Whereas Marx explained 
that ‘capital’ ultimately could be reduced to (productive) labour 
or was nothing other than labour in a different form, appropriat-
ed by a different class, the theory of human capital explains that 
labour – more precisely ‘labouring capacity’ (Arbeits vermögen) 
– can be reduced to capital or become analysed in terms of 
capitalist operations of credit, investment and profitability. This 
is, of course, what underlies the ideology of the individual as a 
‘self-entrepreneur’, or an ‘entrepreneur of oneself ’. This ideology 
is very effective, for the same reasons that made Marx’s theory 
of the reduction of social labour to various multiples of the same 
‘abstract labour’ very effective: namely the fact that, if capitalism 
requires in permanence masses of undifferentiated forces, which 
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are displaced more or less brutally from one place of exploitation 
to another, it also certainly relies on a permanent differentia-
tion and hierarchization of human capacities that is no longer 
provided by traditional disciplines or professions, but becomes 
organized and standardized in capitalist form. 
Capitalist reproduction, or ‘total subsumption’
This was in fact a point of transition, in the direction of defining 
what I tentatively call ‘absolute capitalism’: a steady process 
of commodification, or creation of new ‘fictitious commodi-
ties’, without which the process of accumulation cannot be 
maintained, leads to an incorporation of reproduction processes 
(biological, intellectual or symbolic) into the valorization process 
which ‘metamorphoses’ human activities into monetary magni-
tudes, accompanied by the increasing function of credit and debt 
in correlating individual and collective dimensions of the social 
relation, and therefore the definition of capital itself. 20
However simplified, the examples I have discussed articulate 
the question of valorization, both as formation of value and as 
addition of new value to an existing capital, with processes of 
accumulation, commodification, financialization that are not 
purely based on the exploitation of labour, or ‘productive con-
sumption’ in Marx’s terms, but on other uses of living capacities 
as well. This is not to say that they involve no exploitation or 
dispossession (as David Harvey rightly insists), hence no latent 
or open antagonism.21 Much the contrary. The tendency towards 
unlimited accumulation remains the driving force of capitalism 
more than ever: this is why the realization of value has to be 
20. Other uses of the phrase ‘absolute capitalism’ are currently made by Ingmar 
Granstedt, Franco Berardi, Bertrand Ogilvie and Jacques Rancière. I will discuss these 
different deﬁnitions in another place.
21. David Harvey, ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession’, Socialist 
Register 40 (2004), pp. 63–87.
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planned in advance in every investment. And, since private 
capitals are as ‘liquid’ as possible, shifting from one sector to 
another in order to maximize profits or, rather, in today’s finan-
cial capitalism, to maximize the shareholder’s value of assets, 
this means that so-called ‘rational anticipations’ are included in 
the decision of banks and hedge funds to support this or that 
investment. Without claiming expertise in this matter, I will 
venture an additional hypothesis: the issue is perhaps not so 
much to describe a growth of markets for existing products; it is 
much more to push the range of the market beyond the limits of 
the ‘production sphere’ in the traditional sense, therefore to add 
new sources of permanent ‘extra surplus-value’ that can become 
integrated into valorization, overcoming its limitations, because 
capital is valorized both on the ‘objective’ side of labour and 
production, and on the ‘subjective’ side of consumption and use. 
This is why I insist on the importance of the steady ongoing 
commodification process. Ultimately ‘commodification’ is a 
commodification of life, through its objects and its actions or 
passions. This is a process that began well before capitalism, and 
in any case before the Industrial Revolution; but it continues 
within capitalism, crossing successive thresholds. Karl Polanyi’s 
category of ‘fictitious commodities’ is very precious here, pro-
vided we do not believe that there is something like a naturally 
given list of ‘fictitious commodities’.22 On the contrary, such 
new commodities are continuously invented: health, education, 
knowledge, entertainment and art, care and sentiments, and so 
on, which not only produce ‘means’ for the productive sector 
itself, or for the ‘subsistence’ of human subjects (the two sectors 
22. Polanyi’s concept is explained in The Great Transformation: Political and Economic 
Origins of Our Time, Boston MA: Beacon Press, 2002. The ‘ﬁctitious commodities’ there 
are land, labour and money (note the symmetry with the Trinity formula). Because they 
are supposed to resist complete commodiﬁcation, they support the introduction – 
instead of a pure market economy – of (democratic) socialism, which, writing at the end 
of World War II in the context of the (Beveridgian) welfare state or social state, Polanyi 
deemed inevitable.
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of Marx’s ‘schemes of reproduction’), but ‘produce’ the subjects 
themselves. However, we must also keep in mind the question 
that is involved in Polanyi’s designation, namely whether there 
are obstacles that prevent commodification from becoming limit-
less: contradictory effects which, from inside or from outside, 
make it impossible for valorization through renewed commod-
ification to proceed smoothly. 
It is the combination of these objective and subjective 
dimensions that leads me to offer a quasi-Marxian category of 
‘total subsumption’. I have in mind theories of ‘total alienation’ 
that could be traced back to various authors, from Hobbes to 
Rousseau to Marcuse. Above all I want to continue a reflection 
that was inaugurated by Marx, albeit left by him in the obscurity 
of some unpublished texts. ‘Subsumption’ is an old juridical 
and philosophical category which means that something or 
someone is ‘subjected’ to a norm or a ‘law’ or a ‘rule’ because it 
is incorporated into a form or becomes informed materially by 
that norm, or a law or rule.23 The question is of course: what 
is subsumed under what? I said ‘something or ‘someone’, but 
the most interesting case, probably, arises when we introduce 
the third great ontological category, which is neither thing nor 
person or can encompass both: namely ‘actions’ or ‘agency’.24 This 
is how Marx uses it in Capital when he describes the transition 
from ‘formal subsumption’ to what he calls a ‘real subsumption’: 
the actions of a worker – that is, his/her productive operations, 
making use of instruments to shape a given matter into a usable 
23. Marx’s views on ‘formal’ and ‘real’ subsumption are essentially to be found in the 
unpublished chapter 6 of Capital, ‘Results of the Immediate Production Process’ 
(translated as an appendix to Capital, Volume 1, by Ben Fowkes, London: Penguin 2004). 
In his recent PhD thesis at Kingston University, Andres Saenz de Sicilia has provided a 
thorough analysis of the transformations in the concept from Kant to Hegel and to Marx: 
www.academia.edu/28392192/PhD_The_Problem_of_Subsumption_in_Kant_Hegel_ 
and_Marx_2016.
24. Roman Law (following the ontology of the Stoics) uses not a dualistic but a triadic 
typology of beings: things, persons, actions. The third category is eliminated from the 
‘great dichotomy’ (Bobbio) of modern (bourgeois) legal theory, which leads to inventing 
hybrid formulas in such domains as family and labour legislation.
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object – are being transformed by capitalist manufacture and 
the Industrial Revolution into ‘partial operations’ of a collective 
process whose content and rhythm are dictated by the machinery 
itself, so that the worker can actually produce or ‘do’ something 
only in the conditions of the factory, under the ‘law’ of capitalist 
valorization. Not only must the worker accept the domination 
of the capitalist market, ‘take’ the job that is offered to him/
her (or not…) by the capitalist, but there is no way he or she 
could operate manually or intellectually outside that technical 
and social form. In such a process, continuously repeated, the 
worker’s labour not only becomes ‘abstract labour’; it becomes 
dissociated into ‘partial activities’ of a process without a subject. 
When the formal subsumption, juridically expressed in the wage-
form, has been fully ‘realized’, or transformed into ‘real subsump-
tion’, exploitation is not just a domination; it is incorporated 
into the dispositions of human bodies and minds, or radically 
individualized. But this ‘individuation’ is also a complete loss of 
individuality, this time in the sense of ‘individualization’, or per-
sonal identity and autonomy. This explains why Marx expected a 
liberation only from another industrial revolution, which would 
substitute collective capacities, or collectively distributed capaci-
ties, for the current forms of individual activity.25
In the meantime, however, something else has happened, 
which I call ‘total subsumption’. There are indications of that 
sense in Marx, when he explains that capitalism always wants to 
have it both ways: exploiting labour not only in the production 
process, but also in the reproduction process, where workers and 
their families, social individuals considered ‘proprietors of their 
own person’, consume commodities only in order to ‘reproduce’ 
or ‘re-create’ their labour force. As I noted earlier, Marx is largely 
25. In a rare utopian development of Capital, Volume 1, ch. 15 (‘Machinery and Modern 
Industry’), Marx proposes a Faustian notion of the ‘total individual’ (or ‘fully developed 
individual’) as the common horizon of technological transformations (intellectualization 
of labour) and a socialist programme of education (section 9). 
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blind to the fact that in such a reproduction process, which 
concretely articulates the household with the conditions of the 
market, an additional form of unpaid domestic labour takes 
place; but he is not blind to the fact that market constraints or 
market logic will increasingly command the quality and quantity 
of the worker’s consumption, in order to make it also profitable 
for capital.26 Take the example of housing, or urban development, 
to which Engels had drawn attention very early (The Condition 
of the Working Class in England, 1845), or the mass distribution 
of goods. However, this is only a kind of ‘formal’ subsumption 
in the sphere of consumption. Things change radically with 
the new stages of commodification that I described in terms of 
surplus health or human capital: capitalist investment in the 
caring and education processes themselves. 
This means two things, apparently: (1) that the anthropologi-
cal barrier between work and life, production and reproduction, 
is erased, since reproduction is itself becoming a ‘productive’ 
realm in the capitalist sense; (2) that there is no dimension of 
individuality (nor, let’s make it clear, intersubjectivity, vulner-
ability or dependency among individuals) that will remain 
untouched by commodification.27 No form of life as agency, 
activity and passivity, even suffering, even dying, can be lived 
outside a commodity form and a value-form that is in fact a 
moment in the valorization process of capital. This is not a 
reduction of the individual’s life to ‘bare life’, as Agamben calls it. 
In a sense it is just the opposite: the denaturalization of life, or 
the production of a ‘second nature’ – albeit not in any form (since 
26. What interests Marx primarily is the contradiction arising from the fact that capital 
needs to expand the market of consumption goods, while continuously lowering the 
‘value’ (cost of reproduction) of the labour force. 
27. Just as the capitalist commodiﬁcation of production (wage-labour) seized on 
activity, capitalist commodiﬁcation of reproduction seizes on relationality, the ontological 
‘vulnerability’ of humans with regard to others. This may explain why this notion now 
comes to the fore of critical theory, in order to highlight the existence of alternative 
possibilities in this ﬁeld, which also correspond to antithetic modes of existence. 
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every human culture is a ‘second nature’), but in purely capitalist 
form.28 This is what I call a total subsumption (after ‘formal’ and 
‘real’ subsumption) because it leaves nothing outside (no reserva-
tion for ‘natural’ life). Or, anything that is left outside must 
appear as a residue, and a field for further incorporation. Or 
must it? That is of course the whole question, ethical as much as 
political: are there limits to commodification? Are there internal 
and external obstacles? A Lacanian might want to say: every such 
totalization includes an element of impossibility which belongs 
to the ‘real’; it must be pas tout, or not whole. If that were the 
case, the heterogeneous elements, the intrinsic remainders of 
the total subsumption, could appear in many different forms, 
some apparently individualistic, such as pathologies or anarchist 
resistances, others common or even public. Or they may become 
manifest in certain difficulties in implementing the neoliberal 
agenda, such as the difficulty of dismantling a Medicare system 
once it has been legalized.
28. I am referring here to Giorgio Agamben’s series Homo Sacer (beginning with 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), and 
Bertrand Ogilvie, La Seconde nature du politique. Essai d’anthropologie négative, Paris: 
Éditions L’Harmattan, 2012.
3From the commodity to  
the spectacle: Debord’s Marx
eric-JOhn russell 
 
Published a century after Marx’s Capital, Guy Debord’s The 
Society of the Spectacle was described upon its release as ‘the 
Capital of the new generation’ (Le Nouvel Observateur).1 However, 
the book’s content has almost never been seriously examined 
alongside the dialectical logic of the social forms of value 
systematically ordered within Marx’s Capital. Despite Debord’s 
description of the modern spectacle as a development of the 
commodity-capitalist economy, discussions on Debord’s debt to 
Marx customarily emphasize those early writings in which Marx 
enunciates the critique of alienation without having yet traversed 
the works of classical political economy.2
And for good reason, as his archival notes can verify. A 
preliminary glance at The Society of the Spectacle elicits the 
impression that the ‘ruthless criticism of all that exists’ first 
enunciated by Marx in his early twenties continued to reverber-
ate a century later.3 The book resounds with both implicit and 
1. The Society of the Spectacle was published in November 1967, a hundred years after 
the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1, published in mid-September 1867.
2. Debord refers to classical political economy as ‘the science of domination’ (§41). 
Within the present work all selections from The Society of the Spectacle are taken from 
the English translation by Fredy Perlman and Jon Supak, ﬁrst published in Detroit by 
Black & Red, 1970. Quotations will be followed by thesis number to indicate location.
3. Debord began writing The Society of the Spectacle in the autumn of 1963 (Guy Debord 
Correspondance, Volume 2: Septembre 1960–Décembre 1964, Paris: Librairie Arthème 
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explicit reference to the phenomenon of social alienation or 
estrangement described by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts. And 
yet, we find, early on the following register of social alienation 
through which Debord situates the advent of the spectacle: 
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life 
brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious 
degradation of being into having. The present phase of total 
occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the economy 
leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which 
all actual ‘having’ must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate 
function. (§17)
Here, the primacy of appearance over property draws attention 
not simply to the way in which Debord’s theory of the spectacle 
acquires theoretical determinations from Marx’s early writings 
on social alienation, but, more specifically, how these develop-
ments of the commodity economy come to occupy a certain 
centrality to a dialectical structure of appearances in the critique 
of political economy. We find a clue in a 1990 letter to Giorgio 
Agamben where Debord writes:
I was happy to have attempted – in 1967 and completely contrary 
to Althusser’s sombre denial – a kind of ‘salvage by transfer’ of the 
Marxist method by adding to it a large dose of Hegel, at the same 
time as it reprised a critique of political economy that wanted to 
bear in mind the Marxist method’s ascertainable developments 
in our poor country, as they were foreseeable from what preceded 
them.4
Fayard, 2001. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-14 November1963.
html.) An infamously artful drinker, Debord vowed, two years later, not to pick up a glass 
until the book was complete. As to whether or not he stuck with such a pledge, one can 
never know. As he writes in a 1965 letter to Raoul Vanegeim: ‘For a month, although I 
ﬁnd myself quite happily occupied, I have subordinated many of the charms of everyday 
life and errancy to the completion of the critique of the spectacle. I have absolutely 
stopped drinking, until the last line is written. A digniﬁed example from Antiquity! 
[Digniﬁed] to the Thermopylae, and to the Spartans… In the best case, I still have six 
weeks or two months more. Which weighs upon me. But the trap I’ve caught myself 
in is clever’ (Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2003. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
1August1966.html).
4. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 7: Janvier 1988–Novembre 1994, Paris: 
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For Debord, the society of the spectacle consists in a peculiar 
form of domination developed through the autonomy of the 
commodity economy within the capitalist mode of production in 
which human activity becomes structured by objective forms of 
appearance mediating social relations and yet is constituted by 
determinate modes of real, concrete practice. With the increas-
ing fragmentation of human experience through the division of 
labour and the structuring of social relations through the form 
of the commodity, the spectacle is for Debord the reconstitution 
of a unitary social life from its separated and disjointed moments 
at the level of appearances. In a word, the spectacle is a critical 
category of social organization specifying the multivalent aspects 
of the unity of capitalist society in relation to an underlying 
determinate structure of appearance, the conception of which 
derives from Hegelian thought.5
However, it remains the case that the extent to which Debord 
is justified in his claim that the spectacle constitutes a qualita-
tive development of capitalism has yet to be evaluated in accord-
ance with the categorial determinations of the capitalist mode 
of production. Is it true, as has sometimes been claimed, that 
Debord’s spectacle is simply a replacement for Marx’s commodity 
albeit under conditions of postwar prosperity? Is the difference 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2008. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
6August1990.html.
5. While Debord invoked the category of spectacle as early as 1955, it is only in the 
1960s and ﬁnally within The Society of the Spectacle that it emerges as a critical concept 
for a structured totality. Beginning with ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie 
urbaine’ in 1955, which appeared in number 6 of the Belgian surrealist journal Les Lèvres 
Nues, the category is utilized by Debord generically and in a nonpartisan manner to 
refer to publicity theatrics and the impressions and ambiances garnered from urban 
excursions. As might be expected, the term ‘spectator’ is also employed in a more 
commonplace capacity to refer to the subjectivity of passive reception. However, 
within the 1957 article ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions 
de l’organisation et de l’action de la tendance situationniste international’, the category 
gets the speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘non-intervention’ (Internationale Situationniste, 1997, p. 
699) in relation to which ‘[t]he construction of situations begins beyond the ruins of the 
modern spectacle’ (ibid.). It thereby begins to acquire a more technical meaning as a 
mode ‘psychological identiﬁcation’ (ibid.). It is within this early article – which was one of 
the preparatory texts for the July 1957 conference at Cosio d’Arroscia, Italy, at which the 
Situationist International was founded – that the spectacle emerges as ‘the spectacle of 
the capitalist way of life’ (ibid., p. 701).
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between Marx’s critique of political economy and Debord’s 
analysis of spectacle simply one of emphasis? Further, how does 
the spectacle relate to the other prominent forms of appear-
ance of value, such as money and, perhaps more importantly, 
capital?6 Finally, in what sense ought, as Debord writes in a 1966 
letter, ‘[t]he revolutionary theory of Marx … to be corrected and 
completed’?7
This essay attempts to answer these questions by highlight-
ing the central role of appearance-forms in Marx’s critique of 
political economy. Here, it will become clear that value – the 
social form of wealth within capitalist society – is ontologically 
structured as a totality through a set of appearance-form-
determinations (Erscheinung Formbestimmungen). As we know 
from Hegel, a totality cannot be given directly or immediately, 
and so what becomes primary is the form of value or, again, what 
Marx refers to in a number of places as Formbestimmung, form- 
determination.8 Here, value as formal determination or as the 
self-movement of form – not itself something directly perceptible 
and yet obtaining concrete appearances – derives from the 
self-reproducing logic of the totality of social relations necessary 
for the production and reproduction of capital.
The systematic exposition of Capital proceeds through a struc-
tured succession of categories that unfold immediate appearances 
to reveal their internal dynamics and, most crucially, the necessity 
through which essential social relations obtain the appearance-
forms they do. It is a mode of presentation (Darstellung) that 
examines social reality as a totality of inner connections and 
6. Gilles Dauvé, aka Jean Barrot, ‘Critique of the Situationist International’ (1979); 
translated by Louis Michaelson in Stewart Home, ed., What is Situationism? A Reader, 
Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996; and ‘Back to the Situationist International’ (1979), Aufheben 
no. 9 (2000). See also: Perspectives, At Dusk: The Situationist Movement in Historical 
Perspective, Berkeley CA: Perspectives, 1975.
7. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968. Translation: nOt 
bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-26December1966a.html.
8. The concept Formbestimmung ﬁrst appears in Marx’s doctoral dissertation, but only 
re-emerges in the Grundrisse and the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1.
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determinations. Marx’s Darstellung gives concrete conceptual 
unity to aggregated historical detail. It is a reconstruction that 
starts from the immediacies of how wealth appears within 
capitalist society and proceeds to unfold the mediating essence 
that is the retrospective ground for those forms of appearance.
It is through the logic of the forms of appearance 
(Erscheinungs formen) of value that Marx attempts to provide an 
answer to the problem as to why value must assume its particu-
lar forms. This is a question never posed by classical political 
economy and yet, as we learn from Marx, remains fundamental 
for explaining the mediations between, for example, profit and 
labour. This problem cannot be adequately answered without 
Hegel, specifically his Wesenslogik in which essence must appear 
as something other than itself. For Marx, this logic – through 
which the mutually constitutive identity of appearance and 
essence calls into question the limits of formal dualisms – is a 
conceptual resource for conceiving not only the necessity for 
surplus-value to appear as profit, but also the necessity of value 
to assume its particular concrete shapes, such as commodity, 
money and capital.9 
Not only does the concept of spectacle derive from this 
essentially Hegelian movement of the self-development of 
appearance-forms inherited by Marx, but in the first instance 
Marx’s usage contains insight already disposed towards, let us 
say, the spectacular. One can identify attributes of the Latin 
spectaculum, and its connection to a ‘mirror image’ or ‘arranged 
display’, and of spectare – ‘to view’, ‘watch’ or ‘behold’ – within 
the development of the forms of appearance of value.10 However, 
9. See Patrick Murray, Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge. Amherst NY: Humanity 
Books, 1988, and ‘The Secret of Capital’s Self-Valorisation “Laid Bare”: How Hegel 
Helped Marx to Overturn Ricardo’s Theory of Proﬁt’, in Fred Moseley and Tony Smith, 
eds, Marx’s ‘Capital’ and Hegel’s ‘Logic’: A Reexamination, Leiden: Brill, 2014.
10. As Debord wrote in 1980 to a Greek translator of The Society of the Spectacle: ‘In 
French, “spectacle” has the merit of being linked to the Latin speculum and thus to mirror, 
to the inverted image, to the concept of speculation, etc.’ Guy Debord Correspondance, 
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this would at best only demonstrate that Debord is composing a 
theory of the spectacle by emphasizing certain methodological 
aspects of Marx’s critique of political economy. This is certainly 
true, and the gravity with which Debord aims to formulate a 
critique of society within the contours set by a Hegelian dialectic 
emerges as Debord scrutinizes different possible titles for The 
Society of the Spectacle:
La véritable société du spectacle
La dialectique de la société du spectacle
La dialectique de la société comme spectacle
La dialectique dans de la société du spectacle
La dialectique dans de la société comme spectacle
Le moment spectaculaire de la société marchande (ou sous-titre?)
La société comme spectacle11
Besides the connotations involved in these working titles and 
their affinity with the method of Marx’s critique of political 
economy, there are, in my view, some considerable advances 
made by Debord with his concept of spectacle, which I aim to 
elucidate here. This essay assesses the way in which Debord’s 
society of the spectacle remains a critical category that exceeds 
the specific determinations of the critique of political economy 
while yet having its conceptual basis within them.
Value and its spectacular forms of appearance
Let me begin with §10 of the first chapter of The Society of the 
Spectacle and consider some of the issues embedded there.12
Volume 6: Janvier 1979–Décembre 1987, Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 2006. Translation: 
nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-5August1980.html.
11. Within Debord’s archival materials, a rummage through his notations on Henri 
Lefebvre’s Sociology of Marx reveals these few additional working titles for what would 
eventually become The Society of the Spectacle.
12. This is a characterization of the spectacle that Debord will retain into the 1990s 
when he composed the preface to the third French edition of the book. Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle, p. 8.
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Considered in its own terms, the spectacle is affirmation of 
appearance and affirmation of all human life, namely social life, as 
mere appearance. But the critique which reaches the truth of the 
spectacle exposes it as the visible negation of life, as a negation of 
life which has become visible. (§10)
What does it mean for a negation to gain positive form or 
obtain this appearance-form? For Debord, this is the result of 
the autonomous movement of the commodity economy in its 
abstract and quantitative structuring of social relations. But 
fully to grasp what this means, we have to tour Marx’s theory of 
the form of value. It is there that we will see how it is that the 
economy acquires this independent force of objectivity through 
its forms of appearance.
At the most elemental level, one recalls Marx’s descrip-
tion of the dual character of the commodity as a ‘sensuous 
super sensible’ (sinnlich übersinnlich) thing whereby, in Marx’s 
exposition, the unity of sensuous use-value and abstract 
exchange-value contained within the commodity unfold cor-
responding to concrete and abstract forms of human labour 
crystallized therein. Marx refers to this unity as value, a unity 
that becomes posited for itself when the products of labour are 
equalized in the exchange process; they are abstracted from their 
heterogeneous and concrete particularities by the reduction 
of the substance of their use-value to a quantum or aliquot of 
socially necessary abstract labour time, which is the measure of 
their value.
The use-values of two commodities become momentarily 
displaced during the exchange process. Value is thereby realized 
in the exchange process through the negation of use-value in 
which the qualitative aspects of the commodities are momentar-
ily expelled by the quantitative equivalence of exchange.13 And 
13. I am indebted to Christopher J. Arthur for this interpretation. Christopher J. Arthur, 
The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, Leiden: Brill, 2004.
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yet, for Marx, this negation of use-value acquires a positive 
presence in the form of money and capital, each of which take 
possession of the materiality of production and consumption 
for the purpose of exchange. Within capitalism, production is 
production for exchange, and in this way the concreteness of the 
world is brought into existence by the abstract objective force 
of value. Here, the natural form of the commodity becomes its 
value-form as its form of appearance. As Marx writes:
Within the value-relation and the value expression included in it, the 
abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensibly 
real; but on the contrary the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere 
form of appearance or definite form of realisation of the abstractly 
general.14 
The constant expulsion and affirmation of concrete reality 
constitutes the essential movement of value, a process whereby the 
negation of use-value during exchange in turn objectifies itself, or 
negates its negation, by instantiating concrete reality through its 
development of forms (Gestaltungsprozess). It is an abstract empti-
ness acquiring concrete constitutive power. Such is the manner in 
which value gives itself its own concrete reality, an autonomy of 
real abstractions constituting the world in its own image.15
Debord’s opening chapter, ‘Separation Perfected’, continues 
within this framework. In so far as within capitalism social 
reality appears as an inverted world and subsists through 
estranged forms of abstract social unity, the spectacle is the 
14. ‘The Value-Form’, Appendix to the 1st German edition of Capital, Volume 1, 1867, in 
Capital and Class 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 130–50.
15. It should be noted that the category of real abstraction derives not from Marx 
himself but from Alfred Sohn-Rethel, even if its conceptual content can be traced to 
the former’s analysis of exchange abstraction and equalization. Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology (1978; trans. Martin Sohn-
Rethel, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1983) examines the correlation between 
the social synthesis of the exchange abstraction, along with its anthropological genesis 
within antiquity, and the epistemological abstractions culminating in the philosophy 
of Kant. While there is no available evidence indicating that Debord was familiar with 
the work of Sohn-Rethel, that the concept of the society of the spectacle bears an 
unmistakable affinity to the concept of a real abstraction is undeniable.
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culmination of this fetish in which the ‘unity it imposes is merely 
the official language of generalized separation’ (§3).16 Debord aims 
to elucidate an autonomized social reality constituted through 
appearances, wherein social unity only exists in its inverted 
form. As such, the spectacle is not a falsified representation of 
reality, but the visual or phenomenal exposition of an already 
falsified reality; it is the development of value becoming visible 
to itself. As will become clear, the spectacle is not a distorted 
representation of social reality but the appearance and justifica-
tion of the actual distortion or perversion of social reality itself. 
As Debord writes in the second chapter: ‘The spectacle is the 
moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation 
of social life. Not only is the relation to the commodity visible, 
but it is all one sees: the world one sees is its world’ (§42).
However, if we are to regard the spectacle as a visualization 
of the world of commodities, then the category of the com-
modity itself does not yet obtain the characteristics Debord is 
describing. We need instead to traverse the varied capacities and 
functions of money. Indeed, while the commodity features as a 
more prominent protagonist in The Society of the Spectacle, on 
the surface of things, I’d like to argue that it is actually different 
aspects of the logic of money which better elucidate the spectacle 
as a development of the capitalist mode of production. 
The spectacular nature of money
For Marx, the forms of appearance of value proceed through 
‘visual inspection’ or Augenschein. This is Marx’s formulation 
16. In the analysis to follow, it is worth bearing in mind the affinity between the 
concepts of separation and abstraction. While Debord relies more heavily on the former, 
the Latin abstrahere is always a process of separation and so it might speculatively be said 
that an alternative title to the ﬁrst chapter of The Society of the Spectacle – one which 
would have equally encompassed its content while making more explicit the form of 
domination constituted by the spectacle in its continuity with the value-form – would 
have been ‘Abstraction Perfected’.
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which comes to the fore most explicitly in the first chapter of the 
first German edition of Capital and the ‘Value-Form’ Appendix to 
that edition. There, it is appearances themselves that commence 
the dialectic on the forms of value: ‘Der Augenschein lehrt 
ferner’. In a sense, Marx is simply observing (betrachtet) their 
development. Among the initial passages of Capital, Volume 1, 
the Erscheinungsformen proceed through four basic moments – a 
dramaturgy between coat and linen – progressively gaining 
greater visual impact through a totalization of commodity values 
and culminating in the money-form whose fetish-riddle, as Marx 
writes, is ‘the riddle of the commodity fetish, [but] now become 
visible and dazzling to our eyes’.17 In other words, the money-
fetish is only the commodity-fetish rendered spectacular.
Prior to this, Marx’s exposition has traversed the simple form 
of relative value for which the being of value only ‘comes to 
light’ (kommt dagegen zum Vorschein) as a relation between two 
commodities, whereby their equal relation posits, on one side, 
‘the body of another commodity, sensibly different from it [and] 
becomes the mirror [Spiegel] of its own existence as value [Wert-
sein]’. Here, value ‘reveals itself ’ (offenbart sich), or receives sensual 
expression (erhält sinnlichen Ausdruck), in the relation between 
commodities; that is, one commodity’s use-value becomes the 
form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) or the objective reflection 
of the value of another commodity.
Second, Marx proceeds to the equivalent form of value, which 
unlike future editions already broaches the discussion of the 
fetish character of commodities whose mystical form elicits 
the famous optical metaphor in which subjective impressions 
are explicable ‘not as a subjective stimulation of the optic nerve 
itself, but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye’. The 
equivalent form is, as Marx states, a ‘reflection determination’ of 
17. Capital, Volume 1, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 35, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996, p. 103, translation amended.
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the use-value of other commodities. In his example, linen ‘sees 
itself ’ as equivalent to the coat. There is a reciprocal and mirror-
ing relation of opposites in the relative and equivalent forms of 
value.
Third, Marx proceeds to the developed form of relative value 
in which the form of value becomes an environment of com-
modities. Here we find the proliferation of many simple relative 
value expressions. The accidental character of the equation of 
two commodities immediately falls away to reveal an ‘indefinite, 
constantly extendable series of its relative value-expressions [and] 
the linen relates itself to all possible commodity-bodies as mere 
form of appearance of the labour which is contained in itself ’. 
Within this emergent world of commodities, the body of each 
becomes a mirror (Spiegel) for a universal equivalent.
Finally, Marx follows this series of developments into a situ-
ation in which the totality of values can now attain the appear-
ance of exchange-values or what he calls the universal relative 
form of value. In this process, one commodity as a specific 
equivalent within the world or environment of relative forms of 
value remains. Marx is now tracing the developing money-form 
of value out of the equivalent form’s position within the univer-
sal relative form of value. Here emerges the universal (allgemeine) 
equivalent, the universal and yet individuated materialization of 
abstract human labour whose use-value is precisely its universal 
form of value as a universal equivalent. All commodities thereby 
‘mirror’ or ‘reflect’ themselves in one and the same commodity as 
quantities of value. 
Within this development, what appears as Marx’s frequent use 
of visual similes cannot simply be regarded as a stylistic pecu-
liarity. For instance, there is a determinate reflective structure 
between two commodities in the relative form of value; in turn, 
the equivalent form reflects within itself the relative use-value 
of all other commodities; the universal equivalent is the visible 
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incarnation or ‘reflection determination’ (Reflexionbestimmung) of 
the totality of commodities in which the body and use-value of 
each become mirrors (Spiegel) for the universal equivalent.18
It is, however, within the form of money that the spectacular 
nature of the value-form finds its most potent expression. 
Indeed, money emerges as a great visual embodiment and display 
of all that has preceded it. It can, in my view, be argued that 
money within the capitalist mode of production is spectacular in 
nature. There are three aspects to Marx’s theory of money that, 
in my view, coalesce under the concept of spectacle, or, rather, 
three important elements inherited from the money-form of 
value that come to constitute the spectacle: (1) money as the 
objective visualization of value; (2) money as an omnipotent 
purchasing power and therewith in a monopoly on use-value; 
(3) money as Gemeinwesen, which, as we’ll see, is always already 
capital. But let me now briskly traverse these three aspects before 
discussing the relation between spectacle and capital.
Money as the visualization of value
The money-form necessarily follows from the exchange relation 
in so far as the exchange-value of commodities needs to acquire 
an objective existence. In fact, money emerges as the external-
ized community of commodities, the appearance of their unity 
given an independent existence. As a necessary and observable 
form of appearance of the total social labour within capitalism, 
money is the mirror in which the value of all commodities finds 
determinate reflection. Because every commodity receives its 
18. Within the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1, Marx makes clear that his 
usage of categories of reflection derives from what Hegel terms Reflexionbestimmung 
in his Wesenslogik. Marx offers the following analogy: ‘There is something special about 
such reflection-determinations. This man is, for example, only King, because other men 
behave towards him like subjects. They believe, however, that they are subjects because 
he is King.’ Karl Marx, ‘The Commodity’ [ﬁrst chapter of the ﬁrst German edition of 
Capital], trans. Albert Dragstedt, 1976, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/
commodity.htm; translation amended).
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status in relation to all others, money appears, in Marx’s exposi-
tion, as the actualization of commodity homogeneity and com-
mensurability, the visual embodiment of the relation between all 
commodities. As Marx writes, through the money-form, value 
remains ‘everywhere visible’; it is ‘the social resumé of the world 
of commodities’.19
It is within money that value obtains its most visible incarna-
tion. Important to emphasize here is that money is not, strictly 
speaking, the representation of the value of commodities, but an 
exposition of their relation as values. It is the presented actuality 
of the unity of value. As Marx writes, 
It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other 
actual animals, which form when grouped together the various 
kinds, species, subspecies, families etc. of the animal kingdom, there 
existed also in addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the 
entire animal kingdom. Such a particular which contains within 
itself all really present species of the same entity is a universal (like 
animal, god, etc.).20
Money is the necessary presentation of value for itself, not as 
a representation of value but its visual presence.21 This further 
entails the way in which Marx is not conceiving a nominalist 
theory of money, or money as a mere symbol of value. Money is 
not a stand-in or reference for commodity values, but the totality 
of their relations given an independent form. If anything, money 
19. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 29, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, p. 337; 
Capital, Volume 1, p. 79.
20. Marx, ‘The Commodity’ .
21. Christopher J. Arthur, ‘Value and Money’, in Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Theory of 
Money: Modern Appraisals, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Hans-Georg Backhaus, 
Dialektik der Wertform: Untersuchungen zur Marxschen Ökonomiekritik, Freiburg: Caira, 
1997; Ricardo Belloﬁore, ‘From Marx to Minsky: The Universal Equivalent, Finance to 
Production and the Deepening of the Real Subsumption of Labor under Capital in Money 
Manager Capitalism’, in Heiner Ganßmann, ed., New Approaches to Monetary Theory: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 191–211; Michael Heinrich, Die 
Wissenschaft vom Wert, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1995; Christian Lotz, The 
Capitalist Schema: Time, Money and the Culture of Abstraction, Lanham MD: Lexington 
Books, 2014; Helmut Reichelt, Neue Marx Lektüre – Zur Kritik sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Logik, Hamburg: VSA, 2008.
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liberates itself as a form of representation and in turn transforms 
everything around it into its representative. As Marx writes, in 
money ‘everything is turned around, and all actual products … 
become the representation of money’.22
Through this aspect of money, which doesn’t conceal the real 
material content of economic relations but instead makes them 
phenomenologically actual, it becomes clear in what sense the 
spectacle cannot be conceived as a manipulation or distorted 
representation of the world – that is, a conspiratorial or inten-
tional effort to mystify the world, or merely the technological 
capacity to disseminate images. Nor does the category refer to 
any semiological aspect of the commodity economy. Instead, like 
the monetary instantiation of value, the spectacle is a social rela-
tion rendered into a materially objective force: ‘a Weltanschauung 
which has become actual, materially translated. It is a world 
vision which has become objectified’ (§5). It is a category that 
elucidates the abstract form of domination constituted by the 
Erscheinungsformen of value and its development into an objective 
phenomenal form. 
Money as the monopoly on use-value
I move on now to a second aspect of money that is inherited 
by the spectacle. The value of money in the first instance is 
money’s purchasing power: that is, what money can command. 
As a universal equivalent, it can potentially purchase anything, 
even that which does not appear on the market. Further, while 
all commodities might not be products of labour, all are capable 
of acquiring a price-form.23 As such, money is a universality that 
22. Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 28, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986, p. 126. 
23. As Marx elaborates: ‘The price form, however, is not only compatible with the 
possibility of a quantitative incongruity between magnitude of value and price, i.e., 
between the former and its expression in money, but it may also conceal a qualitative 
inconsistency, so much so, that, although money is nothing but the value form of 
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renders in principle everything in the universe exchangeable 
with everything else. Its use-value is precisely its capacity to 
exchange the totality of use-values. Money is ‘an appropriate 
expression of equivalence in the infinite variety of use-values’. 
Money is ‘the essence of all the use values’. It is for this reason 
that Marx describes money as the ‘absolute commodity’ or ‘the 
ubiquitous [allgegenwärtige] commodity’.24 As already anticipated 
in the ‘Power of Money’ section of the 1844 Manuscripts, money is 
the means of purchase, that which gives access to all objects and 
the only true need.25 Here, money as a means of purchase grants 
it its mystifying and omnipotent power; it is the medium under 
which all needs are potentially met. In fact, money emerges as 
the only true objective need governing the rest.
Within the second chapter of The Society of the Spectacle, 
Debord begins to address the relationship between the spectacle 
and use-value or social need. Between §§46 and 47, Debord 
brings his diagnosis closer to the form-determinations of 
value. Here, the relation of exchange-value and use-value are 
constituted through a relation of subsumption, wherein use 
appears as internal to exchange, a development most clearly 
illustrated in Marx’s identified ‘four peculiarities’ or ‘inversions’ 
of the equivalent form of value. As Debord writes, ‘mobilizing 
all human use and establishing a monopoly over its satisfaction, 
exchange value has ended up directing use’ (§46). Subordinated to 
exchange, use becomes inseparably appended to the production 
commodities, price ceases altogether to express value. Objects that in themselves are 
no commodities, such as conscience, honour, &c, are capable of being offered for sale by 
their holders, and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence 
an object may have a price without having value.’ Capital, Volume 1, p. 112.
24. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 281; Economic 
Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 200; A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 374; 
Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 164.
25. ‘By possessing the property of buying everything, by possessing the property of 
appropriating all objects, money is thus the object of eminent possession. The universality 
of its property is the omnipotence of its being. It is therefore regarded as an omnipotent 
being. Money is the procurer between man’s need and the object, between his life and 
his means of life.’ Karl Marx, ‘The Power of Money’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 3, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, p. 323.
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of exchange-value – that is, to an utterly abstract and quantita-
tive criterion. The spectacle here subjects concrete human 
needs to its own standard, as a form of appearance wherein the 
abstract assumes the shape of the concrete. 
So here the spectacle follows again an aspect of money in 
so far as it is by no means an idealist optical illusion, but the 
determinate reflection of the relations among all other com-
modities, the ontologically objective actuality of relationality 
that gives structure and meaning to all empirical existence. It 
is in this way that Debord can characterize, in a 1969 letter, 
the spectacle as ‘a moment in the development of the world of 
the commodity’.26 This moment is the Gestalt of money which 
renders a world of commodities possible. The visible material 
world is in fact the determinate reflection, or spectacular image, 
of general equivalence which structures that world’s concrete 
and differentiated heterogeneity. This framework elicits a situa-
tion in which reflection becomes reality itself and the matter and 
use-values reflected as ephemeral appearance. As Marx writes, 
money is ‘the external, common medium and faculty for turning 
an image into reality and reality into a mere image’.27
Within this framework, Debord identifies a ‘tendency of use 
value to fall’ (§47), appropriating Marx’s own formulation of 
the rate of profit and referring to a loss of the autonomy of use 
from exchange. As Debord writes, ‘use in its most impoverished 
form (food and lodging) today exists only to the extent that it is 
imprisoned in the illusory wealth of increased survival. The real 
consumer becomes a consumer of illusions. The commodity is 
26. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 4: Janvier 1969–Décembre 1972, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
6August1990.html.
27. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 325. In the words of 
Engels, money is a ‘magic potion that can transform itself at will into anything desirable 
and desired’, and all other forms of wealth are ‘mere semblances compared with this 
incarnation of wealth as such’. Frederick Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, 
and the State (1884), in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 26, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1990, p. 266.
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this factually real illusion, and the spectacle is its general mani-
festation’ (§47, emphasis added)
Debord’s second chapter builds from the exchange relation 
not just the spectacle as the prevailing model of social life, but 
that through the analysis of use-value as internal to exchange-
value the spectacle serves also as the total justification or 
legitimation of the existing system and ensures the permanent 
presence of that justification. In this way, the spectacle is both 
the embodiment of existing social meaning and its verification. 
As Debord writes:
In the inverted reality of the spectacle, use value (which was 
implicitly contained in exchange value) must now be explicitly 
proclaimed precisely because its factual reality is eroded by the 
overdeveloped commodity economy and because counterfeit life 
requires a pseudo-justification. (§48)
So in this chapter we find that the spectacle refers to a pseudo-
autonomy of use as it is emphatically lauded in order to justify 
the reigning domination of the commodity. As Debord will 
later write in the third chapter, ‘The satisfaction which no 
longer comes from the use of abundant commodities is now 
sought in the recognition of their value as commodities: the 
use of commodities becomes sufficient unto itself ’ (§67). Here 
again we find as a model the money-form whose use-value is its 
power of exchangeability. The spectacle asserts itself where the 
shadow of use has reappeared in its inverted form: the economy 
appears as an objective reality which mediates between need and 
satisfaction.28 However, this is, to borrow a phrase from Adorno, 
28. Additionally, within this ‘fraud of satisfaction’ (§70), the constitution of human 
needs within the movement of value cannot be contrasted with any opposing ‘natural’ 
or ‘authentic’ needs and desires. It is rather the case that social existence, in its real 
subsumption within the self-producing development of the commodity-form, becomes 
recalibrated as mediated moments within the autonomous economy. ‘The pseudo-need 
imposed by modern consumption clearly cannot be opposed by any genuine need or 
desire which is not itself shaped by society and its history. The abundant commodity 
stands for the total breach in the organic development of social needs. Its mechanical 
accumulation liberates unlimited artiﬁciality, in the face of which living desire is helpless. 
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the socially necessary semblance of an epoch wherein need and 
its satisfaction are merely the determinate and subordinated 
moments which mediate an economy developing for itself outside 
of anyone’s control. Through this framework it becomes clear 
that the spectacle entails the commensurable identification 
with the predominant images of social need constituted in and 
through the money structure.29 In this way, while reiterating 
the trifling distinction between ‘superficial needs and deep needs’, 
the spectacle erects a model of social satisfaction integral to its 
domination. It is from this perspective that ‘[s]pectators do not 
find what they desire; they desire what they find’.30
This analysis, in my view, comprises an advance beyond Marx 
with regard to the way in which the category of the spectacle 
elicits a sustained critique of use-value and need satisfaction, 
thereby sidelining what Hafner has called the tendency of 
‘use-value fetishism’ (Gebrauchswertfetischismus).31 From that 
perspective, one finds descriptions for the decay or degradation 
of use-value by exchange extrinsically eroded by market forces, 
The cumulative power of independent artiﬁciality sows everywhere the falsiﬁcation of 
social life’ (§68). Further explication on the distinction between ‘superﬁcial’ and ‘genuine’ 
needs as a tenet of class society can be found in Adorno’s ‘Thesen über Bedürfnis (1942), 
in Adorno Soziologische Schriften II, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
29. Debord identiﬁes the advent of the spectacle proper with the period after the 
‘second industrial revolution’, which ran from the late nineteenth century until World 
War I, the historical moment in which ‘alienated consumption becomes for the masses 
a duty supplementary to alienated production’ (§42). At this point, roughly from the 
beginning of the 1920s and accelerating after World War II, the economy must no longer 
disregard the manner in which its working class satisﬁes its needs. Focused efforts 
on cultivating the consuming aspect of the proletariat, rather than simply ignoring it, 
inaugurated a deeper integration of the proletariat into the accumulation process. For 
Debord, the historical speciﬁcity of the modern spectacle unfolding in accordance with 
the development of the autonomy of the commodity can thereby be witnessed through 
a greater absorption of labour into the circulation sphere, an effort devoted strictly to 
the realization of surplus value, rather than to its creation. As Debord writes, ‘as soon as 
the production of commodities reaches a level of abundance which requires a surplus of 
collaboration from the worker’ (§43), consumption in general becomes, as the proletariat 
gains greater access to the total commodity, a dialectical determination of capitalist 
production, or, said another way, the real subsumption of use in – and the abstractions 
of – commodity exchange.
30. Guy Debord, Complete Cinematic Works: Scripts, Stills and Document (1978), trans. 
and ed., Ken Knabb. Edinburgh: AK Press, 2003, p. 114. 
31. Kornelia Hafner, ‘Gebrauchswertfetischismus’, in Diethard Behrens, ed., Gesellschaft 
und Erkenntnis: zur materialistischen Erkenntnis- und Ökonomiekritik, Freiburg: Çaira-
Verlag, 1993, pp. 59–88.
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a theme frequently found within Critical Theory but one which 
emerges as prominent in the work of Helmut Reinicke, Wolfgang 
Pohrt, Stefan Breuer and even Hans-Jürgen Krahl.32
As the complement to money, the spectacle detaches the use-
value of money as the medium of circulation, itself the necessary 
universal equivalent of all commodities, and establishes a 
pseudo-autonomy of use in general as a category for society as a 
whole. If money is the realization of exchange-value’s negation 
of use, then the spectacle is the return of use, now draped in a 
counterfeit independence. The spectacle is the appearance of 
value as use in its sovereignty while unrelentingly still drain-
ing the world of its detail. It is thereby as both the objective 
visualization of value and its monopoly on use that Debord can 
describe the spectacle as ‘the money which one only looks at, 
because in the spectacle the totality of use is already exchanged 
for the totality of abstract representation’ (§49).
Money as Gemeinwesen
There is one other aspect of money that helps us understand 
the relation between spectacle and capital. For Marx, since the 
money-form of value is the concrete actualization of general 
equivalence, society appears as unified and as a whole within 
money. In money, one sees both, in the words of Anitra Nelson, 
‘the universality of the estrangement of individuals from them-
selves and from others’ and ‘the universality and generality of all 
their relations and abilities.’33 However, for Debord and within 
32. Helmut Reinicke, Revolte im bürgerlichen Erbe: Gebrauchswert und Mikrologie, 
Gießen: Achenbach, 1975; Wolfgang Pohrt, Zur Theorie des Gebrauchswerts oder über die 
Vergänglichkeit der historischen Voraussetzungen, unter denen das Kapital Gebrauchswert 
setzt, Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1976; Stefan Breuer, Die Krise der Revolutionstheorie. 
Negative Vergesellschaftung und Arbeitsmetaphysik bei Herbert Marcuse, Frankfurt 
am Main: Syndikat, 1977; Hans-Jürgen Krahl, ‘Bemerkungen zur Akkumulation und 
Krisentendenz des Kapitals’, in Konstitution und Klassenkampf, Frankfurt am Main: Neue 
Kritik,1971, pp. 82–97.
33. Anitra Nelson, Marx’s Concept of Money: The God of Commodities, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999, p. 70.
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the spectacle, society is capable of appearing unified every-
where, not just in the money-form but ‘where the totality of the 
commodity world appears as a whole, as a general equivalence 
for what the entire society can be and can do’ (§49). How this 
relates to capital requires a look at money’s function as a unified 
Gemeinwesen. 
In the Grundrisse, Marx discusses, among the functions of 
money, its third determination from which it is distinct as both 
a measure of value and a means of circulation. Here money 
appears as an end-in-itself, ‘money as money’ or as ‘the universal 
material representative of wealth’ (universeller materieller Repräsent-
ant des Reichtums).34 Marx describes this third determination 
as the unity of the previous functions of money and which, as 
an end-in-itself, cannot be confined to the sphere of circulation. 
This third determination is already latent capital, albeit only 
by preserving its fluid becoming and by withdrawing and re-
entering the sphere of circulation. In a word, for exchange-value 
to become truly autonomous as money it needs to develop into 
capital; that is, it must exit and re-enter circulation and aspire 
to imperishability. Money that is made autonomous and results 
from circulation as exchange value but that re-enters circulation 
and perpetuates and valorizes itself is capital. That is, only in 
capital has money lost its rigidity and become a process. And, 
of course, the specific exchange through which money becomes 
capital and not simply a commodity is in the purchasing of 
labour-power, the use-value that money purchases in order 
to become capital through the immediate unity of the labour 
process and the valorization process.
34. Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 151. Within the Grundrisse, the 
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy and Capital, Volume 1, Marx discusses this 
concept of ‘money as money’ in terms of three predominant sub-determinations: (1) 
hoard; (2) means of debt repayment; (3) means of payment in international trade, i.e. 
world money.
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Here, within the transition to capital, money is no longer 
simply independent exchange-value but the autonomy of 
exchange-value as ‘self-positing’ (selbstsetzende): ‘money must be 
spent for productive consumption, that is it must be engaged 
in reproducing exchange-value.’35 Within M–C–M�, money is 
‘exchange-value-for-itself ’ (Der Tauschwert als sich selbstsetzende 
Bewegung). Money as capital is independent of circulation and 
activates production with the purchase of labour-power. Capital 
must exist in both production and circulation, as both commod-
ity and money.
In its becoming capital, money becomes the community or the 
social bond. ‘It is itself the community, and cannot tolerate any 
other standing above it. But this implies the full development 
of exchange value, hence of a social organisation corresponding 
to it.’ As Marx continues, money is ‘the real community, in so 
far as it is the general material of existence for all, and also the 
communal product of all’.36 It is in this way that capital becomes 
society, a development which includes the real subsumption 
of the labour process by the valorization process. The form-
determination of value strives to make itself a unified totality.37 
We can trace this aspiration first through Capital, Volume 1, in 
which Marx defines capital as value-in-process, then through 
circulating capital as the identity of variable and constant 
capital within Capital, Volume 2, and finally, within both Capital, 
Volume 3, and the Grundrisse, capital is defined as the unity of the 
35. Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 113.
36. Ibid., pp. 155 and 158. Here again we ﬁnd money as the monopoly of use-value, as 
that which ‘satisﬁes every need, in that it can be exchanged for the object of every need 
[and is] quite indifferent to every particularity’ (ibid., 153). Money possesses every natural 
particularity of commodities. Money, as general wealth, is therefore the totality of 
need which ‘can embody the possibility of all pleasures.’ (ibid., 155); it is ‘the god among 
commodities’ representing ‘the celestial [himmlische] existence of commodities, while 
they represent [darstellen] its earthy [irdische] existence’ (ibid., p. 154).
37. Camatte writes: ‘[s]o capital exercises an absolute domination over society, 
and tends to become society … The opposition is no longer between capital and 
previous modes of production, but between a fraction of capital and capital itself, the 
presupposition of the production and circulation processes.’ Jacques Camatte, This World 
We Must Leave and Other Essays, Brooklyn NY: Autonomedia, 1995, p. 123.
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production and circulation processes. In a word, capital becomes 
the form of value that constitutes itself as society. We are now 
able to directly engage the relation between capital and the 
society of the spectacle.
Capital as spectacle
The spectacle cannot be reduced to the commodity because 
the commodity does not by itself yield the objective autonomy 
of exchange-value. This only occurs through the advent of the 
money-form. And yet the spectacle cannot be reduced to money 
since it is not a phenomenon confined to the sphere of circula-
tion. Money only exits circulation as capital (money-capital). So, 
is the spectacle synonymous with capital or, more specifically, 
with value-in-process? I would argue that it is not, and not 
simply for the way in which Debord identifies some pre-capitalist 
tendencies of the spectacle, themes which unfortunately I cannot 
go into here.38
I have indicated that the spectacle incorporates, from the 
commodity, exchangeability as the dominant mode of social 
synthesis.39 More important, however, are the tripartite aspects 
of money outlined above: (1) as the visual objectification and 
actuality of inverted social relations; (2) as the essence of all use-
values; (3) as the unified social whole or the unity of appearance-
forms – that is, as capital. However, the purview of The Society of 
the Spectacle traverses an array of social phenomena not directly 
reducible to the category of capital. These broadly include the 
38. It is worth noting that alongside these developments Debord also sketches the 
historical origins of the spectacle within both religious projection and the phenomenon 
of specialization, both of which have at their foundation a social division of labour 
requisite for the production and exchange of commodities. The emergence of a 
specialized segment of priests within society, and the religious fetishism wielded 
therewith, can be explicable, at least partially, in terms of a social division of labour and a 
class conﬁguration.
39. It is for this that it can accurately be said that ‘the concept of spectacle assumes 
the methodological importance which the category of commodity has for Marx’. 
Perspectives, At Dusk: The Situationist Movement in Historical Perspective, p. 38.
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spectacular appearance of seemingly opposed political factions, 
the spectacular image of individuality as advertised celebrity 
personalities (chapter 3), the spectacular representation of the 
proletariat in various organizational forms (chapter 4), the spec-
tacular appearance time structured by commodity production 
and circulation (chapters 5–6), the spectacular composition of the 
urban environment (chapter 7), the spectacular presentation of 
cultural products and discourses (chapter 8) and the spectacular 
rendering of ideology (chapter 9). These are only a few of the 
aspects of social life that the multivalent category of spectacle is 
meant to critically examine, none of which can be easily reduced 
to the category of capital.
One of Debord’s most explicit connections between capital 
and the spectacle comes at the end of the first chapter. There he 
writes: ‘The spectacle is capital to such a degree of accumulation 
that it becomes image’ (Le spectacle est le capital à un tel degré 
d’accumulation qu’il devient image) (§34). How are we to under-
stand such a formulation? After all, from the perspective of 
value as the unity of the forms of appearance, capital is already 
‘image’, understood here as Erscheinung. A solution to this cryptic 
thesis can be found, in my view, by recalling the aforementioned 
discussion of the money-form of value. That is, just as money 
was the becoming visible of commodity relations in their totality, 
the spectacle is for Debord the becoming visible of capital as a 
totality, but not simply as the monetization of capital since this 
would be a redundant formulation. Capital is already the move-
ment of money.40 Instead, the spectacle as the becoming visible 
40. The ﬁnal thesis of the opening chapter of The Society of the Spectacle has 
frequently confounded interpreters regarding whether it is the commodity or capital-
form of value that has greater import for Debord’s theory of the spectacle. See Gilles 
Dauvé, aka Jean Barrot, ‘Critique of the Situationist International’ (1979), trans. Louis 
Michaelson, in Home, ed., What is Situationism? A Reader; and ‘Back to the Situationist 
International’. However, to cite just one example of Debord’s sensitivity regarding the 
subtleties of the categories of the critique of political economy, the following polemical 
remarks waged against Raoul Vaneigem following the dissolution of the SI are indicative: 
‘We come across another gem further on when he discovers that “what weighs upon us 
is no longer capital, but the logic of the commodity”. He knows full well that Marx did 
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of capital is the becoming visible of the unity of appearances – 
that is, the mode of appearance of society unified under capital. 
However, do not let the term ‘visibility’ suggest that the spectacle 
is a concept primarily concerned with literally visual imagery 
or is reducible to an environment oversaturated with advertise-
ments or consumerism. Visibility here refers back to the riddle 
of the money-fetish – to the inverted world become, in Marx’s 
words, ‘dazzling to our eyes’. In this way, the spectacle remains 
a category that critically elucidates the abstract form of domina-
tion constituted by the exchange relations of the capitalist mode 
of production and yet carries this structure well beyond solely 
‘economic’ relations. As Debord writes: ‘Capital is no longer the 
invisible center determining the mode of production.’ Under the 
spectacle, ‘[s]ociety in its length and breadth becomes capital’s 
faithful portrait’ (§50).
The notion that human beings are deprived of any substance 
not imported by the form-determination of value, and therewith 
structured by appearances, derives from Marx’s critique of politi-
cal economy. However, from the perspective of the concept of 
spectacle, the totalizing implications of this general movement of 
appearance were not theoretically carried through. Central here 
is the manner in which the full autonomy of appearance-forms 
only arises with the emergence of fictitious or interest-bearing 
capital in which capital returns to the form in which it first arose 
as money and begets more money seemingly as a result only of 
itself or the increase in value directly from circulation. Here, the 
production process effectively disappears, and for Marx it is the 
culmination of the form-determinations in which everything is 
reduced to circulation.41 However, it remains the case for Marx 
not wait for him to demonstrate that capital was merely “the logic of the commodity”; 
even so, he reckoned naively on his phrase having a modern sound to it.’ Situationist 
International, 2003, p. 127.
41. ‘In interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, 
money generating money, is brought out in its pure form and in this form it no longer 
bears the birthmarks of its origin.’ Marx, Capital, Volume 3, in Karl Marx and Frederick 
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that this ‘completion of fetish capital’42 nevertheless is intrinsi-
cally related and dependent upon relations of production. It can 
therefore be said that Marx, in his analysis of capital, renders 
explicit the necessity of the relations between appearance-forms 
and essential social relations. 
However, the manner in which forms of appearance detach 
themselves and come to reconstitute real concrete social 
relations indexes their triumph as social reality and therewith 
solicits the demand to examine how the autonomy and move-
ment of appearances might come to pervade all aspects of social 
life. It is here that the category of the spectacle is of service. 
The major distinction to be made between the development of 
value in its particular forms of appearance and the spectacle is 
that, unlike the fetish-character of value, there is no masquerade 
operative in its mystification. The spectacle has a sole demand: 
that social reality appear in all of its transparency.
Recall that the spectacle adopts the mandate of exchange-
value: everything is possible because everything is equivalent. 
As the negation of life and of concrete reality that has become 
visible qua appearance, the spectacle follows the objective 
form-determinations of value by asserting a positive presence 
as the determinate negation of use-value. For this, the spectacle 
makes visible a world that is at once both present and absent. 
The spectacle, as that which is beheld, refers to the identity of 
the non-identical of exchange value not merely as operative, but 
as disclosed. It is the commodity social form ‘shown for what it 
is’ (§37), a display of alienation in its utmost clarity. As Debord 
writes, ‘[n]ot only is the relation to the commodity visible but it 
is all one sees: the world one sees is its world’ (§42). 
Engels, Collected Works, vol. 37, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998, p. 389, translation 
amended.
42. As Marx writes: ‘Here the fetish form of capital and the representation 
[Vorstellung] of fetish capital are complete. In M–M� we have the meaningless 
[begriffslose] form of capital, the perversion [Verkehrung] and materialisation of 
production relations in their highest degree’. Ibid., p. 390, translation amended.
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As a structure of disclosure constitutive of its object, the 
spectacle is a luminosity unfolding upon the terrain of the false. 
Within the spectacle, social activity is made to appear, and in 
doing so is embedded with a meaning that contains both the 
image and the goal of social development under commodity 
society. Through the spectacle, the portrait of capital becomes all 
of society, for which ‘[a]t the moment of economic abundance, the 
concentrated result of social labor becomes visible and subjugates 
all reality to appearance, which is now its product’ (§50). In the 
words of Jacques Camatte: ‘The spectacle has to show humans 
what they are, or what they must be’, in which the human 
being becomes ‘no more than a ritual of capital’.43 Here, capital 
becomes ‘the mirror of all representations’, divorced from any 
dependency on its transubstantiations and reproducing itself, in 
part, through the form determinations of its forms of appear-
ance.44 Capital becomes spectacle to the extent that, as a social 
reality, only the forms of appearance persist. For both Camatte 
and Debord, this movement of capital – as self-valorizing value 
or as a self-developing form of appearance without substance 
43. Camatte, This World We Must Leave and Other Essays, pp. 170, 108–9. Camatte is 
an important resource for illustrating the way in which objective forms of appearance 
come to dominate social relations within capitalist society. While there was no direct 
correspondence between Debord and Camatte, their respective analyses comprise a 
similar picture. Camatte came out of the political tradition of Italian left communism, 
strongly influenced by early Italian Communist Party member Amadeo Bordiga, and 
argued that capital had anthropomorphized itself as a material community. Camatte, 
who has barely received any attention from the anglophone world, never claimed any 
affinity with Socialisme ou Barbarie or the Situationist International because they were 
formal organizations and, in his eyes, held to outdated council communist programmes. 
Debord, for his part, left no evidence of any contact with Camatte. In a passage that 
could have appeared within The Society of the Spectacle, Camatte writes: ‘Capital has 
become absolute representation: everything men do is reflected in it; it can be the 
spectacle of the world in that it reflects, returns to all beings their various movements 
integrated into its life process.’ Jacques Camatte, Capital and Community (1976), trans. 
David Brown, New York: First Prism Key Press, 2011, pp. 339–40. The affinity with Debord 
is unmistakable. In another passage, which in all likelihood is a direct appropriation of §17 
of The Society of the Spectacle, Camatte writes: ‘They are stripped of their activity, which 
is restored to them in the form of representations; the movement of alienation no longer 
bears on the being or the having, but on appearing: their life is organized for them, and 
thus they increasingly tend to perceive of themselves as being thrown into non-life.’ 
Camatte, Capital and Community, p. 252.
44. Camatte, Capital and Community, p. 251.
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– proceeds to an anthropomorphization, which both capitalizes 
human beings and humanizes capital.
Reichelt reminds us that Marx’s various formulations about 
the phantasmic cannot be mere rhetoric, but refer to features 
of reality, wherein ‘[r]eality is inversion, is appearance, in which 
reason, in its inverted forms of existence, subsists contradictorily 
through – estranged – forms of social unity.’45 Correspondingly, 
Debord’s concept of the spectacle follows such an analysis and 
amounts, in my view, to the most developed form of this unifica-
tion within twentieth-century Marxism. The spectacle is the 
appearance of social unity in which separate spheres of social 
life, although dependent on capitalist production, have reached 
an accord that synthetically organizes each of its moments into 
a totality. For this, Debord aims to fully outline the contours 
of what Adorno called that ‘diabolical image of harmony’.46 
Important to recall here is the way in which the spectacle is less 
a critical theory of appearances than it is a theory of the unity 
or organization of appearance-forms. A justification for one of 
its moments is a justification for its entirety. It is the name for 
the reigning identity of production and consumption, of work 
and leisure, of culture and commodity, of state and economy, of 
ideology and the material environment. It renders commensurate 
not only the distinctions between production and consumption, 
monopoly and competition, use-value and exchange-value but 
also class distinctions, leaving in their wake personifications, 
representations, appearances or images of its own movement. 
Such a mode of social organization, which, as Debord writes in 
a 1966 letter, ‘monopolizes all human communication’, entails 
also the organization of human perception, defining what is 
45. Helmut Reichelt, ‘Social Reality as Appearance: Some Notes on Marx’s Conception 
of Reality’, in Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis, eds, Human Dignity: Social 
Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 34.
46. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Reflections on Class Theory’, in Can One Live after Auschwitz? 
A Philosophical Reader, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 96.
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to be seen with how it is apprehended.47 The spectacle is the 
phenomenological terrain of value, a ‘monopoly of appearance’ 
(§12) which, as Debord writes, ‘naturally finds vision to be the 
privileged human sense which the sense of touch was for other 
epochs’ (§18).48 The spectacle thereby ‘says nothing more than 
‘that which appears is good, that which is good appears’ (§12).
Conclusion
The key to grasping the relations between Marx’s critique of 
political economy and Debord’s theory of the spectacle is in the 
study of the structure of the forms of appearance of value. As 
such, already in the first three chapters of Capital, Volume 1, we 
find the elementary forms of the spectacle. However, for Marx, 
the form of appearance ‘makes the actual relation invisible, 
and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of that relation’.49 This 
is in stark contrast to the way in which the spectacle oper-
ates by exposure. This is why the fetish-character of money 
is so important: the mystification acquires an objective and 
autonomous form, unlike the commodity-fetish for which social 
relations remain concealed behind the social relations of things. 
Even if having its basis within them, it remains the case that 
47. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968.
48. Debord’s emphasis on vision should be situated in relation to the following passage 
in Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, in which the history of human sensibility is made actual in 
and through the objectivity of alienated human practice: ‘Only through the objectively 
unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility 
(a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form – in short, senses capable of human gratiﬁcation, 
senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into 
being. For not only the ﬁve senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical 
senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes 
to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature. The forming of the ﬁve senses 
is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up 
in crude practical need has only a restricted sense.… For the starving man, it is not the 
human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as 
well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding 
activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no 
sense for the ﬁnest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not 
the beauty and the speciﬁc character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense.’ 
Marx, ‘The Power of Money’, pp. 301–2.
49. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 540.
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the category of spectacle exceeds the specific determinations 
of value, a broader model of social organization for which the 
structure of appearing outpaces that which appears; or, more 
specifically, it gives particular appearances inner coherence as 
moments of a totality. 
The spectacle is a category which elevates Marx’s forms of 
appearance as a polyscopic and omnipresent element of social 
reality. As Henri Lefebvre put it, ‘there is more to Capital than 
political economy.’50 In this way, the category of the spectacle 
attempts to provide a theoretical reconstruction of social reality 
as an organic whole which is constituted in and through the 
autonomy of the forms of appearance of value. The spectacle 
ought, then, not to be measured by an attained quantitative 
degree of capitalist accumulation, but by the degree to which the 
total result of a society based on capital accumulation obtains 
objectivity at the level of ruling appearance-forms as the domi-
nant social structure. 
The spectacle is an aspect of capital that is not reducible to 
the phenomenon of exploitation. It elicits a form of impoverish-
ment that has expanded proletarian wretchedness more capa-
ciously into a nouveau prolétariat,51 one beyond classical relations 
of exploitation and deteriorating working conditions, instead 
grasping the poverty inherent within capitalist affluence. It is in 
this way that the emergence of the critique of spectacle acquires 
poignant historical determinacy through the peculiarities of 
postwar prosperity. Here, revolutionary class struggle would find 
orientation no longer simply in the emancipation from want, but 
from the dissatisfaction implicit within the dominant images of 
satisfaction and social meaning. The nouvelle pauvreté52 exceeds 
50. Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 1 (1947), trans. John Moore, London: 
Verso, 1991, p. 80.
51. Internationale Situationniste, Internationale situationniste: Édition augmentée, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1997, p. 253.
52. Ibid., p. 256.
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material poverty and instead proliferates within the amelioration 
granted by postwar prosperity. As Debord proclaims in his 1961 
film Critique de la séparation, ‘The point is not to recognize that 
some people live more or less poorly than others, but that we all 
live in ways that are out of our control.’53 
As a critical concept, the spectacle elucidates and gives 
unifying structure to diverse phenomena within contemporary 
capitalism under a logic, derived from the structure of exchange, 
for which ‘appearances of a socially organized appearance’ (§10) 
have acquired ‘enormous positivity’ (§12). It is in the spectacular 
realm of appearance that the inner content of objectivity is 
manifest. That is, the spectacle is the total commodity of society 
– the total result of social objectification and its visible vindica-
tion. In this way, the spectacle is more suitably construed as the 
phenomenological terrain of value as a totality, or perhaps simply 
as the phenomenality of value: the self-movement of appearance-
forms which, to echo the dynamic of Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
draws into itself both subject and substance.
53. Debord, Complete Cinematic Works, p. 31.
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Let us go straight to the heart of the matter, and propose that we 
read Marxian ontology from the standpoint of workers’ struggles, 
the resistance of the multitude, and the insurgencies of the pro-
letariat. From this angle, ontology means planting your feet on 
the ground. We could endlessly discuss, as philosophers do, what 
‘ontology’ means – echoing the Thesis on Feuerbach, we will 
instead repeat that until now philosophers have thought about 
ontology as an idea of being but that today one must construct 
the ontology of revolutionary praxis. What, then, is this ontology 
we are laying claim to, and which draws its meaning and orienta-
tion from struggles? It is the ontology of workers’ history, namely of 
that being which is constructed – always and continuously – by 
the labouring human being, by ‘living labour’, by the multi-
tudinous subjectivation that produces and reproduces the world 
of life through cooperation. This is the framework in which 
Marxian ontology operates. It describes the world, recognizing 
on the one hand the productive forces of labour and on the other 
the forms and relations of production. And, from within this 
relationship between forces and relations, it both recognizes 
and denounces a stupid and unjust order organized on the 
basis of exploitation in the domain of production and hierarchy 
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in the experience and exercise of power. Marxian ontology is 
constituted by and ceaselessly renewed by class struggle, by the 
material antagonism that distributes the consistencies of real 
being. Through these entanglements and clashes there emerges 
a landscape made up of productions of subjectivity and figures 
of emancipation that match the material forces that express 
them. Antagonism and class struggle are therefore not powers 
that inscribe themselves on a surface whose foundation is static: 
they are powers and movements of ‘everything that is’ and they 
mark it on a surface that is also a dynamic and subjectivizing 
foundation – they are expressive powers of desiring multitudes. 
Without this Machiavellian and Spinozist image, it is impossible 
to understand Marxian ontology, or to grasp how class struggle 
can happen and unfold. From our point of view, then, Marxian 
ontology is a theory of class struggle founded on the subjectiva-
tion of ‘living labour’ – a constituent ontology rather than a 
dialectical ontology, albeit an ‘inverted’ one. Inversion or reversal 
alone rarely produces effects that go beyond the unmasking of 
the ideology of the class adversary; and that dialectic, refusing 
as it does a subjectivizing horizon of conflict and a constitu-
ent figure of the project of transition, advances a Ricardian 
objectivism in the theory of production and a transcendental/
tran shistorical viewpoint on valorization. I remain wedded to 
that aspect of Marx’s ontological approach that was incisively 
underscored, in the wake of Lukács, by Hans-Jürgen Krahl. 
At this juncture we can pose two questions. First, what is the 
ontological fabric of class struggle such as we can describe it 
today? Second, did Marxian ontology – as present in his historical 
writings, the Grundrisse and Capital – prefigure these later 
developments?
If we choose to insist on the centrality of class struggle to any 
definition of the ontology of the present we must underscore the 
transformations undergone by the structure of capitalism from 
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the mid-nineteenth century to now. The concepts of labour and 
exploitation, and consequently the very nature of capital, have in 
fact experienced a significant mutation.
The first moment in our consideration of the present ontol-
ogy of capital will thus be the analysis of the transformation of 
living labour and the clarification of how its productivity has 
been intensified in the growing cooperation that characterizes 
the mode of production. If labour-power manifests itself in 
Capital as ‘living labour’ that augments its own productivity 
within simple and/or expanded cooperation, and then in the 
organization of manufacture and large-scale industry; and if 
the capitalist organization of labour reinforces cooperation, 
increasingly defining its character until it subsumes it as social 
activity; then, when we enter the ‘cognitive’ phase of capitalist 
development, that of the General Intellect, social and cooperative 
labour is no doubt enormously enhanced, immersed as it is in 
a world of communication networks and digital connections 
that crisscross industrial assets and agricultural systems along 
with each and every economic form. Capital is valorized by 
cooperative flows in which muscles, languages, affects, codes and 
images are subsumed into the material process of production. 
And it is the neoliberal counter-revolution which – in the wake 
of the trente glorieuses of post-World War II workers’ struggles 
and the defeat of the 1970s – has brought us to this pass. Over 
this half-century, the spheres of capitalist production and society 
have been radically transformed by the extension of the primary 
sites of production from the factory to society. Automation has 
played the pivotal role in this transformation – not only from 
a political point of view (destroying the power of the working 
class and expelling workers from factories in the dominant parts 
of the planet) but also from a technical one (by intensifying 
the rhythms of production). In order to recover profitability, 
which could no longer be extracted from the factories, capital 
91Marxian OntOlOgy, tOday
has put the social terrain to work, and the mode of production 
has become ever more closely entangled with forms of life. 
While industrial automation meant the production of ever more 
material goods, outside the robotized factories we now see the 
growth of ever more complex integrated productive services, 
linking together heavy technologies and fundamental sciences 
with industrial and human services. In a second phase, informa-
tion becomes more important than automation – it is in fact 
information that distributes throughout society a transformation 
in the technical composition of living-labour that was previously 
fashioned within the factory. 
Second, our attention will turn to the concept of exploitation, 
insisting on the change it has undergone as it turns into an 
extractive function of social valorization.
We have described how the capitalist counter-offensive tar-
geted the accumulation of resistances and revolts that took place 
over the 1960s and 1970s. Now it is possible for us also to recog-
nize the passage to the society of the General Intellect in terms 
of an increasing economic role for social production, which leads 
to a new phase in the relation between capital and labour – from 
Fordism to post-Fordism. While in the Fordist period, capitalist 
production was structured by disciplinary regimes and accumula-
tion was centrally directed by profits generated from the planned 
cooperation of industrial labour, in post-Fordism – at a time when 
productive knowledge and the social capacities of cooperation are 
ever more widely diffused throughout the whole society – capital 
exploits the emergent forms of labour-power in a new fashion, by 
extracting social wealth produced in common and, in a way, by 
subsuming the entire social field. The new centrality of extraction 
thereby transforms the nature of exploitation. In particular, the 
quantities of surplus-labour and surplus-value, defined in keeping 
with a temporal analytic, take on a new quality, meaning that 
exploitation must now be analysed according to different criteria. 
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The Marxian concept of exploitation – focused on the different 
‘times’ of the working day of the individual labourer – seems very 
distant now. When Marx pedagogically explains that in a regime 
of waged labour workers receive the wealth produced during the 
initial hours of the working day and the capitalist expropriates the 
value produced in the remaining hours, he establishes an intimate 
relation between exploitation and the organization of production. 
Today instead these realities diverge and the distance between 
the two grows ever larger: finance abstractly considers productive 
subjects as a mass and extracts value at a distance, while produc-
tive subjectivities enjoy an ever-greater capacity to cooperate and 
to plan cooperation autonomously. Capitalist entrepreneurs no 
longer organize labour; nor do they forge new combinations and 
generate productive forms of cooperation, as Schumpeter had 
once theorized. They are now consumed by financial activities 
and their attention is drawn to stock exchanges, dividends and 
market fluctuations.
This takes us to a third moment, in which we must consider the 
transformation of capital into a financial-extractive force. When 
finance emerges as a crucial component of the capitalist mode of 
production in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
it constitutes a powerful supplement to industrial capital, helping 
to define the latter’s dominant role in the economy and over the 
whole social formation. Finance offered instruments of abstrac-
tion and centralization that eased the passage from manufacture 
to the commanding role of large corporations and their monopo-
lies, while it was also employed as a weapon in the arsenal of im-
perialist projects. As the twentieth century wore on, however, this 
relation was inverted, to the extent that today finance dominates 
industry, setting some of the fundamental conditions for produc-
tion and exploitation. Within the rule of finance and its ever more 
complex instruments, capital accumulates above all through the 
capture and extraction of a value that appears as something found, 
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a natural gift, terra nullius. Financial capital extracts value from 
the common, whether we are dealing with material values hidden 
in the earth or those germinating within society. Now, it is clear 
that the transition to the commanding role of financial capital can 
be explained by the formation of global markets and the decline 
of national industrial economies, marked by the recurrence of 
crises and the deepening of speculative operations, but its centre 
of gravity, which concerns the very definition of finance, must be 
referred back to the mode of production, in the sense that finance 
functions as an apparatus of capture of social and natural values 
and of extraction of the common. Extraction follows in the tracks 
of the common. By contrast with industry, extraction develops 
on the basis of forms of wealth that in great part pre-exist capital 
investment. While the automobile is produced in the factory, oil 
and coal exist in the earth – though of course extraction is itself a 
process of production, refining and distribution. The distinction 
becomes clearer if we turn to social intelligence, social relations 
and the territories of sociality. While in the factory workers 
cooperate on the basis of frameworks and disciplines dictated 
by the capitalist, here in society value is produced through social 
cooperation that is not directly organized by capital. Social 
cooperation is in this respect relatively autonomous. This all goes 
to underscore once again how much the capital relation has been 
destabilized – in the face of the relative autonomy of cooperation 
finance appears as an extractive industry. 
The totalization of the world of work, the absorption of 
production into reproduction, the financial sublimation of value 
within the framework of the real subsumption of productive 
society into capital – this was famously the definitive theoretical 
conquest of the Frankfurt School. Whence, however – on the basis 
of what we’ve argued up to this point – the need to move ‘beyond’.
To define this beyond means advancing on three terrains that 
we have begun to explore and disclosing their ‘subjective’ facets.
94 caPitalisM: cOncePt, idea, iMage
First, the terrain of work. This is where the cooperative 
association of labour-power redefines the concept of working 
class, revealing it as a multitudinous ensemble of labouring 
(working-class) singularities, as a multiplicity of immaterial 
(and/or material) powers. In cooperative associations, these 
singular powers virtually configure a plural recomposition of the 
labouring class – a recomposition that is crisscrossed by flows of 
subjectivation. We call this new figure of class ‘multitude’.
Second, with regard to the conception of exploitation. To go 
beyond the alienation or reification of labour means making 
room for the effects of subjectivation in the relation between 
variable and fixed capital. Where exploitation targets the cogni-
tive, social and cooperative components of living labour there is 
a rupture in the dialectic of capture and appropriation of labour-
value by capital. And alienated labour, appearing as the second 
nature of labour-power, is able in its turn to break the order of 
exploitation – at a second level of the latter’s operations. But we 
will return to this development later.
Third, the new nature of capital and of its extractive 
mechanism is answered ontologically by the social dynamic of 
the common. Once the relations of discipline and control that 
characterize mass-work have broken down and its measure of 
value has collapsed, extractive expropriation is countered by 
the dimension of the common. At this point we can draw a 
preliminary conclusion. In varying forms and degrees, social 
production has become ever more central both in the activity of 
production (employing social and scientific knowledges, coopera-
tive frameworks or relations of care) and in the product (which 
conversely incorporates shared social components). Within the 
horizon of capital, as we’ve noted, these products appear as 
gifts, manna from heaven. But we must keep in mind that the 
very features of social production that constitute the key to the 
extraction and accumulation of wealth by finance also constitute 
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the seeds and foundation of the social existence of revolt. Both 
sides of this ambivalence or tension between exploitation and 
resistance are contained in the increasingly abstract nature of 
social production. We are all familiar with Marx’s analysis of 
abstract labour as the key to understanding capitalist exchange-
value. In many respects, the abstract nature of labour and the 
value it produces increase dramatically within social production. 
When workers interiorize knowledge, for instance, and develop 
it socially within cooperation, their labour and the value they 
produce are ever more abstract. But the greater abstraction of 
the process of production and valorization – as it is implemented 
in languages, codes, the immaterial articulations of collective 
life, cooperation, affective elements, and so on – also offers an 
extraordinary potential of resistance and autonomy from capital. 
The abstraction that we are acknowledging here corresponds 
directly to the common, which, as we have said, tends to be both 
the foundation and the result of contemporary production. And 
the common, too, comes to be qualified here in a twofold sense – 
namely as the substance of capitalist extraction and the potential 
basis of autonomy and resistance.
Following Marx’s arguments, we can conceive this dual 
character by developing it in terms of a three-level logical process 
– from abstraction to social production, and from social produc-
tion to subjectivity. First, abstraction. The economic relation 
between capital and labour, writes Marx, ‘develops more purely 
and adequately in proportion as labour loses all the character-
istics of art; as its particular skill becomes something more and 
more abstract and irrelevant, and as it becomes more and more a 
purely abstract activity.’1
1. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), 
trans. Martin Nicolas, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books/London: New Left Review, 1973, 
p. 297.
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But Marx does not have a nostalgic view of this loss of ‘art’ 
on the part of the craftsman in the performances of his trade. 
The loss of a trade or an art is also a gain. ‘Labour is not this 
or another labour’, Marx has earlier pointed out, ‘but labour 
pure and simple, abstract labour, absolutely indifferent to any 
particular determination but capable of all determinations.’2 The 
abstraction of labour is not empty but entirely full – it is full, in 
particular, with the social character of production. 
The progressive general capacities of labour – this is the second 
move – presuppose the social, which is to say common, nature of 
production. Individual, specific labour is externally qualified as 
social labour; ‘it is mediated by the social conditions of produc-
tion within which the individual is active’. The increasing abstrac-
tion of productive processes thus rests on networks of social 
relations, on the social conditions that make production possible. 
It stands, in other words, on the foundation of the common, 
which includes the shared knowledges, cultural forms and circuits 
of cooperation that constitute our collective existence.
Marx’s third move consists in putting this social basis in 
motion from the standpoint of subjectivity. Against the totality 
of capital stands a labour that is equally total and abstract. The 
fact that labour is abstract and social harbours a potential of 
subjectivation, albeit one that is often not realized.
This reference to abstract totality (along with the ‘theory of 
the social individual’ developed in the Grundrisse) does not allow 
us to mobilize a homogeneous and unified subjectivity capable 
of action. But the social nature of production implies a field 
of differences wherein subjectivities cooperate and enter into 
conflict in something like a (volatile but effective) composition. 
The common starts to appear when, within production, myriad 
heterogeneous subjectivities begin to enter into association. It 
2. Ibid., p. 296, translation amended.
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is this emergence in the form of differences (in divergence) that 
constitutes a line of subjective antagonism. 
From an ontological perspective, the concept of capital is 
given as a figure and product of class struggle. This means that 
the concept incorporates a relation that involves, in and against 
capital, the continual recomposition of development; capitalist 
command (constant capital) and the resistance of subjects put 
to work (variable capital, living labour) present themselves as 
asymmetrical and intransitive powers engaged in a continuous 
conflict. What we witness here is a true dialectic, a dialectic 
shorn of Aufhebung, a dialectic that knows no teleology and that 
is kept constantly open by class struggle.
Allow me a brief pause here, an intermezzo of sorts. I think it 
is important at this juncture to recall the thought of Gramsci. In 
Gramsci we find a concept of capital that is always open to class 
struggle. Gramsci’s Machiavelli is not a rhetorical device aimed 
at translating the Leninist party into Italian, nor an analogical 
fiction intended to actualize a new proletarian Risorgimento. 
For decades these metaphors were inculcated into the militants 
of the Italian Communist Party, thus debasing the image of 
Gramsci, together with that of the revolutionary process of the 
working class. On the contrary, it is by recovering the Machiavel-
lian image, the one which sees the political as split in two, which 
looks upon it from below and from above as the entanglement of 
antagonistic forces – it is in this light that the concept of capital 
must be politically defined. ‘The revolution against Capital’, the 
Bolshevik revolution against Karl Marx that Gramsci affirmed in 
1918 in Il Grido del Popolo, was a slogan targeted at the positivist 
interpretation of Marxism and its reformist use by the Italian 
Socialist Party, against the ideology of lorianesimo (after the ideas 
of Achille Loria), namely against the superstition of economism 
– but it is also and above all the revelation of the ‘rebellious 
content’ of the economic fabric, of capital as that within which 
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class struggle unfolds. Twenty years later, in ‘Americanism and 
Fordism’, the reading of the concept of capital as a frame wrested 
away and reconstructed by class struggle will corroborate the 
intuition first voiced in Il Grido del Popolo. It is perhaps unneces-
sary to highlight here that the ontology of Marx’s historical writ-
ings corresponds entirely to this Machiavellian and Gramscian 
definition of capital. 
We now need to answer the second question that was posed 
at the outset. Namely whether the ontology of Capital prefigured 
these developments of Marxian theory. The reply cannot but be 
a positive one. It is obvious from what we have been saying up 
till now that Marxian ontology presents itself as an ontology of 
the power of labour, with no break between the early Manuscripts 
and the final articles on Wagner. Particular importance needs 
to be accorded here to the Grundrisse, because they are not just 
preparatory notebooks for Capital but the text in which Marx’s 
philosophical and economic writings find their highest synthesis, 
while they also weave the historical writings into their fabric. 
An ontology of power and not just production, a Spinozist and 
not just a materialist ontology. It suffices here to refer you to the 
final chapter on ‘metaphysics and production’ of Franck Fisch-
bach’s book La production des hommes. Marx avec Spinoza.3
The other central and enduring element of Marxian thought 
– an element strongly emphasized by Western Marxism, from 
Lukács to the Frankfurt School – is Marx’s insight into the in-
creasing superimposition of production and reproduction. Little 
by little, reproductive processes are included in productive ones. 
Against classical economics, for which reproduction is a conse-
quence and effect of production, and essentially of consumption, 
Marxian ontology opens onto the inclusion of reproduction into 
production – as well as the repetition of the antagonism between 
3. (The Production of Human Beings: Marx with Spinoza) Vrin: Paris, 2014.
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the two. It is from this point of view that we can discern the 
biopolitical point of view within Marxian ontology.
The third element that needs to be taken into account, in the 
continuity of Marxian thought, in its ontology, is the construc-
tive and constituent anthropological dimension that invests the 
capital relation and is specified in the question of technics. This 
problem has never been as central to any Marxian reading as it 
is today, when it evokes the political theme of subversion in the 
age of the General Intellect. It is not enough to underscore that in 
Marx this theme is clearly foregrounded in the Grundrisse; it must 
be recovered as a revolutionary theme in a society where intel-
ligence at work constitutes the centre of the productive process. 
Here the theme of the liberation of humans from labour, on the 
basis of the transformation of labour, emerges with tremendous 
force. The theme ‘appropriation of fixed capital’ by ‘living labour’ 
enjoys a central place in Marxian ontology, along with the 
productivity of antagonism and the overturning of the alienated 
condition into a productive ‘second nature’. The appropriation of 
fixed capital by living labour – this theme is not a metaphor, it is 
alive in the pages of Capital. Marx in fact begins by showing how 
the mere placement of the worker before (the command over) the 
means of production modifies not just his productive capacity, but 
his figure, his nature, his ontology. From this point of view the 
Marxian narrative of the passage from ‘manufacture’ to ‘large-
scale’ industry is a locus classicus. In manufacture, the division 
of labour is still governed by a ‘subjective’ principle – meaning 
that the worker has appropriated the productive process after the 
productive process was adapted to the worker; while instead in 
large-scale industry the division of labour is ‘objective’, since the 
subjective/craft use of the machine is eliminated and machinery 
constitutes itself against man; the machine comes forward as the 
worker’s competitor and antagonist, even reducing him to the 
status of working animal. And yet in Marx there is also a different 
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insight. He recognizes that the worker and the instrument of 
labour are also configured as a hybrid construction and that 
the conditions of the productive process largely constitute the 
worker’s conditions of life, his ‘form of life’. The concept of pro-
ductivity of labour implies a very close and dynamic connection 
between variable and fixed capital, while theoretical discoveries, 
as Marx suggests, are incorporated into the productive process 
through the experience of the worker. 
In a moment we will conclude our argument by touching on 
how Marx himself intuits, in Capital, the appropriation of fixed 
capital by the producer. But now let us highlight how Marx’s 
analysis in Capital remains subtended by the arguments of the 
Grundrisse, namely by the theorization of the General Intellect as 
the matter and subject of the productive process. That discovery 
led him to show the extent to which cognitive matter was central 
to production and how the very concept of fixed capital was 
transformed by it. When Marx proclaims that fixed capital, which 
in Capital is usually understood as a complex of machines, has 
become ‘man himself ’, he foreshadows the development of capital 
in our time. Though fixed capital is the product of labour and 
nothing but labour appropriated by capital; though the accumula-
tion of scientific activity and the productivity of what Marx calls 
the ‘social intellect’ are incorporated into machines under the 
control of capital; and though, lastly, capital freely appropriates 
all of this – at a certain point of capitalist development living 
labour begins to exercise the power of inverting this relation. 
Living labour begins to show its primacy over capital and the 
capitalist management of social production, even when it cannot 
necessarily stand outside that process. In other words, when it 
becomes an ever-ampler social power, living labour operates as 
an increasingly independent activity, outside the disciplinary 
structures commanded by capital – not only as labour-power but 
also, in a more general way, as vital activity. On the one hand, past 
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human activity and intelligence are accumulated, crystallized as 
fixed capital, but on the other, inverting the flow, living human 
beings are capable of reabsorbing capital into themselves and their 
social life. Fixed capital is ‘man himself ’ in both senses.
Here the appropriation of fixed capital is no longer a metaphor 
but becomes a dispositif that class struggle can take up and that 
makes itself felt as a political programme. Capital is no longer, 
in this case, a relation that objectively includes the producer, 
forcibly imposing its domination upon him; rather, the capitalist 
relation now includes a final contradiction – that of a producer, 
of a class of producers, which has, be it partially or totally, but 
in any instance effectively, dispossessed capital of the means of 
production, asserting itself as a hegemonic subject. The analogy 
with the emergence of the third estate within the structures of 
the ancien régime is carried out by Marx in the historicization of 
the capital relation, and it obviously presents itself in an explo-
sive, revolutionary way.
To conclude, Marxian ontology displays at least two aspects. 
The first is represented by the development of labour-power in 
its radical productive capacity, in its full and bodily abstraction, 
which determines the evolution of capital and imposes upon it a 
progressive character; this is an ontology that takes the figure of 
a deposit of dead labour, a common that is fixed, stratified, organ-
ized as existing wealth and the command over it. But this ontol-
ogy has a second face, the one represented by living labour, class 
struggle, a continuous drive to break capitalist development, 
which takes the guise of virtuality and the power of liberation 
from work. This relation implies two opposing teleologies: the 
one that corresponds to the ontology/deposit of dead labour and 
the one that corresponds to the ontology/power of class struggle. 
The common presents itself in two forms: as deposit and telos, as 
deposit of dead labour and as telos of living labour.
translated by albertO tOscanO
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5From the production of value 
to the valuing of reproduction
tithi bhattacharya 
 
Capital, of course, is about the working class and hence about 
labour.1 This claim only appears controversial because, barring a 
few passages and the famous chapter on the working day, Capital, 
as a text, is predominantly concerned with abstract labour or the 
value-form of labour. Since it is Capital that best teaches us that 
the value-form violates and extinguishes all sensuous properties 
of human labour, Marx’s central concern in Capital appears to 
be tracing the procedures of that extinguishment rather than 
establishing the subjective, conscious aspects of human labour. 
This particular reading of Capital, as a text organized solely 
around the form-determination of wage labour, has led some 
Marxists to make a further analytical leap about the ‘indiffer-
ence’ of capitalism as a mode of production. For instance, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, a prominent advocate of this view, has argued 
that 
Sexual and racial equality … are not in principle incompatible with 
capitalism. The disappearance of class inequalities, on the other 
hand, is by definition incompatible with capitalism. At the same 
time, although class exploitation is constitutive of capitalism as 
1. I am grateful to Aaron Jaffe for suggesting my title.
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sexual or racial inequalities are not, capitalism subjects all social 
relations to its requirements.2
In this reading of Marx, capitalism as a system is reconstructed 
as the first and only exploitative system that does not require the 
production and sustenance of extra-economic inequalities. The 
existence of such inequalities is seen as contingent rather than 
exigent to the system whose reproduction can be assured through 
the wage-form, or through the extraction of surplus value 
between economically unequal but juridically equal subjects. 
Social Reproduction Theory, a conceptual apparatus primarily 
developed from Capital by Marxist feminists, this essay argues, 
offers a better reading of Marx’s method than the hypothesis of 
capitalist indifference. I make this argument in three separate 
but related ways. First, at a general level, by critically assessing 
the status of labour in Capital; second, through a more specific 
argument about capitalism’s systemic unity, which urges us 
to develop theoretical frameworks capable of reproducing in 
thought the social relations that capitalism engenders and 
sustains; and, finally, through an empirical argument about how 
labour-power is differentially produced in different sections of 
the working class.
Let me preface my argument with some brief remarks about 
Social Reproduction Theory (SRT) and its theoretical contours. 
Fundamentally, SRT theorizes labour-power and the practices 
that enable its reproduction within capitalist social relations. 
Situated within, and following from, the conceptual architecture 
of Capital, SRT proposes (a) that the labour expended in the 
production of commodities (at the point of production) and 
the labour expended for the ‘production’ of people or workers 
who produce such commodities are part of the same capitalist 
totality and intrinsically relational; and relatedly (b) that the 
2. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 259.
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working-class family is the primary, but not the only, site for the 
reproduction of labour-power or the reproduction of the working 
class as a whole. 
SRT identifies two key features regarding labour-power and 
its coagulation into capitalist wage labour. First, capital’s contra-
dictory need with regards to labour-power. On the one hand, 
capital needs a steady, predictable circuit for the reproduction of 
labour-power, since it is the source of capital’s profit and hence 
its own reproduction. But labour-power is reproduced by human 
beings, not machines, hence how it is reproduced, to what extent 
its capacities are developed, may not align with capital’s needs. 
Thus all sites and processes for the reproduction of labour-power 
are, ultimately, arenas of contestation between labour and 
capital: the former constantly tending towards a greater ‘share of 
civilization’ to develop and further human capacities, while the 
latter straining to reduce such a share and mould labour-power 
and such capacities to create and maintain the productive worker 
that capital needs. 
Capital, SRT and the value-form 
If SRT is, at its core, concerned with the gendered, racialized 
reproduction of labour-power, and Capital, as text, is fundamen-
tally concerned with how surplus-value is produced and with 
what consequences, in what ways are the two related? Positions 
such as Wood’s above try to demonstrate that capitalist social 
relations as they unfold historically ought to be theoretically 
separated out from the abstract or logical architecture of capital-
ism. This particular derivation from Capital and the approach to 
capitalism it involves are, in my view, at odds with both Marx’s 
methodology and the project of Capital.
Capital is indubitably about the value-form of labour, and 
we can certainly find passages in Marx which might support 
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the argument that economic categories ought to be considered 
distinctly from their historic unfolding.3 However, we cannot 
lose sight of the fact that what distinguishes Marx’s method 
from non-Marxist ones (say Ricardo’s concept of fixed essences) 
is that Marx rejects a separation between reality and its ap-
prehension in thought. Instead, his methodology establishes a 
dialectical unity between them, operating simultaneously at both 
logical and historical levels. To be clear, Marx is not proposing a 
simple unity between theory and reality in a naturalistic way, but 
shows how theoretical categories derive from historic develop-
ments. This does not mean that such categories are reflective 
of immediate appearances; indeed, they may be their mirror 
opposites. Rather, Marx’s method discloses a constant upward, 
spiral movement between theory and reality (or appearance and 
essence), becoming more complex at each successive level of 
determination. 
The relationship between ‘theory’ and ‘history/reality’ is often 
cast as a relationship between abstract categories and concrete 
histories. So far, we have argued that there is a relationship 
between the two, but Marx goes much further than simple rela-
tionality. Bertell Ollman provides perhaps the most perspicuous 
analysis of Marx’s method of abstraction, and for our purposes it 
is worth following his argument in its entirety. 
An abstract category, commonly understood, is a static one, 
an unmoving part separated from a dynamic whole which 
can reveal to the analyst key features of the whole, the latter 
being impossible to study in its totality. Marx uses several such 
abstractions – ‘money’, ‘commodity’ – to understand the history 
and nature of capitalism. Unlike bourgeois approaches to 
3. ‘It would therefore be infeasible and wrong to let the economic categories follow 
one another in the same sequence as that in which they were historically decisive. Their 
sequence is determined, rather, by their relation to one another in modern bourgeois 
society, which is precisely the opposite of that which seems to be their natural order 
or which corresponds to historical development.’ Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin 
Nicolaus, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1993, p. 107.
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abstraction, Marx’s methodology refuses all static forms. Hence, 
Ollman argues, Marx sets out ‘to abstract things, in his words, 
“as they really are and happen”, making how they happen part of 
what they are. Hence, capital (or labour, money, etc.) is not only 
how capital appears and functions, but also how it develops; or 
rather, how it develops, its real history, is also part of what it is.’4 
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels mock Bruno Bauer for 
attempting to prove an antithetical relationship between ‘nature’ 
and ‘history’, as if these ‘were two separate “things”’.5 In contrast, 
a Marxist theoretical abstraction encloses both a history of its 
becoming while disclosing its possible future. For instance, 
within the abstract category ‘capital’ we find its past – ‘primitive 
accumulation’ – as well as forecasts of its future: constant expan-
sion through surplus-value extraction, the accumulation drive 
necessarily creating a world market, and so on. Ollman thus 
rightly concludes: 
This ‘history’ of capital is part of capital, contained within the 
abstraction that Marx makes of capital, and part of what he wants 
to convey with its covering concept. All of Marx’s main abstractions 
– labour, value, commodity, money, etc. – incorporate process, 
becoming, history in just this way.6 
While we may find these categories, in whole or in part, in other 
epochs of history – that is, in other modes of production – they 
either remain unrealized in their function or play entirely dif-
ferent roles from their current incarnation. When they combine 
in the capitalist mode of production they do so simultaneously 
saturated with their past, while establishing new relationships 
within themselves. The history of precapitalist practices thus 
cannot be severed from explanatory categories of capitalism. 
4. Bertell Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic: Steps in Marx’s Method, Urbana and Chicago 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003, p. 65; emphasis added.
5. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5, London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1976, p. 39.
6. Ollman, Dance of the Dialectic, p. 66.
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Let us now revisit Ellen Wood’s claim that (a) extraction of 
surplus value is the primary concern for capital and hence (b) 
the ‘how’ of that process, whether through racialized, gendered 
or ableist means, is external to capital’s central pursuit. We 
have already established, following Ollman, that even abstract 
categories in Marx carry historical lineages and futural allu-
sions. In a sense this should be enough to reject Wood’s claim of 
capitalist indifference. But there is actually a case to be made for 
indifference as regards capitalist forms, just not, however, in the 
way Wood conceives of it. 
Let us take the category ‘labour’ as it appears in Marx. It 
is banally true that human beings have always laboured in a 
diversity of historical epochs and social formations. But labour 
as a simple category that Marx uses to build the theoretical 
infrastructure of capitalism, ‘when … economically conceived in 
this simplicity’, becomes ‘as modern a category as … the relations 
which create this simple abstraction’. Under capitalism labour-
as-such, not a specific kind of labour, becomes the basis for the 
creation of wealth. To conceive of labour in this, its most simple 
form, was an analytical leap taken by classical political economy. 
‘It was a tremendous advance on the part of Adam Smith’, writes 
Marx, ‘to throw aside every limiting specification of wealth-
creating activity – not only manufacturing, or commercial or 
agricultural labour, but one as well as the others, labour in 
general.’ And how did classical political economy arrive at this 
generalized form of labour? Not simply by seeing that labouring 
was an ahistorical category common to all epochs, but because 
labour, under capitalism, had become, for the first time, ‘labour 
in general’. The theoretical conception of this general or simple 
form for labour was only possible in the historical actuality of a 
‘very developed totality of real kinds of labour, of which no single 
one … [was] any longer predominant’. Abstraction arose from the 
many determinations of the concrete while the concrete could 
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only be conceived of as such through the simple abstraction. The 
‘most general abstractions’, Marx reminds us, ‘arise only in the 
midst of the richest possible concrete development, where one 
thing appears as common to many, to all. Then it ceases to be 
thinkable in a particular form alone.’7 
It is because indifference is expressed in the historical form 
that it can be grasped as such in the theoretical form. It is 
because individuals in capitalist society can fluidly move from 
one form of labour to another that labour has become ‘the 
means of creating wealth in general, and has ceased to be organi-
cally linked with particular individuals in any specific form’. 
Hence, far from there being an ‘abstract capitalism’ indifferent to 
historical forms and a ‘historical capitalism’ marked by concrete 
social relations, Marx’s methodology urges critical thought to 
unite theory and reality in transformatively radical ways.8 
This methodology, I submit, urges us to see Capital as an exer-
cise in charting the fate of labour under capitalism, including the 
historical forms it assumes within the system. Accordingly, Marx 
posits abstract labour very carefully as one aspect of his labour 
theory of value. Subjective forms of concrete labour, the analyti-
cal twin of abstract labour and social labour through which the 
value form is organized, are all understood as different aspects 
of labour operating as a unity. Most importantly, Capital is about 
why and how abstract labour dominates over the other aspects 
and submits them to the law of value. If the other aspects of 
7. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 37–8.
8. In her essay ‘Remarks on Gender’, Cinzia Arruzza makes the case for theory and 
history in the following way: ‘as soon as we accept … [a] distinction between the logical 
structure of capital and its historical dimensions, we can then accept the idea that 
the extraction of surplus-value takes place within the framework of relations between 
formally free and equal individuals without presupposing differences in juridical and 
political status. But we can do this only at a very high level of abstraction – that is to 
say, at the level of the logical structure. From the point of view of concrete history, 
things change radically.’ While agreeing fully with the overall thrust of this rich essay I 
differ with her slightly on the distinction she makes between a ‘high level of abstraction’ 
and ‘the point of view of concrete history’. I think her own method, which scaffolds the 
essay, is closer to Ollman’s view than this particular formulation allows us to see. Cinzia 
Arruzza, ‘Remarks on Gender’, Viewpoint Magazine, 2 September 2014.
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labour appear as muted shadows of abstract labour, then, it is not 
because Marx is ‘reporting’ on reality in any simple way. These 
other categories in Capital have a much more significant role to 
play in the totality of Marx’s argument – they signal the limits 
to capitalism’s ability to reduce workers to simply being potential 
sources of surplus value. 
Let us look more closely at the relationship between abstract 
and concrete labour and their respective roles in capitalism. As 
we indicated above, a system organized on the basis of abstract 
labour can only appear when different forms of concrete labour, 
performed by historically situated people, are forced into a 
relationship of equivalence via the market, production for which 
take place solely for profit rather than for human need. Two con-
current processes constitute the totality of capitalism, the system 
reproducing itself through the production of commodities and 
rubbing against but nested within it, human beings reproducing 
their lives. Reproduction of life-making practices and the repro-
duction of value must be simultaneous and continuous.
Two preconditions attend to such a system: one, that people 
are forcibly torn from the means of production such that access 
to their subsistence or life-making is only available through the 
mechanism of the market; two, that the system is able to ensure 
its continued reproduction by reproducing the social relations 
that scaffold the market and the extraction of surplus-value. 
In other words, capitalist social relations must continually 
reproduce the worker’s dependence on capital. ‘The advance of 
capitalist production’, Marx writes, ‘develops a working class 
which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the require-
ments of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. 
The organization of the capitalist process of production, once it 
is fully developed, breaks down all resistance.’9
9. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1909, p. 809. 
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Dominance of abstract over concrete labour, of value over use-
value, creates the conditions for and necessitates the ‘production’ 
of a worker compliant to capital’s every whim. 
If this were the whole story of Capital, then celebrations of its 
150th birthday would be held at Wall Street. So how, if at all, is re-
sistance a part of the story? If Marxist theory requires all parts of a 
social totality to be connected through internal relations, how can 
resistance to capital be shown to be immanent to the reproduction 
of capital? This is where SRT, deploying Capital’s methodology but 
building upon its silences, effects a categorial transformation of 
the concept of labour-power as the analytical causeway between 
capitalist reproduction and anti-capitalist resistance. 
Labour-power
Even the most creative reading of the concept of labour-power in 
Capital shows that the text presupposes the existence of what is 
being reproduced. Discussion of labour-power begins not from 
where or how it has been societally produced but from the ways 
in which, in its commodity form, it sustains the production of 
surplus-value. Differently put, the conceptualization of labour-
power in the text is limited to the form in which it is useful to 
capital. SRT troubles this capital-oriented view of labour-power 
and performs, in theory, a reverse movement, away from the site 
of commodity production to the site of reproduction of labour-
power. Labour-power is nominated variously in Capital as the 
unique, special or peculiar commodity, because it is presented 
as the only commodity ‘whose use-value possesses the peculiar 
property of being a source of value’.10 SRT reveals that there is 
another aspect to labour power’s peculiarity. It is a commodity 
that is not produced capitalistically – that is, within the direct 
10. Ibid., p. 186. 
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ambit of the capital–wage labour relation. Instead, as Lise Vogel 
has shown, it is produced and reproduced in a ‘kin-based site’, the 
‘working class family’.11 
Vogel’s critical insight is significant in three crucial respects. 
One, because it expresses the dialectical unity of the historical 
and logical form of capital. Labour-power, SRT shows, can only 
become available to capital through distinct but reliable sets 
of gendered, racialized social relations which create their own 
institutional forms of sustenance (e.g. the monogamous, hetero-
normative family form).12 Older historical forms may be recast, 
new forms may be created and mobilized, but it is only through 
concrete social relations, and sensuous human labour, that 
labour-power is produced and made available to capital. This is 
not a functional argument about capital creating the ideal family 
form or gender regime to correspond neatly to the compulsions 
of its own reproduction. Rather, while capital does not exert 
direct influence on the production of labour-power and thus 
allows for relative autonomy of forms and practices, capitalist re-
production imposes conditions upon the social forms possible in 
which labour-power may be reproduced. Second, being attentive 
to labour-power not as it appears to capital but as it is produced 
and reproduced, SRT introduces, or rather restores, to capitalist 
totality a sphere of social relations where life-making activities 
proliferate. Capital’s goal is to increase surplus-value in the 
sphere of production; the worker’s goal is to enhance her quality 
of life, or a qualitative enrichment of her labour-power and her 
selfhood, through the satisfaction of her needs. SRT reminds us 
of the power of these life-making activities by workers, for they 
seek to impose brakes on the process of accumulation, as capital 
is forced to pay for them through wages and social benefits. 
11. Lise Vogel, Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward A Unitary Theory, New 
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983, pp. 151, 170. 
12. I use gender and race as two of the most visible forms of labour-shaping relations. 
Age, ability, location, ethnicity and other factors play similar roles.
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Finally, there is a clear strategic component to SRT. Life-making 
social practices by workers are not simple congeries of activities to 
satisfy needs. They have the potential to carry an anti-capitalist 
charge. Struggles to enhance or expand such practices will always 
reveal the balance of class forces. This is not to claim that any 
or all struggles by workers to improve their living conditions are 
anti-systemic struggles. Recent contestations over the welfare 
state, played out globally, reveal the dark obverse of emancipatory 
politics. In several countries, especially in the global North, social 
benefits of the welfare state, dwindling due to neoliberal cuts, are 
being dangled before the working class by authoritarian, populist 
parties as rights to be defended against migrants, racial minorities 
and national ‘others’. As a processual theory, SRT is helpful in this 
context for we are reminded of the adaptability of capitalist social 
relations and their systemic ability to reshape its past political con-
cessions – in this case, welfare benefits for workers – into political 
forms that benefit accumulation: here, the way racism within 
the working class functions to undermine class-wide solidarity 
and hence potential for resistance. Struggles that are about 
enhancing the sphere of life-making for workers can thus reveal, 
often implicitly but sometimes explicitly, the upper limits to what 
the working class can claim in its goal of self-enhancement and 
liberation. They thus carry the potential of teaching the worker-
in-struggle the most important political lesson about capitalism: 
that while the wage-form exists, life-making activities can never 
be free of the drive for accumulation, and that real emancipation 
of life and labour is only possible with the abolishment of the 
wage-form and hence of capitalism. 
Production of difference
If SRT establishes the non-capitalistic production of labour-
power and its reproduction through gendered and racialized 
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social relations, it also raises more troubling questions about 
the procedures of its reproduction. The production of value and 
the extraction of surplus-value, as demonstrated in Capital, have 
certain tendencies and countertendencies that seek equalization 
throughout the system. But the hallmark of capitalism is surely 
its deep social inequality both between the capitalist class and 
workers and within the classes themselves. The production 
and extraction of surplus-value of course unpacks the secret of 
inequality between capital and labour, but what explains the 
sustenance of inequality among workers? 
Traditional Marxist accounts of racism within the working 
class, for example, locate the production and reproduction of 
race in labour-market competition. The argument goes: workers 
compete with each other as individual sellers of labour-power 
on the market and historically dominant sections of the class 
compete with the more vulnerable over jobs, pensions and social 
benefits. Writing on why a section of the American working 
class voted for Reagan in 1980, Robert and Johanna Brenner 
elaborated on this thesis thus:
It appears possible for the stronger sections of the working class to 
defend their positions by organizing on the basis of already existing 
ties against weaker, less-organized sections. They can take advantage 
of their positions as Americans over and against foreigners, as 
whites over and against blacks, as men over and against women, as 
employed over and against unemployed, etc.13
While agreeing with the broad outlines of this account, I think 
SRT urges us to push the question of differentiation further and 
pitch it not just at the level of the labour market, which expresses 
the price of labour-power, but at the level of production of the 
value of labour-power. 
13. Robert Brenner and Johanna Brenner, ‘Reagan, the Right and the Working Class’, 
Against the Current, Os , vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1981), p. 30.
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The value of labour-power as a commodity, like all commodi-
ties under capitalism, is determined by the value of the means of 
subsistence deployed in its reproduction. But Marx reminds us 
that for this peculiar commodity labour-power, in ‘contradistinc-
tion … to the case of other commodities’, there enters a ‘histori-
cal and moral element’ in the determination of its value. This is 
because while there might be a lower limit to what a labouring 
body needs to reproduce itself to be ready for new day of work, 
there can be no fixed upper limit to the worker’s necessary needs, 
as needs themselves are dynamic, historically produced and 
shaped by the gains made by the working class through struggle. 
The number and extent of the worker’s ‘necessary wants’, Marx 
confirms, thus ‘are themselves the product of historical develop-
ment, and depend therefore to a great extent on the degree of 
civilisation of a country, more particularly on the conditions 
under which, and consequently on the habits and degree of 
comfort in which, the class of free labourers has been formed’.14
If necessary wants, which determine the value of labour-
power, are historical and dynamic, it follows, then, that different 
sections of the working class, produced at different moments of 
history, will have different standards of necessary wants. The 
Irish worker, in direct contrast with her English counterpart, 
embodied, for Marx, this production of difference, for the 
Irish worker was at that ‘level of wage labour’ that accepted 
‘the most animal minimum of needs and subsistence’ in her 
exchange with capital.15 This version of productive difference, 
then, situates difference in the very operation of labour-power’s 
reproduction, which means that labour-power, pace Robert and 
Johanna Brenner, has already been differentially (re)produced 
even before it reaches the field of labour-market competition. 
Indeed, even the access or entry into the labour market cannot 
14. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 190
15. Marx, Grundrisse, p. 285. 
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be a presupposition as such access/entry varies across different 
sections of the class precisely due to differential (re)production.
Attention to socially reproductive activities reveals the specific 
social processes through which certain workers, embodying 
certain qualities of labour-power, arrive at the doorstep of capital 
more vulnerable and degraded than others. Ruthlessly depressed 
levels of ‘necessary wants’ for Latino workers in the USA is one 
example of brutally differentiated processes of social reproduc-
tion between migrant workers and their citizen counterparts. 
The median space per person in a Latino household in the USA 
is 350 square feet, 80 square feet less than that of the average 
non-migrant family living below the poverty line.16 In a similar 
vein, a recent study revealed the growing wage gap between black 
and white workers. For our purposes, it is instructive to note 
the puzzlement of the researchers of this study when faced with 
the ‘growing unexplained portion of the divergence in earnings 
for blacks relative to whites’. According to the report, this could 
be owing to ‘hard-to-measure factors’ including discrimination, 
read racism, or difference in the quality of public schools.17 The 
‘equalization’ of value that capital achieves within a bounded 
community/nation-state, is achieved through differentiated 
norms across differentiated elements of reproduction, (re)pro-
ducing some sections of the working class as more abject than 
others.
Access to housing, police violence, substandard schools and 
healthcare are obvious ingredients that determine the level of 
necessary wants for a section of the working class and thereby 
determine, and lower, the value of their labour-power. But 
the lowering of value for one section of workers always has 
16. US census data quoted in Susan Ferguson and David McNally ‘Precarious Migrants: 
Gender, Race and the Social Reproduction of a Global Working Class’, Socialist Register 
2015, vol. 51, pp. 1-23.
17. www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-05/black-workers-wage-gap-has-widened- 
for-hard-to-explain-reasons.
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conditioning impulses for all sections, for lower wages for some 
workers can allow capital to rationalize and lower wages for all 
workers. Degraded social reproduction of racialized workers thus 
can help establish a regime of cheapened wages for all. 
In conclusion, it is useful to circle back to the morphology 
of labour-power since the argument offered in Capital and the 
significance of SRT are fused within it. While it is true that 
capitalism tries to produce the working class it needs, Capital 
shows workers’ struggle against the wage form to be a necessary 
part of the internal dynamics of the system and its reproduction. 
The worker will always tend towards the development of her 
own needs through life-making activities, while capital will 
continually tend towards limiting such activities to increase its 
share of surplus value and hence ‘civilization’. Collective organ-
izing on the basis of solidarity remains the only way the working 
class can win in this unequally resourced battle against capital. 
The warning we receive from SRT, however, is that multi-
racial working-class unity will not arise spontaneously through 
either left-wing propaganda or voluntarism, for differentiation of 
the working class is produced and sustained at cellular levels of 
the system. Vicious border policies and gendered and racialized 
labour regimes are some of the ways in which neoliberalism 
seeks to globally reproduce the working class in combined but 
deeply unequal ways. Against this warning, the aspiration we 
receive from SRT is equally important. As a unitary theory 
revealing the relationship between point of production of 
commodities and the spaces of reproduction of labour-power, 
SRT imbues every struggle for enhanced social reproduction 
with anti-capitalist possibilities. A working-class movement 
that will be able to give form to such possibilities cannot simply 
retrace older cultures of solidarity; it will have actively to forge 
new ones. Such a movement must champion with equal vigour 
working-class struggles based in communities – around water, 
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housing or police violence – alongside workplace struggles. It will 
have to learn to unify universal demands (healthcare) with race 
and gender specific ones (reproductive health, affirmative action). 
If Capital remains one of the most savage critiques of capital-
ism as a system, SRT can perhaps be thought of as animating 
that critique with embodied voices of workers in struggle.
6Social reproduction and 
racialized surplus populations
sara r. Farris 
 
In this essay I draw on my recent book on the exploitation 
of feminist themes by right-wing nationalist parties within 
Islamophobic and anti-immigration campaigns, or what I 
call ‘femonationalism’.1 In the last ten years or so right-wing 
nationalist parties across the Western world have increasingly 
demonized Muslim, migrant and racialized males more generally 
for being misogynist, and have depicted Muslim women in par-
ticular as ‘victims to be rescued’. It is obvious how hypocritical 
and opportunistic this move is, considering the very poor record 
these parties have when it comes to women’s rights. 
The mobilization of gender-equality themes by right-wing 
parties within Islamophobic and racist campaigns has been 
analysed by many scholars, mostly addressing the political impli-
cations of such manoeuvres. I am thinking here of Jasbir Puar’s 
notion of homonationalism and Eric Fassin’s use of the concept 
of sexual democracy to describe the centrality of themes of 
sexuality for contemporary anti-Islam campaigns.2 However, as a 
1. Sara R. Farris, In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, Durham 
NC: Duke University Press, 2017.
2. Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages. Homonationalism in Queer Times, Durham NC: 
Duke University Press, 2007; Éric Fassin, ‘Sexual Democracy and the New Racialization 
of Europe’, Journal of Civil Society, vol. 8, no. 3 (2012), pp. 285–8.
122 caPitalisM: cOncePt, idea, iMage
Marxist feminist, I am interested to see whether we can identify 
a political-economic logic behind these ideas that Muslim and 
non-Western migrant women (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) 
need rescue. In particular, I have wanted to explore whether the 
sudden stigmatization of Muslim and non-Western migrant men 
in the name of women’s rights has also something to do with the 
position of Muslim and migrant women in the economic arena, 
particularly within what is called social reproduction.
 Here, then, I will explain in what ways I think social-
reproduction feminism is central for understanding the reasons 
contemporary nationalist/racist formations seem to apply a 
double standard to racialized men and women. According to 
such a double standard, non-Western men (Muslim and non-
Muslim alike) are oppressors of women, but also job stealers, 
whereas non-Western women are usually depicted as victims 
of their misogynist and backward cultures, to be saved and 
emancipated. But they are hardly depicted as those taking jobs 
from ‘native’ workers. Why is this the case? To understand this 
gendered and racialized double standard in terms of the way 
in which it foregrounds the economic threat when it comes to 
non-Western men, while entirely omitting the economic realm 
when it comes to women, I have recourse to Marx’s concept of 
reserve army of labour.
The essay is divided into two parts. In the first part I briefly 
summarize Marx’s theory of the reserve army of labour, or 
surplus population, and see if and how it can help us to under-
stand the position of migrant labour in the contemporary 
European economy. In the second part I discuss in what ways 
a combined reading of social-reproduction feminism and the 
Marxian theory of surplus populations can enable us to answer 
the questions raised at the outset. Is there an economic logic 
behind the femonationalist ideological formation? And in what 
ways can social-reproduction feminism help us to decode why 
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nationalists’ racist narratives address racialized men as oppres-
sors and women as victims to be rescued?
On Marx’s theory of the reserve army of labour 
In Marx’s analysis, (a) the increase in the magnitude of social 
capital (that is, the ensemble of individual capitals), (b) the 
enlargement of the scale of production, and (c) the growth of the 
productivity of an increasing number of workers brought about 
by capital accumulation, create a situation in which the greater 
‘attraction of labourers by capital is accompanied by their greater 
repulsion’.3 These three interrelated processes, for Marx, set the 
conditions according to which the labouring population gives 
rise, ‘along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, [also 
to] the means by which it itself is made relatively superfluous, is 
turned into a relative surplus population; and it does this to an 
always increasing extent’). Marx describes this as a law of popu-
lation, which is peculiar to the capitalist mode of production 
just as other modes of production have their own corresponding 
population laws. The paradox of the creation of the surplus 
labouring population under the capitalist mode of production is 
that while it is ‘a necessary product of accumulation’, this surplus 
population is also the lever of such accumulation; namely, it 
is that which ‘forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that 
belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it 
at its own cost’.4) The discussion on the creation of the reserve 
army of labour is strictly related to Marx’s analysis of the organic 
composition of capital and the tendency of capitalist accumula-
tion to encourage the increase ‘of its constant, at the expense of 
its variable constituent’.5 
3. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 
35, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, p. 625.
4. Ibid., pp. 625–6.
5. Ibid., p. 323.
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In other words, the creation of a pool of unemployed and 
underemployed is due to capital’s need to increase the mass and 
value of the means of production (i.e. machines), at the cost of 
the decrease of the mass and value of living labour (i.e. wages 
and workers). Indeed, a crucial element in the reduction of 
wages and workers, or variable capital, is technical development 
and mechanization, which alongside other factors leads to the 
expulsion of a number of labourers from the productive process, 
and therefore to the creation of a surplus of workers who are no 
longer needed. This notwithstanding, Marx saw an inescapable 
limit to mechanization, for labour-power is the main source of 
surplus-value, and therefore is that component of the labour 
process that cannot be entirely replaced by machines. This 
is one of the reasons why, in order to guarantee and increase 
capital’s accumulation, the history of capitalism has seen the 
development of a number of strategies all aimed at decreasing 
the mass and value of variable capital, but also at limiting the 
pitfalls of complete mechanization. Some of these strategies 
have been: (a) relocation of production in areas with cheap 
labour, instead of investments in costly technological innovation 
to maintain productive sites in areas with ‘pricey’ labour power; 
and (b) resorting to the supply of cheap labour usually provided 
by migrant workers, particularly in the case of non-relocatable 
productive sectors (construction and the service industry, for 
instance), thereby giving rise to forms of competition between 
‘native’ and ‘non-native’ workers for the jobs available. For this 
set of reasons, already in Marx’s time migrants and racial-
ized minorities occupied a special place within the capitalist 
reproduction of surplus labouring populations, a situation that 
enabled capitalists to maintain wage discipline and to inhibit 
working-class solidarity by means of the application of a logic of 
divide and rule.
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Social-reproduction feminism and migrant/racialized women
The Marxian notion of the reserve army of labour, together with 
those theories that highlight the operations of the state in helping 
to produce and reproduce the reserve armies of labour, is an 
essential tool for describing the conditions of migrant and racial-
ized labour in the present conjuncture.6 In particular it enables 
us to decipher both the economic and the political process of the 
construction of migrant and racialized workers as a new global 
class of dispossessed. This notwithstanding, we should note that 
migrant and racialized women in contemporary Western Europe 
are neither presented nor perceived in the same way as men. 
Moreover, the role these women play within the contemporary 
capitalist economy, as a fraction of labour segregated in a newly 
commodified sector such as care and domestic work, is arguably 
also different. How can we explain this gender double standard?
Women comprise slightly less than half of all international 
migrants worldwide.7 In Europe, for instance, estimates reveal 
that women make up slightly more than half of the migrant 
stock in the EU27. A large number of migrant but also racialized 
women (who are not necessarily migrant as in the case of many 
Muslim women or second-generation immigrant women) who 
actively participate in the Western labour market are employed 
in one single branch of the economy, namely the care and 
domestic or socially reproductive sector. The increasing partici-
pation of ‘native’ women in the ‘productive’ economy since the 
1980s, the decline of the birth rate and the increasing number of 
elderly people, coupled with the erosion, insufficiency or simply 
non-existence of public or affordable care services, has resulted 
6. See, for instance, Jon May, Jane Wills, Yara Datta, Evans Kavita, Joanna Herbert 
and Cathy McIlwaine, ‘Keeping London Working: Global Cities, the British State 
and London’s New Migrant Division of Labour’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 32 (2007), pp. 151–67.
7. United Nations, International Migration Report, 2017, www.un.org/en/development/
desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_
Highlights.pdf; accessed 20 February 2018.
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in the marketization of so-called ‘reproductive’ labour, which is 
now done mainly by migrant and racialized women. The demand 
for labour in this sector has grown so much over the past twenty 
years that it is now regarded as the main reason for the femini-
zation of international migration).8
In order to understand the ‘exception’ constituted by migrant 
and racialized women in contemporary Europe as a workforce 
and segment of the population that seems to be spared from 
accusations of economic and social – as well as cultural – threat, 
and even victimized and offered rescue, I suggest that we need 
to look more closely at the reorganization of social reproduction. 
What distinguishes the care and domestic sector, or socially 
reproductive sector, where migrant and racialized women are 
mostly employed, from other sectors that employ mostly migrant 
and racialized men?
First, as many scholars have emphasized, ‘affectivity’ is a 
fundamental – albeit not exclusive – component of ‘socially 
reproductive’ labour. This is important because the ‘affective’ 
component of social reproduction poses core difficulties for 
attempts to mechanize and automate it. As Silvia Federici argues,
Unlike commodity production, the reproduction of human beings is 
to a great extent irreducible to mechanization, being the satisfaction 
of complex needs, in which physical and affective elements are 
inextricably combined, requiring a high degree of human interaction 
and a most labor-intensive process.9
8. See Rachel Salazar Parreñass, Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration and 
Domestic Work, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2001; James A. Tyner, Made in 
the Philippines: Gendered Discourses and the Making of Migrants, London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004; Nana Oishi, Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies and Labor 
Migration in Asia, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2005; Maurice Schiff, Andrew 
R. Morrison and Mirja Sjoeblom, The International Migration of Women, New York: World 
Bank Publications and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Jennifer Rubin, Michael S. 
Rendall, Lila Rabinovich, Flavia Tsang, Constantijn van Oranje-Nassau and Barbara Janta, 
Migrant Women in the European Labour Force: Current Situation and Future Prospects, 
European Commission, Directorate General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunity, RAND Europe, 2008; International Labour Office, Domestic Workers Across 
the World: Global and Regional Statistics and the Extent of Legal Protection, Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2013. 
9. Silvia Federici, ‘The Reproduction of Labor-Power in the Global Economy: Marxist 
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Second, the need for proximity between the producer and 
consumer of socially reproductive labour such as care and 
domestic work, the impossibility of suspending it, as well as the 
fact that such work must be consumed immediately after, or 
during, its production, make the interruption and ‘the physical 
relocation of production away from the site of final consumption 
(as in commodity production) (practically) impossible’.10
One of the consequences of socially reproductive labour’s 
resistance to mechanization and relocation is not only that this 
work has been re-privatized, redistributed onto the shoulders 
of migrant women, or partly commercialized, but also that it is 
one of those sectors where Marx’s analysis of the reserve army of 
labour needs amending. As already indicated, the discussion of 
the creation of a surplus-labouring population, or reserve army, 
is strictly related to Marx’s analysis of the organic composition of 
capital and the tendency of capitalist accumulation to encourage 
the increase of the mass and value of the means of production 
at the cost of the mass and value of living labour employed in 
the production process. A crucial element for the reduction of 
variable capital is indeed technical development and automation, 
as well as relocation, which, alongside other factors, leads to the 
expulsion of a number of workers from the productive process 
and therefore to the creation of the reserve army. However, 
the resistance of social reproductive labour to mechanization 
and relocation means that only a small amount of this labour 
can be replaced by technical development. Mostly, it has to be 
performed by living labour, whether commodified through the 
recruitment of care/domestic workers in private households or 
through the growth of commercial services (fast food, laundry 
Theory and the Unﬁnished Feminist Revolution’, in Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, 
Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle, New York: PM Press, 2012.
10. Nicola Yeates, ‘Global Care Chains’, International Feminist Journal of Politics 6 
(2004), pp. 369–91.
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and so forth), or performed ‘for free’ by members of the family/
household.
As a result, the demand for care/domestic work in private 
households – particularly in a situation in which reproductive 
tasks are increasingly privatized within households, outsourced 
and commodified, and in light of societal and demographic 
changes such as the ageing of the population and the growing 
participation of women in paid work – is destined to grow 
dramatically in the coming years. It is thus not by chance that 
recent studies on the impact of the global economic crisis on 
migrant workers in many Western European countries shows 
that the sectors where migrant women are more concentrated 
(namely social reproduction) ‘have not been affected by the 
crisis’; indeed these sectors have ‘even expanded in its context’.11 
As previously noted, the ageing of the population and the 
increasing participation of ‘native’ women in the labour market 
in the last twenty years, which was followed by neither a growth 
of public care services nor by changes in the gendered division 
of labour within the household, has certainly been one of the 
reasons for the growing demand of female private carers and 
houseworkers, and a powerful impetus for the feminization 
of contemporary migration flows. Yet, ‘it is not simply the lack 
of public provision that shapes the demand for childcare [and 
elderly care], but the very nature of state support that is available.’12 
In the last fifteen years, across Europe, forms of cash provision 
or tax credit have been introduced in order to assist families, 
encouraging the development of the ‘commodification of care’ 
11. Office of Economic and Cultural Development, International Migration Outlook, 
Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012; Sara R. Farris, ‘Migrants’ Regular Army of Labour: Gender 
Dimensions of the Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Migrant Labour in Western 
Europe’, The Sociological Review 63 (2015), pp. 121–43; Maria Karamessini and Jill Rubery, 
eds, Women and Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender Equality, London: 
Routledge, 2013.
12. Fiona Williams and Anna Gavanas, ‘The Intersection of Child Care Regimes and 
Migration Regimes: A Three-Country Study’, in Helma Lutz, ed., Migration and Domestic 
Work: A European Perspective on a Global Theme, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, p. 14.
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and domestic services, which are generally sought privately in the 
market, where migrant and racialized women provide the lion’s 
share of supply.
The growing demand for care and domestic workers in 
Europe, which has been nurtured by the set of societal and 
demographic phenomena I have described, is a very important 
factor in explaining why female migrant and racialized labour 
does not receive the same treatment as its male counterpart. 
Evidence for this can be found in the different ways in which 
current campaigns and policies against illegal migration 
impact upon men and women. The Italian case is particularly 
emblematic. In 2009 the Italian government granted an amnesty 
only for illegal migrants working as carers and domestic workers 
(badanti), who are mostly women, since that was considered 
the only sector where the demand for labour could not meet 
the national supply. On this occasion, Roberto Maroni of the 
Northern League (then minister of the interior) declared: ‘There 
cannot be a regularization for those who entered illegally, for 
those who rape a woman or rob a villa, but certainly we will take 
into account all those situations that have a strong social impact, 
as in the case of migrant care-givers.’13 Thus, right-wing anti-
immigration parties such as the Northern League are willing 
to turn a blind eye to undocumented migrants when they are 
women working in the care and domestic sector. The Northern 
League is also one of the parties deploying the femonationalist 
ideology described at the beginning of this paper.
Furthermore, one should note that integration policies across 
Europe are increasingly requiring migrant women to accept jobs 
in the social-reproductive sector in order to be granted the right 
to remain in the country. Paradoxically, these integration policies 
depart from the assumption that migrant women (particularly 
13. Interview available at www.repubblica.it/2008/05/sezioni/cronaca/sicurezza-
politica4/bossi-spagna/bossi-spagna.html; accessed 20 February 2018.
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Muslim) need to be emancipated, yet these same policies channel 
them towards jobs such as childcare, elderly care and housekeep-
ing which have been historically considered as the gender activi-
ties marking women’s lack of emancipation. 
As already mentioned, one of the consequences deriving from 
the peculiarities of commodified socially reproductive work 
performed by migrant and racialized women is that female 
migrant labour does not lend itself to be analysed through the 
Marxian category of the reserve army of labour in quite the 
same ways as male and racialized migrant labour in other sectors 
of the economy. The female migrant and racialized workforce 
employed in the care and domestic sector in Western Europe 
nowadays amounts not to a ‘reserve army’ that is depicted 
(and perceived) as an economic threat to native-born workers, 
constantly exposed to unemployment and used in order to 
maintain wage discipline. Rather, it amounts to a ‘regular’ army 
of labour. Instead of being competitors with native women in the 
market of low-skilled jobs, migrant women employed as care and 
domestic workers have both allowed a number of native-born 
women to work outside the household and created entirely new 
professional figures, such as that of the paid personal carer 
(badante), which in Italy, for instance, had not previously existed. 
Rather than inspiring campaigns for their exclusion from the 
labour market and from welfare benefits, or from Western 
Europe altogether, non-Western migrant and racialized women 
undergo exceptional processes of regularization (as in the Italian 
example) and even receive offers of ‘salvation’ from their allegedly 
backward cultures.
The emphasis on non-Western migrant women overall as 
individuals to be helped in their integration and emancipation 
process, including through job offers, is thus possible because 
they, unlike male migrant and racialized workers, currently 
occupy a strategic role in the socially reproductive sector of 
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childcare, elderly care and cleaning. Rather than ‘job stealers’ 
and ‘cultural and social threats’ – designations regularly used for 
migrant men – Muslim and non-Western migrant women seem 
to be those who allow Western Europeans to work in the public 
sphere by providing the care that neoliberal restructuring has 
commodified.
In conclusion, I would like thus to suggest that the double 
standard applied to migrant and racialized women in the 
public imaginary, as individuals in need of special attention, 
and even ‘rescue’, operates as an ideological tool that is strictly 
connected to their key role (present or future) in the reproduc-
tion of the material conditions of social reproduction. What I call 
femo nationalism, or the appropriation of feminist themes by 
nationalists in racist campaigns, should thus be understood as 
part and parcel of the specifically neoliberal reorganization of 
welfare, labour and state immigration policies that have occurred 
in the context of the global financial crisis and, more generally, 
the Western European crisis of social reproduction. The very 
possibility that right-wing nationalists can exploit emancipatory 
ideals of gender equality within xenophobic politics springs in 
large part from the specifically neoliberal reconfiguration of the 
Western European economy in the past thirty years. 
As I hope this essay has shown, a combined reading of 
social-reproduction theories and the Marxian theory of surplus 
populations is crucial for understanding the intertwining of 
racial and gendered oppression with class exploitation, as well as 
their equally cogent centrality to capitalist reproduction.

FREEDOM,  
DEMOCRACY  
& WAR

7It is getting darker around 
the central sun of freedom: 
Capital, translation and the 
re-feudalization of capitalism
bOris buden
As in the universe each planet, while turning on its own axis, 
moves around the sun, so in the system of freedom each of its 
worlds, while turning on its own axis, revolves around the central 
sun of freedom.
Karl Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’,  
Supplement to the Rheinsiche Zeitung, 1842
At the end of his introduction to the edition of the Communist 
Manifesto published by Penguin Classics in 2011, Marshall 
Berman tells a story he heard from the eminent theorist of 
international relations Hans Morgenthau, who emigrated from 
Nazi Germany in 1937. Morgenthau’s father, who was at the 
beginning of the twentieth century a doctor in a working-class 
neighbourhood in the city of Coburg in Bavaria, was often asked 
by his patients – mostly miners who were dying of tuberculosis 
and whom he couldn’t help – to bring them the Manifesto. Their 
last request was to be buried with Marx and Engels’s famous 
book – instead of the Bible.
A grave is not the best place for a book to survive. But it is, 
beyond doubt, a good starting point for research into manifold 
forms of its afterlife. This is why we would do well to imagine 
Karl Marx’s Das Kapital in its original shape, in German, the 
language in which it was originally written, together with its 
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ideal readers, the German-speaking working class, being buried 
together in a grave. In this picture, a return to the original is 
possible only as an act of commemoration. One takes any round 
number of years and creates a memory event. Yet even the 
megalomania of today’s powerful memory culture has its limits. 
Not all that is historically dead can be culturally kept alive. This 
is one more reason to approach Karl Marx’s Das Kapital from the 
perspective of its historical death. So, instead of commemorating 
its former life, let us turn our attention to the often contra-
dictory historical and linguistic conjunctures in which it has 
found its afterlife.
Freedom as a freedom from Marx
Almost a century after Hans Morgenthau’s father helped his 
dying patients to take Marx and Engels’s books with them to the 
grave, new people were celebrating getting finally rid of their 
writings. Speaking in the same text of the situation in Central 
and Eastern Europe shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
1989, Berman writes: ‘[A]t the end of the twentieth century, there 
were plenty of ex-citizens of Communist police states who felt 
that life without Marx was liberation.’1
This, however, shall not surprise us if we remember that 
Marx’s writings, together with other texts belonging to the 
corpus of so-called Marxist–Leninist literature, were in these 
places for decades canonized as dogma and, as such, ideologically 
supportive of the local dictatorial regimes. Berman calls it a 
disaster – a disaster for Karl Marx’s texts and their true readers. 
This is why those readers also embraced the fall of historical 
communism as liberation. It was only in a life without Marx that 
his texts could be read freely again.
1. Marshall Berman, ‘Tearing Away the Veils: The Communist Manifesto’, www.
dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/tearing-away-the-veils-the-communist-manifesto.
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The question is, however, who are these true readers of Marx? 
Berman leaves no doubt: ‘Intellectuals all over the world have 
welcomed this end-of-the century crash as a fortunate fall.’2 If 
Berman is right, it was precisely the historical defeat of Marx’s 
ideas that has saved them for posterity. Moreover, it seems that 
only after the history and the people who were making it had 
abandoned Marx’s concepts and trashed his arguments could 
these reappear in their original theoretical innocence, as if 
miraculously purified of the dirt of historical praxis. The trans-
formation resembles some sort of post-historical sublimation 
of Marxism, in which the whole realm of history retroactively 
appears as a foreign, hostile land for Karl Marx’s original ideas, 
a quasi-dialectical moment of their alienation from which they 
have now recovered, restoring themselves in their genuine 
ahistorical authenticity. Finally, how are we to think of Berman’s 
‘intellectuals all over the world’? Are they really Marx’s genuine 
readers? Was he not rather writing for a different audience, those 
‘workers of the world’ whom he and Engels addressed explicitly 
at the end of the Manifesto? 
In fact, Berman makes no significant distinction between 
them. Already in All That Is Solid Melts into Air he quoted Marx’s 
words from the Manifesto on the historical achievement of the 
modern bourgeoisie, which ‘has stripped of its halo every oc-
cupation hitherto honoured and looked up to in reverent awe. 
It has converted the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the 
man of science, into its paid wage-labourers.’3 As far as capitalism 
puts both intellectuals and workers into the same wage-relation, 
they also share a common class and historical position. This 
is why Berman can see in today’s intellectuals of the world 
2. Ibid.
3. Marshal Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988, p. 115. He uses the same quotation in ‘Tearing 
Away the Veils: The Communist Manifesto’, explicitly identifying intellectuals with 
workers.
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the rightful heirs to the emancipatory legacy of the historical 
workers’ movements, those proletarians who once had nothing 
to lose but their chains.
However, there is something the intellectuals of the world still 
have to lose: the freedom that Berman has implicitly ascribed to 
their social role and that makes it possible for them to detach 
themselves from historical praxis and encounter ‘directly’ the au-
thentic world of Marx’s ideas. But this type of freedom does not 
look like something new. Indeed, it unavoidably evokes an old 
idea of public reason, or more precisely Immanuel Kant’s concept 
of the freedom to make public use of one’s reason, as opposed 
to its private use.4 In fact, it is today in direct contradiction to 
the commonsensical differentiation of public and private. For 
Kant, those who, for instance, work in what we call the public 
sector are restricted in their use of reason by the mechanism for 
which they work – that is, by the will of the government. So they 
cannot argue freely, because they must obey. However, if they 
regard themselves at the same time as members of the whole 
community, or of a society of world citizens, and in the role of 
scholars address the general public, they will nevertheless be able 
to use their reason freely – that is, publicly.
This might explain why Berman and all genuine readers of 
Karl Marx have welcomed ‘a life without Marx’ brought about 
by the crash of 1989. In Kant’s sense, it liberated Marx’s writings 
from their private use – by, for instance, those apparatchiks of 
an official Marxism, also known as Marxologues, who were not 
able to read Marx and discuss his ideas freely because they had 
to obey their totalitarian masters, the Party and the state. In 
other words, the post-1989 liberation of Marx’s writings might be 
understood as a sort of reappropriation by public reason. It has 
4. See Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”’, 
in Kant: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. H.S. Reiss, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, pp. 54–61.
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liberated Marx as author, who is now finally free – to address, as 
a scholar (Gelehrte), ‘the intellectuals of the world’, or, in Kant’s 
parlance, the society of world citizens (Weltbürgergesellschaft).
Let us put aside the question of whether Karl Marx was ever a 
scholar. How can we identify the figure of the world intellectual? 
Is it a member of the cognitive elite of today’s society of world 
citizens? One who actually belongs to this intellectual community? 
If it is a cosmopolitan community, is it also a universal one? 
And, after all, which language does this elite speak? Will it read 
Karl Marx’s works in the language in which they were originally 
written?
It is not difficult to recognize in Berman’s notion of ‘the 
intellectuals of the world’ an older intellectual figure, which, in 
fact, still echoes in Kant’s notion of Weltbürgergesellschaft – the 
so-called ‘republic of letters’: an international community of 
scholars of which Kant, for instance, was a typical member. It 
emerged at the time of the Renaissance, and as a new histori-
cal form of intellectual exchange it prepared and finally made 
possible the Age of Enlightenment.5
As is well known, the original language of the Republic of 
Letters was Latin. It was actually called Respublica Literaria or 
Respublica Literarum. Later in the seventeenth century it switched 
mostly to French. Finally, Kant wrote his works in German, 
following the example of the brightest minds of the Renaissance 
who abandoned Latin for their respective vernaculars, early 
prototypes of a new figure of the scholar: a bourgeois vernacular 
intellectual. Such was Marx too. He wrote his works in German 
in a time when the old Republic of Letters had already developed 
into something qualitatively different – both in a social and in 
a political sense – namely, what Habermas later termed ‘the 
bourgeois public sphere’ (der bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit). Thus was 
5. See Dirk van Miert, ‘What Was the Republic of Letters? A brief Introduction to a 
Long History (1417–2008)’, Groniek 204 (February/March 2016), pp. 269–86.
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the old Latin Republic of Letters subsequently nationalized, or, 
more precisely, territorialized within the borders of a new politi-
cal institution of a modern world and emerging capitalism, the 
bourgeois nation-state, in which the old vernaculars were finally 
tamed and disciplined (German Romantics would say gebildet, 
meaning educated and civilized) into national languages.
Marx lived in London but he wrote Das Kapital in German. If 
he lived today in Berlin, he would, for sure, write his main work 
in English – so that Berman’s ‘intellectuals of the world’ could 
understand him. 
Through the veil of translation
We take it for granted that most if not all relevant discussions on 
Marx’s Capital and the topics raised by the book take place today 
in English. As far as these discussions refer to the text itself, they 
rely on a translation, not on the original text in German. This 
circumstance, however, has been naturalized today to the point 
that it goes completely unnoticed. We think and talk about Marx 
in English as though he thought and wrote about our world 
in the same language. But he did not. And this can sometimes 
become an issue.
It was German Marxist Wolfgang Fritz Haug who recently 
spoke out about the trouble with the English translations of Das 
Kapital.6 As an example he took one of today’s most influential 
commentaries on Marx’s major work, David Harvey’s Companion 
to Marx’s Capital.7 Haug, who himself published a similar 
commentary,8 argues, in short, that Harvey’s interpretation 
6. Wolfgang Fritz Haug, ‘On the Need for a New English Translation of Marx’s Capital ’, 
Socialism and Democracy, vol. 31, no. 1 (March 2017), pp. 60–86.
7. David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, London and New York: Verso, 2010.
8. Vorlesungen zur Einführung ins ‘Kapital’ (Introductory Lectures on ‘Capital’) was ﬁrst 
published in 1974. In fact, Haug and Harvey were not only born in the same year, 1935, 
but also both began to give courses on Marx’s Capital in the same year, 1971, not only for 
students but also for unionized workers. 
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of Marx’s text lacks accuracy and leads to misunderstanding 
of some of the most important concepts of Marx’s theory. 
The reason: Harvey does not read German. In other words, 
Harvey’s Companion does not follow Marx’s own text but rather 
an English version of it handed down by Ben Fowkes – his 
English translation of the first volume of Das Kapital, which 
first appeared in 1976. The shifts of meaning that have arisen 
from this translation have, according to Haug, at certain points 
significantly influenced Harvey’s interpretation of Marx’s Capital 
and subsequently erected ‘an epistemological barrier’ for today’s 
international left, constantly undermining their revived efforts 
to deepen the analysis of contemporary capitalism through 
rereadings of Marx’s classical texts.9
One of the most striking examples of such shifts of meaning 
Haug detects is Fowkes often ignoring Marx’s differentiation 
between the German adjectives stofflich, dinglich, sachlich and 
materiell.10 Fowkes renders them all as ‘material’, which results in a 
series of misinterpretations that are, according to Haug, ‘fatal for 
materialist thought’. 11 The consequence is, as he concludes, that 
the international left today gets ‘a Marx bereft of his materialism, 
and an historical materialism without historical materiality’.12
This applies concretely to Harvey’s interpretation of Capital. 
Here, as Haug shows, Fowkes’s translation of Marx’s expression 
dinglich as ‘material’ leads Harvey to conclude – reasoning by way 
of opposition – that ‘unreified’ (unverdinglichte) social relations are 
for Marx objective but nevertheless ‘immaterial’. So, he argues, 
one cannot sensuously apprehend them; in Harvey’s own words, 
‘you cannot actually see, touch or feel social relations directly’.13 
9. Haug, ‘On the Need’, p. 63.
10. Stofflich means ‘stuff-like’ and is for Marx the antonym of the socio-historical 
form-determination; dinglich might be approximately translated as ‘thing-like’ and Marx 
opposes it to the relational and processual; sachlich also means ‘thing-like’, but Marx uses 
it as the antonym of ‘personal’; and materiell translates as ‘material’. Ibid., pp. 75–6.
11. Ibid., p. 75.
12. Ibid., p. 63.
13. Ibid., pp. 63, 76. The quotation from Harvey’s Companion: ibid., p. 33. Haug, on the 
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This has further consequences for Harvey’s understanding of 
Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. Here, Fowkes translates 
Marx’s well-known designation of commodities as sinnlich 
übersinnliche oder gesellschaftliche Dinge14 as ‘sensuous things 
which are at the same time supra-sensible or social’. While Marx’s 
original notion more accurately translated as ‘sensuous-supra-
sensuous or social’ keeps both ‘sensuous’ and ‘supra-sensuous’ 
together. Despite – or, to put it more precisely, because of – the 
contradiction in meaning, Fowkes separates them and so facili-
tates Harvey’s understanding of Marx’s concept of the social as 
something supra-sensible; that is, something immaterial, yet still 
in a way objective. 
When this gets applied concretely to the concept of commodity 
fetishism – Marx’s explanation of how a social relation between 
humans themselves assumes in a commodity the fantastic form of 
a relation between things – it becomes in Harvey’s interpretation 
‘an absence of an immediate producers–consumers relation that 
is effected by the market exchange of things’.15 To illustrate the 
meaning of the fetish character of commodity form, he uses the 
example of a person who goes into a supermarket to buy a head of 
lettuce. To do this, one has to put down a certain sum of money. 
The material relation between the money and the lettuce express-
es in fact a social relation because the price is socially determined. 
And here Harvey concludes: ‘Hidden within this market exchange 
of things is a relation between you, the consumer, and the direct 
producers – those who laboured to produce the lettuce.’16
So, as Haug states, Harvey reduces the concept of commodity 
fetishism to a lack of knowledge about the relations between 
consumers and producers. This ends in Harvey establishing a 
contrary, argues that social relations, however, can be empirically and also sensuously 
observed; ibid., p. 76.
14. Karl Marx, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie Buch I, Der Produktionsprozess 
des Kapitals, in Marx–Engels-Werke (MEW), vol. 23, Berlin/GDR: Dietz, 1979, p. 86.
15. Haug, ’On the Need’, p. 80.
16. Ibid. Harvey, A Companion, p. 39.
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causal relation between globalization and fetishism: ‘[I]n highly 
complicated systems of exchange it is impossible to know any-
thing about the labour or the labourers, which is why fetishism is 
inevitable in the world market.’17
For Haug, however, the fetishism that is intrinsic to the world 
of commodities, of money and of capital has nothing to do 
with the difference between the national market and the world 
market. It has nothing to do with the ‘subjective ignorance’ of 
the consumers ‘about that labour or the labourers’ either. More-
over, a relation of consumption is for Haug not at all at the core 
of Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. Rather, it is about a 
relation among producers, a relation of production. In fetishism, 
the ability of the products as commodities to make themselves 
autonomous expresses itself in relation to those who have 
produced them. Commodity fetishism is about the powerlessness 
of the producers vis-à-vis the life of their own products.
One does not have fully to agree with Wolfgang Fritz Haug 
when it comes to the extent and gravity of misinterpretations 
that are generated by the shifts in meaning that almost unavoid-
ably take place when a text is translated into another language. 
He probably exaggerates when he argues that some of these 
shifts, as in the case of Ben Fowkes’s English translation of 
Marx’s Das Kapital, are ‘fatal for materialist thought’ and will 
prevent the international left today from revisiting Karl Marx’s 
genuine materialism. It may even be that the shortcomings of 
this translation’s contribution to our contemporary interpreta-
tion of Marx’s thought is on a much smaller scale than alleged 
by Haug. But the German Marxist definitely has a point. Even 
more so when it comes to his general assessment of the linguistic 
preconditions of current Marxist debates, as well as the warnings 
he makes in this regard.
17. Harvey, A Companion, pp. 39–40.
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What has essentially reframed the way we read Marx and 
discuss his ideas today is the emergence of English as the global 
lingua franca. It is the language of transnational high-tech 
capitalism as much as of international Marxism. This, according 
to Haug, ‘puts a heavy responsibility on Anglophone Marxist 
scholars, since their version of Marxian texts have acquired a 
referential priority for most students from all over the world’.18 It 
is for this reason that Haug expects them to pay more attention 
to the English translations of Marx’s texts with which they work 
so as to neutralize the shifts in meaning that have arisen from 
them. When it comes to Das Kapital, for Haug there is no doubt 
that a new English translation of Marx’s major work is needed, 
one that would satisfy the criteria of a critical edition. If this 
does not happen, even Marx’s thoughts in their original lan-
guage, German, will not be spared distortions in meaning. This 
is precisely what happened in the German translation of David 
Harvey’s Companion. It has transmitted into German Harvey’s 
analysis based on Fowkes’s English translations and mixed it 
with original quotations from Marx. The result, as Haug writes, 
‘borders on linguistic money-laundering’.19 This is a further level 
of complication: the linguistic alienations of Marx’s thought that 
took place in the English translations of Das Kapital have now 
been reimported, resulting in the linguistic alienation of Marx’s 
thoughts in his own native language. 
A Marxist who cannot speak English is no Marxist
There is a certain resentment that can be clearly felt in Haug’s 
critique of English translations of Das Kapital. At stake is, 
however, much more than the personal disappointment of a 
German Marxist whose own commentaries on Marx’s work 
– based on and written in the original language of the book 
18. Haug, ’On the Need’, p. 60.
19. Ibid., p. 62.
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– have been pushed aside, even within his own language, by the 
interpretations of an international author who does not even 
understand German. Rather it is the resentment of the language 
itself that speaks out of Haug’s critique, not his personal injury. 
German, once the language of the highest literary and cultural 
values of modern philosophy, and thanks to Marx’s writings the 
language par excellence of the critique of capitalism, is today 
only a shadow of its former glory.
The historical erosion that has affected not only German 
but many national languages today has its name: re-
vernacularization. At stake is a retrograde process in which a 
distinctive and fully formed national and cultural language falls 
back into the condition of a vernacular from which it had raised 
itself since the sixteenth century. Concretely, in its European 
environment as well as within its own territory, German has 
been increasingly pushed back from higher discourses of science, 
politics and business and forced to retreat onto the level of 
everyday life and less important discourses. ‘German is today a 
disappearing, little language (like Breton or Occitan), because 
its speakers don’t attach any importance to the preservation 
of German in higher discourses’, one German philosopher of 
language comments bitterly on the degeneration of his mother 
tongue.20 Of course, there is no doubt about what has pushed 
German ‘into cultural insignificance’21 today. It is another, more 
powerful language, English as the new lingua franca of the 
globalizing world. As a result, in Europe and elsewhere, we are 
witnessing today the emergence of a new cultural and linguistic 
condition that might be described as a sort of ‘a neo-medieval 
diglossia – high: English/low: other languages’.22 This new/old 
linguistic condition might be also defined in terms of Pierre 
20. Jürgen Trabant, Globalesisch oder was? Ein Plädoyer für Europas Sprachen, Munich: 
Verlag C.H. Beck, 2014, p. 92.
21. Ibid., p. 192.
22. Ibid.
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Bourdieu’s understanding of linguistic competence as capital.23 
While English speakers possess ever-growing transnational 
linguistic capital, the speakers of German, or of some other 
once powerful national languages, like French for instance, are 
nowadays increasingly losing it. In Bourdieu’s sense one might 
say that a new form of linguistically generated class division 
emerges today on a global scale. 
Some see this development as a historical loss, a further 
decline in linguistic and cultural diversity. Others welcome the 
transformation as a progressive move towards a global linguistic 
harmony. Both, however, seem to agree that this development 
is irreversible. The old forms of linguistic practice that still 
shape the picture of the global world as a cluster of nation-states 
and their respective cultures and languages are crumbling 
before our eyes. One can, of course, endlessly speculate about 
still unforeseeable cultural, cognitive, economic and political 
consequences of this development, but it is clear already that 
there are more and more things that can no longer be said in the 
old national languages because certain discourses are available 
only in English. There is no doubt that this is also the case with 
contemporary Marxism. 
So, what Berman calls ‘life without Marx’ is in fact a life 
without Marx in German and in many of the historical transla-
tions of his works that were once made from German. It is 
a life without Marx who addresses a national public sphere, 
the readers on all its strata, in their own language, from the 
heroic figure of the bourgeois intellectual to the members of a 
national working class. They are those who have been, according 
to Berman, liberated from Marx by the collapse of historical 
23. See, for instance, Jürgen Gerhards, From Babel to Brussels: European Integration and 
the Importance of Transnational Linguistic Capital, trans. Maureen Metzger, Berlin Studies 
on the Sociology of Europe (BSSE), no. 28, Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2012; www.
ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/38916/ssoar-2012-gerhards-From_Babel_
to_Brussels_European.pdf?sequence=1; accessed March 2018.
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communism. For all of them Marx is now dumb. He speaks a 
language they do not understand.24
On the other side, there are Marshall Berman’s ‘intellectuals 
of the world’, for whom a ‘life without Marx’ has paradoxically 
brought him back. It is for them, his only genuine addressees 
today, that Marx was liberated, so that they can freely read his 
writings and discuss his ideas; as far as they speak English, of 
course – which they actually do, for it is obviously their own 
language, the mother tongue of today’s international community 
of scholars. Shortly after the fall of historical communism, 
which made possible the global expansion not only of capitalism 
but also of contemporary art, an artist from Croatia, Mladen 
Stilinović, made his famous comment on the new linguistic 
condition brought about by the historical transformation: ‘An 
artist who cannot speak English is no artist.’ This applies equally 
to Karl Marx and his ideas after 1989: a Marxist who cannot 
speak English is no Marxist.
Wolfgang Fritz Haug is fully aware of this. Although he 
shows how the inability to read Marx’s writings in the original 
language generates misinterpretations and misunderstandings, 
he does not expect future Marxists to learn German. He knows 
very well that Das Kapital in its original language is already dead. 
All we can do is make and canonize the best possible English 
translation of the book, following the example set by the transla-
tions of the greatest works of classical philosophy: ‘It might well 
be that Marx, for the generations to come, will play a role similar 
to that of Aristotle, since both laid the groundwork for a new 
civilizational paradigm.’25 
24. This circumstance implies a curious correlation between English-language skills and 
an affinity for Marxist ideas. The more people in a community who are in command of 
English, the more potential Marxists there are among them. The chance that Karl Marx’s 
Capital will be read in the Netherlands, where 87.6 per cent of the population speak 
English, is much higher than in Bulgaria where this number drops to 15.4 per cent. Ibid., 
p. 17. 
25. Haug, ’On the Need’, p. 61.
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The comparison to Aristotle is quite telling. It is in fact 
completely in line with Berman’s vision of a post-1989 liberation 
of Marx, which implies a sort of post-historical sublimation of 
his thoughts, their ascension from the contingency of historical 
praxis into a world of eternal cognitive values. But is it in line 
with these thoughts themselves, with their intentional adher-
ence to this same historical praxis? One who wants a critique of 
capitalism to be canonized as a civilizational paradigm has, in 
fact, already admitted the defeat of that critique.
Nevertheless, it makes sense to imagine future generations of 
Marxist scholars reading and discussing Marx’s writings in their 
ultimate English translations, a sort of critical English edition 
of his magnum opus made by a team of the best linguistic 
experts as well as other specialists in philosophy, economy 
and history. The picture truly evokes the famous ‘recovery of 
Aristotle’: the Latin translations of his works made from Greek 
or Arabic during the Middle Ages. If Aristotle was in fact finally 
canonized – and at the same time rediscovered – only through 
the translations of his works into Latin, why should this not be 
possible for Marx? It might well be that only a canonization of 
his works in their English translations will recover and preserve 
them for posterity. The idea sounds quite plausible, but before 
we enthusiastically welcome it as a definitive solution to the 
problem of saving and reviving the Marxist critique of capitalism 
for the generations to come we should ask ourselves one more 
question: how has it come about that we today, a century and a 
half after the first publication of Das Kapital, look into the future 
of its ideas from a perspective that is in fact centuries older than 
the book itself? Could it be that our visions for the twenty-first 
century rely on an intellectual and sociolinguistic paradigm from 
the Middle Ages?
Indeed. The German critic of the re-vernacularization of 
his language already mentioned explicitly argues that this new 
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sociolinguistic and cultural condition in which we live today ‘re-
sembles the Europe of the Middle Ages’ and that it clearly has a 
‘neo-medieval’ character. If this is really the case, then we cannot 
ignore the question that the brightest minds of the Middle Ages 
asked themselves: are the vernaculars spoken outside of their 
Latin- or Arabic-speaking community of scholars really of no 
use? Is it possible to think of the sublime ideas of philosophy or 
to write poetry in the languages of hoi polloi? 
We know their answer, which is a good reason to repeat 
their question – looking back into 150 years of the dramatic 
life of Marx’s Das Kapital: is there anything worth remember-
ing from the dozens of its translations into the once proud 
national languages that, in the meantime, history has rendered 
vernaculars again?26 Should we really leave to oblivion all the 
afterlives the book found in these languages, its so many difficult 
and often painful rebirths in all the various translations? Is 
there really nothing we can learn from the different linguistic 
and cultural versions of the book, from the ingenious solutions 
or, often, embarrassing failures of its translators and the fatal 
misinterpretations as well as heuristic insights these translations 
once generated? 
Let us take just one example, the Serbo-Croatian translation 
of Das Kapital. It was accomplished at the beginning of the 1930s 
in jail by a team of imprisoned communists, led by a Jewish 
painter and art critic sentenced to twenty years for member-
ship of the illegal Communist Party. His main assistant in the 
common work on the translation was a young member of the 
terrorist organization ‘Red Justice’, sentenced for his participa-
tion in the assassination of the minister of the interior. Some ten 
years later the translators, or at least those of them who survived 
26. In the ﬁrst hundred years of its existence the book was translated into forty-three 
languages. See ‘Der Weg des “Kapitals” – 220 Ausgaben in 43 Sprachen’, in Karl Marx. Das 
Kapital 1867–1967, Special Issue 2, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Marxistische Blätter, 1967, 
pp. 86–8.
150 caPitalisM: cOncePt, idea, iMage
the local white terror, Stalin’s purges and the Spanish Civil War, 
were in the Bosnian mountains, commanding a partisan army 
with whom they soon won the war – to make use of their Marx 
translations in living social praxis: in failed collectivization 
and successful industrialization; in the name of Stalin and 
the Comintern, as well as against them; to suppress bourgeois 
culture but also to promote modern art and architecture; to 
build a welfare society based on workers’ self-management and 
at the same time to reintroduce a market economy and integrate 
it into the financial and political institutions of the emerging 
transnational capitalism; to arm the people and to promote 
world peace; to tame national movements as well as to support 
anticolonial struggles. 
This story together with many similar ones, hiding a huge 
historical experience once generated by various translations of 
Marx’s writings, seems to have sunk today into the new vernacu-
lar darkness.27 While it is true that life without Marx, as it has 
emerged after 1989, has in fact brought back his writings to his 
readers, it has at the same time deprived them of a wide variety 
of lives that Marx’s writings had once found in the multitude of 
their translations across the world. At the end, one seems to be 
left with a single option: to support the international community 
of Marxist scholars in their search for a perfect English transla-
tion of Marx and Engels’s works. This, too, is a consequence of 
the historical turn of 1989.
27. The fact that work on new translations of Das Kapital in other languages 
has continued – or rather resumed – does not contradict this diagnosis. However 
philologically improved and historically updated, they share the fate of their languages 
and the cultures of their respective societies being inexorably swallowed by an even more 
widespread vernacular darkness. There was recently (2013) a new – the third – translation 
of Das Kapital published in Slovenian, a language spoken by fewer than 2 million people. 
Yet, at the same time, what is known worldwide as the ‘Slovenian School’ of philosophy 
and cultural theory, including Marxism, does not imply the use of the Slovenian language. 
The works of its authors are exclusively written in English. And, as far as they refer to 
Marx, they necessarily rely on English translations of his writings.
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The free and equal individual: a transitional monodrama
What actually happened in 1989? It seems that there is today 
almost no disagreement about it: a democratic revolution that, 
following the ideals of the greatest emancipatory events of 
world history, liberated East European masses from the yoke of 
communist totalitarianism. In short, it was all about freedom. 
After 1989 people who had been previously subjected to various 
forms of repression, above all by an alienated one-party state 
and its ideology, were finally free – to speak out in the public 
sphere, to form political parties and choose their representatives 
in free elections, to exercise their religious beliefs, to pursue 
their economic interests or to move wherever they want to. If we 
are to believe Berman, after 1989 even Karl Marx went through 
a double liberation: a life freed from Marx has recovered Marx 
freed for the intellectuals of the world.
There are, however, other interpretations of this historical 
event, told in the languages and histories that have meanwhile 
descended into an ever-deepening vernacular oblivion, some of 
which especially highlight the role the intellectuals played in this 
event. Looking retrospectively at how the so-called democratic 
revolution in the former communist East actually unfolded, we 
may broadly differentiate three stages in which the historical 
change was brought about.28
The first democratic breakthrough was achieved on the level 
of what in orthodox Marxism was called the superstructure. 
The awakening democratic forces, or, to use a typical and until 
recently widely used metaphor of Western propaganda, ‘the 
freedom-loving people’, successfully occupied the sphere of 
consciousness. In this struggle, fought mostly in the field of 
culture, intellectuals assumed the leading role. It was their ideas 
28. Rastko Močnik, Spisi o suvremenom kapitalizmu [Essays on Contemporary Capitalism], 
trans. Srećko Pulig, Zagreb: Arkzin 2010, p. 263.
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and values that won hegemony over civil society in opposition 
to and often in open confrontation with the official ideology of 
the one-party state. However, without having first secured the 
dominant position in the sphere of civil society, the democratic 
forces would never have been able to carry on the struggle to the 
second stage, the seizure of political power, which is generally 
mistaken for the event itself. Indeed, the dramatic pictures of 
the popular uprising, of crowds tearing down the Berlin Wall, 
jingling keys on Wenceslas Square in Prague or storming the 
Central Committee building in Bucharest, evoked memories of 
the genuine revolutions of the past that once changed the world’s 
history. Spectacular or not, this was, nevertheless, the moment 
when the democratic forces, still inspired and often led by 
prominent intellectuals, appropriated the state and occupied the 
political sphere of their societies. And while the whole world was 
still celebrating the final victory of freedom, the new political 
elite turned the state into its political instrument and immedi-
ately used it to change property and production relations. This 
was the third and final stage of the historical turn of 1989 – the 
restoration of capitalism.
This third phase, which had in fact the historical form of the 
primitive accumulation of capital – concretely the privatization 
of the means of production – implied and was facilitated by a 
massive use of violence, both structural and open. This is gener-
ally excluded from the grand narrative of the democratic revolu-
tion; not only because it reveals the ugly side of the glorious 
historical event. There is one more reason why this story remains 
untold and why in 1989 and its aftermath everybody was talking 
about democracy yet hardly anyone mentioned capitalism.
At stake is an ideological construct that has totalized the 
whole event: the abstract figure of the so-called free and equal 
individual. It originally belonged to the political sphere of 
bourgeois, capitalist society, yet in the former system of actually 
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existing socialism this figure was banned from the political 
life of the state. Nevertheless, it reappeared in a place where it 
essentially does not belong as such, in the sphere of civil society. 
Recalling the young Marx’s critique of the limits of bourgeois 
political emancipation, inspired by Hegel and epitomized in 
the concept of the bourgeois Homo duplex, one might say that 
in the struggle for freedom under the conditions of the one-
party system the abstract political figure of citoyen moved over 
to the realm of its non-political doppelgänger, the bourgeois. 
Here, on the stage of civil society, behind the backs of the 
party-state, the abstract political figure of citoyen performed a 
sort of mono drama, disguised in the costume of a living flesh-
and-blood person. It was best personified in the image of an 
anti-communist dissident heroically fighting for human rights. 
Finally, when in 1989 the masses in Wenceslas Square chanted 
to Václav Havel, one of the most prominent of all the Eastern 
bloc dissidents: Havel na hrad – ‘Havel to the Castle’, which was 
traditionally the seat of state power – the drama was over. In the 
figure of a recovered bourgeois Homo duplex political freedom 
was finally re-established. Havel, now a statesman, went to the 
Castle, while Havel, a playwright, a husband, a fan of Velvet 
Underground, stayed in downtown Prague, among his fellow citi-
zens in the theatres, beer gardens and intellectual salons of the 
city. Neither, it seemed, had anything to do with the restoration 
of capitalism. One talked of a ‘transition to democracy’ instead. 
But the historical monodrama of the free and equal indi-
vidual’s victorious struggle against communist dictatorship has 
produced yet another ideological effect. It has made us forget 
the immanent opposition to the communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe. At stake is a left critique of what its proponents mostly 
called ‘Stalinism’. Regardless of whether they challenged the 
dogmas of official Marxism–Leninism or clashed with the party 
over the repressive practice of their implementation, they never 
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crossed the floor to the other side. The left critics of historical 
communism were never anti-communists. Rather, they remained 
at all times within the horizon opened up by the emancipatory 
promise of Marx’s critique of capitalism, sharing its highlights, 
shortcomings and contradictions, and taking active part in the 
theoretical disputes and dramatic political conflicts that accom-
panied the communist movement from its very beginning – for 
which they often paid dearly. Nevertheless, their critique was 
truly immanent in the sense that it appeared, time and again, at 
all levels of the system and all stages of its development without 
having ever established a unified frontline against the commu-
nist cause as such. This also applied to the bourgeois concept of 
political freedom, or more concretely to individual freedoms and 
rights. Consistently committed to the progressive legacy of the 
bourgeois revolutions, the left critics of state socialism defended 
them often as vehemently as the anti-communist opposition. 
This was especially the case when it came to freedom of expres-
sion, in whose defence the left frequently called in the support of 
Marx himself, particularly his early writings on the freedom of 
the press. 
In one of these texts the young Marx speaks of freedom 
through the metaphor of the solar system: ‘each of its worlds, 
while turning on its own axis, revolves only around the central 
sun of freedom’.29 Following this metaphor, we might say that 
the left critics of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe were 
well aware of where the light of political freedom historically 
comes from – from the figure of the free and equal individual 
born in the bourgeois revolution – but they never turned 
29. ‘die Zentralsonne der Freiheit’; in Karl Marx, ‘Die Verhandlungen des 6. Rheinischen 
Landtags rheinischen Landtags. Erster Artikel. Debatten über Preßfreiheit und 
Publikation der Landständischen Verhandlungen’, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Werke, vol. 1, Berlin/GDR: Dietz Verlag, 1978, pp. 69–70. Translated as ‘Proceedings 
of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly. First Article. Debates on Freedom of the Press 
and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates’, in Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1, Lawrence & Wishart, e-book, pp. 173–4. 
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themselves into followers of the sun cult. Rather, they focused on 
the solar system of freedom as a whole. In fact, many of the left 
critics of Marxist orthodoxy and its repressive praxis still read 
Marx in German, which is why they knew nothing of what we 
call today ‘civil society’. Instead, they discussed and dealt with 
a different concept, the one that Marx borrowed from Hegel 
and that reads in the German original bürgerliche Gesellschaft, 
which the better English translations call ‘bourgeois society’.30 
This is what is actually meant by Marx’s solar system of freedom 
and its various worlds each turning on its own particular axis 
of freedom: freedom of trade, of property, of conscience, of the 
press, and so on. Together they inform this historically new 
sphere of society that emerged with capitalism and the bourgeois 
class, a sphere where individuals are torn apart by competing 
private interests and class inequalities that are generated by the 
relations of production; divided by their isolated family lives and 
the different roles they play; separated by their various religious 
beliefs and the various civil associations they form, and so on. 
While all these worlds revolve around the abstract figure of the 
free individual, there are no equal individuals and there is no 
unity among them within the system itself. However, this is 
possible in another sphere, that of the state. Here was another 
figure at home, a purely political being, both free and equal to all 
others, yet existing only as a mere abstraction totally alienated 
from the real life of bourgeois society. 
A historical sublation of this alienation, whose economic 
roots Marx thoroughly analysed in Capital – and not a recovery 
of bourgeois political freedoms – was the real challenge for 
the Marxist left. It never turned its back on the solar system 
of bourgeois freedom but rather insisted on the expansion of 
political emancipation into the worlds revolving around its 
30. Though often it is rather translated as ‘civil society’, as in the above-mentioned 
text.
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centre, above all into the world of production relations.31 The left 
critics of state socialism wanted each of these worlds to emanate 
the same light as the sun itself. In other words, they wanted both 
abstract figures of the bourgeois political system – citoyen and 
bourgeois – to collapse into a free and equal individual of flesh 
and blood who, liberated equally from exploitation in the sphere 
of production and from the alienated state, takes responsibility 
in working collectives as much as it makes decisions in public 
affairs – in short, who is present throughout the whole sphere of 
what was once called bourgeois society. This, however, turned 
out to be just another leftist utopia. Yet the right seems to have 
been more successful in a similar effort. 
Human, all too human
As is well known, the historical erosion and final breakdown of 
the communist regimes in Eastern Europe coincided with the 
neoliberal transformation of modern capitalism. In this process 
the abstract figure of the free individual seems also to have 
played a significant role. As Rastko Močnik argues, the crucial 
step in the epochal breakthrough made by neoliberalism was 
precisely ‘exporting’ this figure from the political sphere of the 
state, where it originally belonged, into the very core of civil 
society.32 This, however, has not been done, as dreamt of and 
tried by the communist left, to expand political freedom and 
equality into the entire realm of bourgeois society, including, 
nota bene, the sphere of production, but rather to impose the 
relations of capitalist domination upon a space of social life that 
was traditionally of no interest to the classical bourgeois state. 
This is why it was spared from its direct control and domination: 
31. This was precisely the case with the Yugoslav self-management project.
32. Here I follow the arguments developed by Rastko Močnik in the essay ‘Utopizam 
s onu stranu utopizma’ [‘Utopianism Beyond Utopianism’], in Spisi o suvremenom 
kapitalizmu, pp. 260–84.
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the space of different lifestyles, world-views, religious beliefs, 
uses of leisure time, fashion, status, family relations, and so on. 
It is in this way that the entire sphere of civil society became the 
ideological apparatus of the capitalist state. This is one of the 
crucial facts that, as Močnik writes, determines the contempo-
rary epoch: ‘Relations deriving from the rule of capital invade a 
sphere which, according to the ideal model of capitalism, should 
be “free from” i.e. “indifferent to” it.’33
However, the problem is that such an ideal model has never 
been realized in historical praxis. On the one hand, so-called 
pre-capitalist or non-capitalist forms of production and exploita-
tion have never been an element foreign to the capitalist mode of 
production, but rather its functional component, which capital-
ism incorporates and exploits for the production of value. This is 
especially true in the case of the accumulation of capital, which 
Rosa Luxemburg explicitly defines as ‘a kind of metabolism 
between capitalist economy and those pre-capitalist methods of 
production’.34 On the other hand, and closely connected to this, 
the relations of exploitation in capitalism cannot be established 
and reproduced exclusively through economic means. That is to 
say, the capitalist mode of production structurally relies on the 
support of ideological apparatuses, such as the legal system and 
its institutions like ownership rights, or, as mentioned before, 
the legal figure of the free and equal individual. Using Althusser’s 
parlance, Močnik sums it up in the thesis that, in capitalism, the 
ideological dominant never fully coincides with the economic 
determinant.
This also applies to the commodity form. While it clearly 
differentiates the capitalist mode of production from previous 
ones, it appears in historical reality never as the sole form but 
33. Ibid., p. 265.
34. Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2003, p. 416.
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merely as a dominant one – that is, always intertwined with 
other pre- or non-capitalist modes of production. In fact, Marx 
and Engels believed in the progressive role of the capitalist mode 
of production, a capitalism that will erase all previous forms 
of individual and social life, best expressed in the famous lines 
from the Communist Manifesto: 
All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and 
venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed 
ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts 
into air, all that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to 
face … the real conditions of their lives and their relations with their 
fellow men.35 
This vision has been proved wrong. In fact, individuals in capi-
talism can never face the reality in which they live, and social 
relations in which they are involved, in their immediacy. It is 
the fetishistic character of commodity production that prevents 
this from happening, or, more precisely, makes these individuals 
experience their mutual relations as relations between things. At 
stake is the mystery of the commodity form that Marx reveals in 
the closing section of Capital’s first chapter on the commodity: 
the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics 
of human labour as objective characteristics of the products of 
labour – as properties of these things – or, in Marx’s own words, 
‘a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their 
eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things’.36
The problem is, however, that this fetishistic relation – that 
is, the reification of social relations in the commodity form 
– although predominant in capitalism, has never been able to 
totalize the entire heterogeneous field of historical praxis.37 
35. I take this Manifesto quote from Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air, p. 21. 
The translation is more accurate, since Berman himself slightly altered the standard 
translation made by Samuel Moore in 1888.
36. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 
35, New York: International Publishers, 1996, p. 83.
37. At least, no more than the class structure of the capitalist mode of production 
159the central sun OF FreedOM
Thereby it is not just a matter of other pre- or non-capitalist 
modes of production and the different forms of social relations 
they imply, but also of the already mentioned displacement of 
the political fiction of the abstract individual into the originally 
non-political spheres; that is, the circumstance that under the 
conditions of neoliberal transformation the abstract figure of a 
free and equal individual turns into an ideological apparatus of 
the capitalist state.
Močnik explains it in terms of a certain reversal of Marx’s 
formula of commodity fetishism, which, instead of resulting in 
reification (that is, in the fetishism of things), leads to a sort of 
humanization of the reified social order with its hierarchies and 
power relations as they are institutionalized in legal systems. Re-
writing Marx, he argues that ‘the social relation of sub ordination 
and domination assumes, in the eyes of those involved, the 
fantastic form of a relation between free and equal individuals.’38
This results in a sort of retro-effect. The social relations of 
contemporary capitalism are perceived, as in pre-capitalist social 
formations, as relations of personal dependence, subordination 
and domination; the social causes of these relations appear 
masked in the phantasies of personal values, personal excel-
lence or deficiency, personal merits or faults, and so on. Social 
tensions that necessarily arise from these same relations are 
ultimately experienced as interpersonal conflicts. In short, 
Močnik writes, ‘The class struggle assumes in the eyes of those 
involved the fantastic form of personal intrigues.’39 The more 
these individuals perceive their social position in terms of their 
personal bio graphy, or the success or failure of their ‘career’, 
– that is, the class struggle as its historical essence – has been able to produce the effect 
of social totality. At stake is, of course, Marx’s concept of the proletariat as the class of all 
classes that, in its mere existence, immediately expresses the truth of every class society, 
and that, in sublating itself in the proletarian revolution, sublates class society as such. 
See Močnik, Spisi o suvremenom, pp. 266–7.
38. Ibid., p. 272.
39. Ibid.
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and experience their relations to their fellow men and women 
through competition struggles and mutual exclusions, the more 
they blindly support and reproduce the structure of capitalist 
domination.
This is, according to Močnik, the mechanism behind the 
processes that we perceive today, in their existential immediacy, 
as a re-feudalization of social relations. It comes to light in the 
entire sphere of civil society, where any element of the individual 
lifeworld, from lifestyle or entertainment to family relations – 
elements that were originally of no interest to the state – now 
might turn into an ideological apparatus of the capitalist state, 
having huge impact on the political life of society. This is the 
case, for instance, with the phenomena of religious fundamental-
ism, ethnic nationalism and various excesses of identity politics. 
It shows itself also in the new governmental technologies: in 
the concept of corporate ethics, for instance, with its mythology 
of success and loyalty, omnipresent in today’s corporations and 
large bureaucratic institutions in the fields of economy, finance 
and governance, where, as Močnik writes, a new noblesse de robe, 
the contemporary pendant to the famous second estate of the 
Ancien Régime, is in charge.40
In this picture of the future…
The Middle Ages may have not been as dark as the common 
narrative suggests, but today’s neoliberal capitalism is about to 
give them another chance. A quick glimpse of how the ongoing 
process of re-feudalization might change the world is given to 
us in a quotation taken from the introduction, written by Leon 
Trotsky in 1937, to Jack London’s famous dystopian novel The Iron 
Heel: 
40. Ibid., p. 274.
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In this picture of the future there remains not a trace of democracy 
and peaceful progress. Over the mass of the deprived rise the castes 
of labour aristocracy, of praetorian army, of an all-penetrating 
police, with the financial oligarchy at the top. In reading it one does 
not believe his own eyes: it is precisely the picture of fascism, of its 
economy, of its governmental technique, its political psychology!41
Is this the world in which posterity will commemorate the 
second centenary of Karl Marx’s Capital? Read in its perfect, 
ultimately canonized English translation only by a tiny Marxist 
fraction of the digital Republic of Letters, a new global com-
munity of scholars dominated by an even thinner aristocracy, 
the knights and barons of academic excellence who claim the 
possession of knowledge, as well as the privileges and influence it 
brings, as their inherited right, and whose social status is based 
on the labour of a growing army of cognitive serfs? And where 
shall these scholars discuss Karl Marx’s critique of capitalism? In 
the castles and forts of the future knowledge societies, the elite 
global universities, still accessible only to a transnational caste 
of ‘the successful’; in these old baroque institutions, which have 
survived until today not because they have so smartly adapted 
to the ever-changing world of new communications technolo-
gies, global trade and finance, and rapid growth of neoliberal 
economies, but rather because the social relations in this new 
world increasingly resemble those fixed and fast-frozen social 
formations of the pre-revolutionary absolutism in which these 
institutions were born.42 Finally, whom will they be addressing 
– the English-speaking global civil society of Anthony Giddens’s 
‘clever people’, who eagerly wait for the elite Marxist pundits to 
explain to them the mystery of commodity fetishism, the limits 
41. See www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1937/xx/ironheel.htm; accessed March 
2018.
42. Slovenian sociologist Jože Vogrinc, in Močnik, ‘Utopizam s onu stranu utopizma’, 
p. 273.
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of capital accumulation, and why capitalism still cannot survive 
its contradictions?
There is an impression that the circle of those who still read 
and discuss Karl Marx’s Capital is growing today, sometimes 
expanding into unexpected directions.43 But this impression 
is deceptive. In fact, the overall social, historical and cultural 
ground on which this new interest in Marx occurs is increasingly 
narrowing. It is shrinking together with the light of the central 
sun of freedom, the figure of the free and equal individual that 
has been for the last two centuries illuminating the worlds 
revolving around it. The more the sun cools down, ever-larger 
parts of its system are swallowed by the new vernacular dark-
ness. And while here, around the dimming light of an old, tired 
and ever-weaker freedom, Capital is well preserved, lovingly 
taken care of and seriously discussed and studied – as is right 
and proper for such a valuable and long-canonized piece of the 
world’s cultural heritage – there in the darkness people don’t give 
a damn about the book. Rather, they get buried again with their 
holy Bibles, Qurans or Torahs, with their reconsecrated national 
myths, or the masterpieces of post-truth trash. But if it is true 
that they have abandoned Marx, it is even more true that Marx 
has abandoned them. He no longer talks to them in their new 
vernaculars – the languages of the decaying post-translational 
societies that have become slow to catch up with the acceleration 
of technological development, global trade, finance and politics; 
that increasingly lose the capacity to convey the complexity of 
the contemporary world and to critically reflect upon its con-
tradictions, dangers and chances; that have scrapped the ideas 
of enlightenment – which once raised them into the spheres of 
43. ‘John Cassidy, the New Yorker magazine’s ﬁnancial correspondent, told us in 1997 
that Wall Street itself was full of study groups going through Marx’s writings, trying 
to grasp and synthesize many of the ideas that are central to his work: “globalization, 
inequality, political corruption, modernization, impoverishment, technological progress 
… the enervating nature of modern existence…” He was “the next great thinker” on the 
Street.’ Berman, ‘Tearing Away the Veils’.
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secular universality, natural and human sciences, culture, the 
rule of law and political freedoms – to replace them with the 
neo-medieval ‘values’ of servitude, ignorance and superstition; 
that have sunk into their own ahistorical temporalities, without 
any relation to a common history, the languages of those who 
were liberated from Marx only to be left behind by global 
capitalism. They have accumulated an enormous capacity for 
political mobilization, but it is today increasingly activated for 
the interests of domination and exploitation. It is from this ever 
broadening and deepening vernacular darkness that contempo-
rary capitalism draws today the ideological energy for its ongoing 
reproduction. At stake is a metabolism between the neoliberal 
economy and neo-medieval social relations, a kind of ideological 
accumulation of the capitalism of our age. 
Once, the greatest minds of the Late Middle Ages, like Dante, 
Galileo and Descartes abandoned Latin, the lingua franca of 
learned Europe, and turned to the vernaculars of hoi polloi, in 
which the modern era found its expression. Later, even freedom 
learned to speak in the languages of the sans-culottes and 
proletarians, in which also Marx’s Capital was written and in 
which it has subsequently been translated. Perhaps the time has 
come to do it once again – to recover freedom from the heart of 
the neo-vernacular darkness.
8Capital’s destinerrance 
as event and task
gayatri chakravOrty sPivak 
 
—Mute in the face of the killing fields in the world
Destinerrance, according to Derrida, dislodges ‘tout ceux qui 
par quelques télécommunications prétendent se destiner’ – 
translated as ‘all that – by some telecommunication – claims 
to destine itself ’.1 It is both a wandering away and a regular 
description of how a text reaches its implied reader. This is 
destinerrance as event. This, in other words, is how it is. As 
I speak to you in what is known as the English language, it 
is common sense that I cannot know how each one of you is 
understanding this. The implied reader of Capital, Volume 1 was 
the working class as a collective. Even in its own day this was 
subject to destinerrance in the Northwest European context. The 
historical proof is the change after the Weimar Republic, and 
ultimately ourselves at this conference. Endlessly talking vari-
ations on the talk, while the target-walk is walked by research 
and development, R&D and affectively reconstituted finance 
1. Jacques Derrida, La Carte Postale: de Socrate à Freud et au-delà, Paris: Flammarion, 
1980, p. 7; The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 3. In this paper I have accommodated three 
recipients: in London a meeting on ‘The Philosophy and Politics of Capital Today’, in 
Berlin a conference on ‘The Art and Politics of Marxist Feminism’, and in Yunnan, a 
conference on ‘An Imperative to Re-imagine the Silk Road’.
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capital, helped by a corporatized education. The best students 
are inside a hopelessly privatized dissertation machine where 
the idea of knowledge remains knowledge about knowledge. 
Activism is fundraising and otherwise occasional and national, 
taken to be the irreducible ‘local’. This is where destinerrance as 
a task has to be situated. 
I propose that today the implied reader of Das Kapital must be 
shifted to the citizen. This is, literally and practically, an absurd 
declaration. This proposal – that the implied reader of Das 
Kapital is the citizen – ignores many questions. In what language 
will the citizen read the text? From what niche will s/he read 
it? With what distant-learning subject-summarizing instruc-
tions will s/he follow the text? Will s/he have come to Capital 
because s/he has swallowed whole the global capitalist hoax 
of full connectivity? Without the desire or ability to confront 
these perilous questions today, ‘global thought’ has become an 
intel lectually defunct but well-subsidized industry, thriving on 
a class-caste system of nationalities. Under these circumstances, 
beset by these questions we say that the proposal that the 
implied reader of Das Kapital must be shifted to the citizen is 
itself of course, and indefinitely, subject to destinerrance. The 
other face of the citizenship coin is migrancy. I cannot dwell 
here on the making useful of Das Kapital in this most crucial and 
diversified of contemporary global problems, migrancy. 
W.E.B. Du Bois had already proposed the accommodation of 
the question of citizenship as besieged by the colour line into 
the question, by implication, of the implied readership of Das 
Kapital, in suggesting that the approximately 200,000 fugitive 
slaves joining the Union army at the time of the American Civil 
War shifted the war into a war against slavery, rather than a war 
for the appropriate functioning of capitalism, calling this move-
ment a general strike. Nahum Chandler has suggested that such 
gestures transform our general constitution of the question of 
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being and knowing.2 Read that book to modify your programme. 
And then read Hortense Spillers to meditate gender.3
The possibility of citizenship, as we grasp its immediate 
ideological sense and nuance, still carries a Platonic smell, linger-
ing in the word ‘city’ – except, to my knowledge (which is limited 
here), in Chinese, Arabic and Turkish – to designate belonging to 
a nation-state. Most of us have stopped living in city states for 
rather a long time. And Plato’s material is not even really about 
municipal government, but about varieties of political behaviour, 
which pre-comprehends a certain rearing – rather than training, 
for many of Plato’s varieties of political behaviour spring out of 
mothers misleading sons. 
We are still on the track of the implied reader of Capital today, 
globally, being the citizen of the nation-state. The conflict is 
between a largely hyperreal global governance and a citizenship 
committed to the Greek word ‘democracy’. To the competitive 
tradition of international Islam – as it came to the place of 
the competition (Byzantium) – the Platonic does not dictate 
anything. The Greeks are too close, simply the first Europeanized 
millet, living outside the limits of the city. There is a theory that 
Istanbul simply means inside the city:
Istanbul is the modern name of Byzantium, a corruption of 
Constantinople – Constantinopolis – as most people think, but its 
more interesting derivation is the appellation, Istinpolin, a name the 
occupants of the city heard Byzantine Greeks use, which in reality 
was a Greek phrase (eis tēn polin) which meant ‘in the city.’4 Through 
2. Nahum Chandler, X: The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought, New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2014. ‘Official ﬁgures say that there were in all 186,017 Negro 
troops, of whom 123,156 were still in service, July 16, 1865; and that the losses during the 
war were 68,178. They took part in 198 battles and skirmishes. Without doubt, including 
servants, laborers and spies, between three and four hundred thousand Negroes 
helped as regular soldiers or laborers in winning the Civil War.’ W.E.B. Du Bois, Black 
Reconstruction in America, New York: Atheneum, 1992, p. 112. 
3. Dagmawi Woubshet, ‘Introduction for Hortense Spillers’, Callaloo, vol. 35, no. 4 (Fall 
2012), pp. 925–8 gives the reader unacquainted with Spillers’s work an idea of where to 
begin.
4. B.E., ‘Istanbul’, Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. 22, 15th edn, Chicago: Encyclopædia 
Britannica, 1995, p. 148.
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a series of speech permutations over a span of centuries, this name 
became ‘Istanbul’, just a civic interiority, a Medina (also a city called 
‘city’), Medina forever Arabic, Istanbul forever inside from the Greek 
outsiders, as is India.5
And in Ottoman and modern Turkish, belonging to a geography 
is indicated by a word that can simply mean belonging to the 
patria – ‘The notion of modern citizenship (vatandaslik) gradually 
surfaced. Holding a property was the main parameter to have 
right to vote.’6 No metaphor of the polis in that word.
We must remember the importance of the existence of words 
that can be mobilized according to the politics/poetry of the 
moment. During the so-called Second Constitution, which sup-
posedly brought modernity into Ottoman space, it is well known 
that Abdul Hamid, 
as he modernised the physical and social infrastructure of the 
state – increasing the provision of railway, telegraph, postal and 
quarantine services, and building schools, barracks and government 
offices – … tried to secure the support of his Muslim subjects by 
imbuing them with a spirit of loyalty to the Padishah (sultan) and 
caliph of all Muslims, the Ottoman equivalent of ‘God, King and 
Country’ invoked by his fellow-monarchs in Europe. Abdulhamid’s 
prudent, modernising conservatism, supported by a large network of 
spies, kept the state more or less at peace and more or less intact for 
some twenty years. But it did so at the cost of stifling the initiative 
of the young Muslims whom his schools were training.7 
In Voltaire’s Candide, Ottoman Turkey is the preferred place 
of wise retirement, whereas Westphalia is a place of rape and 
murder. The history of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
the face of European intervention and a superficial secularism 
received insufficient closure. The second call for allegiance to 
5. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Readings, Kolkata: Seagull, 2013, pp. 13–14. For Ottoman 
Greeks as an outside Europeanized millet, see also Resat Kasaba, ed., The Cambridge 
History of Turkey, New York: Cambridge University Press, Vol. 4, p. 160. 
6. Indirect personal communication from Ali Yaycioglu, 10 April 2018.
7. The Cambridge History of Turkey, p. 151.
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the Khalifa was launched by a section of Indian Muslims. It 
is possible to suggest that this call, manoeuvred, was at least 
partially responsible for the divided face of independent India. 
This is the context within which the new Khilafat – undoing the 
European nation-state map-making that accompanied the end of 
the Ottoman Empire – has to be placed. It is not the question of 
winning or losing by killing larger or smaller numbers of people. 
It is a question of a long-standing desire for an alternative inter-
nationality, gone bad, beyond repair, so that we cannot think of 
Capital, Volume 1 – or Marxist feminism – wandering there, as 
event or task. That Osmanli desire never quite disappeared – not 
the least because the transition to modernity still kept the words 
to support that desire intact, and it can certainly be seen in the 
teens of the twenty-first century in the denial of democracy by 
Erdoğan. To designate belonging to a nation-state, the possibility 
of citizenship as we understand it, then, is no longer there in the 
history of the new Khilafat, although the Kurdish army – many 
women leading – keeps some possibility open in this year of 
2018. Plato tabulates ways of being citizenly, motivated often by 
bad competitive motherly projection. In globality, those ways of 
being are accessible above a race/class/gender line, unevenly.
The constitution represented a novelty in a state with shallow 
traditions of the rule of law. Its chances of placing limitations 
on executive power were in any case slim. The real restraints on 
imperial power during the nineteenth century had come from the 
bureaucracy. And it was Abdulhamid II’s succession quashing the 
independence of the Sublime Porte that led to the centralisation 
of power in the court and inadvertently paved the way for the 
revolutionary rise of a new and more dangerous rival for power 
– the military.8
We have not come to the end of that line. It is ‘the military’ in 
the abstract that is the element of what we are calling the new 
8. Ibid. 
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Khilafat. In the broadest possible sense, this military belongs to 
the various powerful nation-states that have complex relations 
among themselves – and also to the Khilafat – the hollow 
structure that pretends to be a nation-state, even if only in the 
minds of those who would rather find an alternative to the map 
they inherited. The geopolitics within which this changeful 
‘military’ operates is also anchorless. The idea of citizenship, in 
Syria or the chimerical Khilafat, is also an empty form backed by 
no social contract or its possibility. Gendering is used in different 
ways within this structureless dynamics. 
The possibility of citizenship as we understand it variously 
is no longer there in the history of the new Khilafat. Talking 
about Marx’s Capital on its 150th birthday, which keeps itself 
confined to niche marketing by intellectuals, substituting citizen 
for worker, will not be able to set this text free, so that the 
enormous problem of migration – Euro-fetishized into colonial-
ism – can be seen today within that larger historical problem, 
the history of the various desires for the various Khilafats. Again, 
this is an immense topic that I will not be able to do justice to 
here. I mention it to get out of the prisonhouse of benevolent 
Europe. We are caught in a bureaucratically quantified series of 
egalitarian summits/festivals/conferences preaching to the choir, 
supported by corporate funding and corporate universities giving 
up on the responsibility of critical teaching; we are organic to 
the ideology that lets capitalist globalization survive. In response 
to this, a long-time ‘activist’ from Croatia suggested that we 
should get as much money as possible from the corporate sector 
– presumably to proliferate huge global conferences on resist-
ance. Confusion between money and capital. Further, between 
capital and capitalism. Here one proceeds from Marx’s mockery 
in the Grundrisse of those who think socialism can make good 
use of capital to his later take in Capital, where he establishes the 
centrifugal figure of labour as the pivotal questioning point of 
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his critique, and implies the use of consensual capital for social 
justice. We can follow the line through the chapter in Capital, 
Volume 1 on so-called primitive accumulation to the chapter 
in Volume 3 where this intervention with capital effaces the 
difference between all modes of production. Many committed 
readers of Marx feel that Volume 3 is both continuous with and 
transgressive of Capital, Volumes 1 and 2. 
One of the most famous ‘transgressive’ passages in Capital, 
Volume 3 is the invocation of the realm of freedom. It reflects 
Marx’s robust unexamined humanism. Marx’s efforts to undo this 
as he composes a phenomenology of capital is the major subject of 
his own (perhaps perceived) task of setting Hegel destinerrant. 
An important way station is the discovery of a Zwieschlächtig-
keit or centrifugality in labour-power, the judicious use of 
which by the agent of production, namely the collectivity of 
workers (as citizens?), would bring about, presumably, the kind 
of structure of governance that would support the realm of 
freedom described in our transgressive passage. This calls for an 
understanding of a Zwieschlächtigkeit, a centrifugality between 
private self-interest and public responsibility in the social, that 
Marx’s occasional class-based shrewdness surmised, but never 
theorized. Indeed the Zwieschlächtigkeit between the Geist as 
the philosophical over against Bewusstsein as private, or even 
‘philosopherly’, remained vaguely related to ideology as the truth/
false consciousness opposition. Does this matter in the practical 
art of politics? Hegel made it clear that the phenomenology 
went forward not with Bewusstsein but with Geist, although the 
emergence of the former was instrumental in the emergence 
of the latter. He repeatedly pointed at the overturning contrast 
between the individual consciousness (falsely self-conscious of 
itself as agent) and the Allgemein, the proper acting space for 
Geist. Consciousness lodged in the Allgemein makes sublation or 
Aufhebung possible through Rede or general speech. 
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Lacan calls Hegel metonymic of psychoanalysis. In the 
obsessively over-repeated warnings not to confuse Bewusstsein’s 
self-confidence with the structural development of truth in Geist, 
it is possible to see the imaginary/symbolic play of the distancing 
between interpretation and its principle being staged. This pro-
vides the empty space, which, in his humanist language, Marx 
can call the realm of freedom. This is the transgressive moment 
that we can occupy, we ourselves, to introduce the incalculable, 
the supplement always considered dangerous by mechanical 
Marxists. Imaginative training for the ungeneralizable singular, 
persistent preparation for the ethical reflex. The absence of 
which, in general education, brought the first set of revolutions 
to heel. The passage invites careful reading. 
Marx, interested only in the economic sphere at that point, 
compliments capital, in this well-known passage: 
It is one of the civilizing [zivilisatorisch] sides of capital that it extorts 
this surplus labour in a manner and in conditions that are more 
advantageous to the development of productive powers, of social 
relations and to the creation of elements for a higher renewal than 
was the case under the earlier forms of slavery; serfdom, etc.9
It is important that he is not speaking of capitalism here. In 
this passage Marx is looking forward to the socialist use of 
capital. I’m thinking especially of phrases such as gesellschaftliche 
Verhältnisse, where the adjective can almost be socialist, and 
the noun is the more philosophical Verhältnis, suggesting a 
philosophically correct structural position, rather than the 
more colloquial Beziehung, which means relationship. And of 
eine höhere Neubildung we can say that it is close to the Hegelian 
Aufhebung, or sublation. 
9. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 3, trans. David Fernbach, 
New York: Penguin, 1981, p. 958; translation modiﬁed. Capital is hereafter cited in the 
main text as C, with volume and page numbers following.
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This is what capital does. And the capitalist disappears from 
the passage. This is where our globally diversified effort can 
teach and practise Marxism by persistently dehumanizing greed 
as the primum mobile, the dangerous supplement, one-on-one yet 
collective, destinerrance. 
In the next movement of this rich paragraph, Marx once again 
generalizes, bringing all modes of production together, bringing 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft together, a contrast supported in 
Morgan’s anthropology, Marx’s main source. (In Morgan, the 
evolutionary theory goes from the Iroquois, a tribe he joined 
by invitation, to industrial society, of which he is critical. He 
was a senator and a railroad worker. Marx and Engels valued 
the diversity of his experience. The dialectical understanding of 
social formations was introduced by Ferdinand Tönnies. It is not 
surprising that he found in Karl Marx one of the authorities for 
this analysis.10)
Here is the loss of the proper name of modes of production 
as a subjunctive goal. In the original German it is a list of condi-
tions that would make socialism possible. Marx points at capi-
tal’s rationalizing capability. Exchangeability begins in nature. 
Before capital, nature ruled the human like a blind power, and 
socialized capital – associated producers – controls this originary 
exchangeability – Stoffwechsel, usually ‘metabolism’, translates 
literally into ‘exchange of material’ – with nature, communally, 
in a rational way. Here is the passage: 
Freedom, in this sphere, can consist only in this, that socialized 
man, the associated producers, govern their metabolism with 
nature in a rational way, bringing it under their communal 
[gemeinschaftlich] control instead of being in bondage to it [beherrscht 
zu werden] as a blind power… But this always remains a realm of 
necessity. Beyond it begins the development of human powers as an 
10. Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society, London: Macmillan, 1877; Ferdinand Tönnies, 
Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001.
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end in itself, the true realm of freedom, though it can only flourish 
with this realm of necessity as its basis. (C3, pp. 958–9)
Shades of the master–slave dialectic are clear here. In the 
good realm of necessity after the emergence of capital, nature 
is not a blind master but something rationally controlled. (The 
section located between Geist and the master–slave dialectic is 
Reason.) For the master–slave dialectic to function conscious-
ness, Bewusstsein, had had to emerge in Hegel, after voiding the 
place of sinnliche Gewissheit, sense certainty, and then itself being 
de-classed in preference to a spatio-structural intuition of Geist.11 
In the various Capitals, I am suggesting, Marx does not go there 
and thus he opens a space for destinerrance as task, not only for 
social justice, but planetary justice – making the rational control 
of exchange with nature more than merely rational. In this 
passage, for example, Marx suggests that in the entire world all 
modes of production together are the realm of necessity which 
supports human development for its own sake. In the passage 
quoted above, Marx is considering freedom within the realm of 
necessity, in diesem Gebiet. The real realm of freedom is beyond 
social engineering. 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us continue reading. 
Here is the passage restricted to the realm of necessity, describ-
ing social engineering to build a basis for the realm of freedom. 
First, Marx takes the small peasant, the least likely candidate, 
as proof of the illusion that capitalism is the norm. Then he 
shows us how easy it is to disprove this illusion by painting 
that effortless picture of a socialist state. ‘Because a form of 
production that does not correspond to the capitalist mode of 
production, the self-employed small peasant can be subsumed 
under its forms of revenue’, and up to a certain point this is not 
incorrect. ‘The illusion that capitalist structural relationships are 
11. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Terry Pinkard, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 60–108, 132–252.
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the natural structural relationships of any mode of production 
is further reinforced.’ Again, in the USA, in New York City, small 
business might as well be complete communism. ‘If, however, 
one reduces wages to their general basis’, writes Marx, 
that is that portion of the product of his labour which goes into 
the worker’s own individual consumption, if one frees this share 
from its capitalist limit and expands it to the scale of consumption 
that is allowed, on the one hand, by the existing social productivity, 
that is the social productive power of his own labour as effectively 
social, and on the other hand claimed by the full development of 
individuality. If one further reduces surplus labour and surplus 
product to the degree claimed by the given conditions of production, 
on the one hand to form an insurance and reserve fund, on the 
other hand for the constant expansion of reproduction, in the degree 
determined by social need. If finally, one includes in both one, the 
necessary labour, and two, the surplus labour, the amount of labour 
that those capable of work must always perform for those members 
of society not yet capable or no longer capable of working. That is, if 
one strips both wages and surplus value of their specifically capitalist 
character, nothing of these forms remains then, but simply those 
general grounds of the forms that are common, gemeinschaftlich, 
to all social, gesellschaftlich, modes of production. (C3, pp. 1015–16; 
translation modified) 
Unfortunately, this can without destinerrance translate into the 
kind of globalization hoax that is perpetrated because everybody 
forgets the theft of surplus value. Capital is only socially produc-
tive. And we buy it.
Hal Draper has suggested that the early Marx understood 
dictatorship in terms of left democracy.12 I have not checked his 
meticulous documentation. It does seem, however, that if Marx 
came to distrust the state because of the potentially globalizing 
power of capital, against which only an International would 
suffice, it is the inhabiting contradiction within democracy 
(and therefore within gendered/classed citizenship in Britain, 
12. Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, Volume 2: The Politics of Social Classes, 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978. 
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his chosen refuge – as within every so-called democracy) that 
he ignored in ignoring the conflict within the use of the word 
‘social’. The contradiction within democracy is a contradiction 
between liberty (ipseity as autonomy) and equality (alterity as 
others who do not resemble me). The conflict within the word 
‘social’ is between quantified labour-power, on the one hand, 
and the collectivity of agents who will use the abstract average 
labour-power to generate a surplus that would be used as de-
scribed in the transgressive passage above, to make Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft come together, on the other. The latter requires 
citizenly behaviour, as in Plato. It is that preparation that Marx 
leaves aside, and Gramsci recognizes as ‘gnoseological’.13
The point was, of course, to generate a Zwieschlägtigkeit 
within the ‘social’, precisely between something like the ‘public’ 
(quantified labour) and something like the ‘private’ (desire for 
social justice), to revise Hegel’s achieved justice and to open 
it to permanent revolution. Marx could not think it through 
in theory. Marx’s change in 1844, when at 26 he opened Hegel 
and the Wealth of Nations, from national economy to political 
economy, from nation-state to an international perspective 
– because capital was international – is well-known. He was 
preparing to write the phenomenology of capital without focus-
ing only on Geist.
Yet, Moishe Postone, recently dead, said in his last interview, 
that when Marx moved to Britain he became a Victorian.14 It is 
also true that in the important Postface to the second edition 
of Capital, Volume 1 Marx wrote that because Britain was the 
best example of advanced capitalism, it was the appropriate 
place from which to produce a critique – in the classical German 
philosophical sense – of capital as such; whereas anything 
13. See Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘Global Marx?’, in Robert Garnett et al., eds, Economics, 
Knowledge, and Class: Marxism without Guarantees, London: Routledge, 2017, p. 268.
14. Moishe Postone, interview by Anej Korsika, Chicago, 2011, https://anejkorsika.
wordpress.com/2015/02/26/interview-with-moishe-postone-critique-and-dogmatism.
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produced at that point in Germany would be a mishmash (C1, pp. 
95–6). Marxism has not recovered from this ongoing focus on the 
nation-state despite its declared interest in the international or 
the global. Because of this unacknowledged yet necessary focus 
on the nation-state (the globe is not a world), the destinerrant 
subject of Marxism today is the citizen in the robust sense of the 
word, resistant to unexamined nationalism.
The European Union, a collection of debtor states and creditor 
states, with Germany as an uneasy head, should not be mistaken 
for a necessary German preoccupation with the ‘local’. As Xavier 
Sala-i-Martín, co-inventor of the global competitiveness index, 
repeats when he speaks to the ministries of finance in Rwanda 
and/or in Canada – although he is advising both ministries 
to find new places for economic growth – he is not saying the 
same thing.15 We on the left need to remember that the ‘local’ of 
the German state is not the same as the ‘local’ of the huge war 
camps where women are stored willy-nilly today, subject to the 
rape culture and bribe culture most of the world takes as normal. 
To remember that is ‘the art’ of politics – because it requires 
imagination. We cannot congratulate ourselves on local victories, 
state-based – whatever the state – and think of it as the only 
model of Marxist feminism.
Marxist feminism or feminist Marxism aspires to achieve 
socio-political, economic and juridico-legal equality for women; 
not a mean feat. If, however, we accept that gendering precedes 
even our becoming-proper to ourselves and provides the first 
semiotic for creating a social formation, we can consider the pos-
sibility that feminism must persistently interrupt Marxism, sup-
plementing the neglected Zwieschlächtigkeit of the social into the 
labyrinthine and open-ended pathways of sexuality. Because this 
bold move is neglected, it is still possible, at the end of Moishe 
15. Private conversation.
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Postone’s interview, to produce a recommended reading list for 
Marxism consisting of four white men. To replace Postone’s 
criticism of the Victorian Marx, we must consider Marx’s final 
exchange with a woman, Vera Zasulich, where, after many 
anguished drafts, Marx introduces the final response, which 
basically says, in response to Zasulich’s question, ‘How do we 
establish capitalism-based Marxism in peasant-commune-based 
Asian Russia?’, ‘I don’t know. You must work it out yourself.’ Too 
much at that point for the European imagination.16
It is in this context – the context of any possible ‘art and 
politics’ of a Europe-based Marxist-feminism – that we have 
to consider Lenin’s establishment of the Comintern in 1919. 
In George Padmore’s invaluable words: when ‘the expected 
revolution in Western European countries – Germany, Austria, 
Hungary, Poland – failed to materialize’, Lenin turned not only 
towards ‘the illiterate workers and uncultured mujiks of Czarist 
Russia … [but also towards] the even more backward workers 
and peasants of feudal China’, and also of course the progressive 
bourgeoisie of the colonies.17 If we take Padmore’s idealistic 
words seriously, we will have to confront the ungeneralizable 
question of subaltern sex-gender and its relationship to citizen-
ship – a destinerrance even more absurd than the general 
question of citizenship itself. Work here must be language-based 
and textural; earning the right to be global and structural. Frigga 
Haug’s theory of European ‘memory-work’ is an interesting idea 
here, though necessarily general.18 If we take the realistic fact 
of the brief mustering of forces of the anti-colonial ‘progressive 
bourgeoisie’ of the various contemporary colonies, we are looking 
at a completely separate, more class-continuous scenario.19 In the 
16. Karl Marx to Vera Zasulich, 8 March 1881, in Teodor Shanin, ed., Late Marx and the 
Russian Road, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983, pp. 99–126.
17. George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism?, London: D. Dobson, 1956, p. 293.
18. Frigga Haug, Beyond Female Masochism: Memory-Work and Politics, London: Verso, 
1992.
19. This passage from Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India, written in Ahmedabad 
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context of Britain and Germany, we must also not forget that the 
Comintern was dismissed because, in 1943, Stalin needed to keep 
alive the alliance with the UK and the USA. 
And indeed Rosa Luxemburg’s words to Lenin, not in the 
nationalism debate, but from prison in 1918 – that he should not 
ignore the peasant communal nature of larger Russia – must also 
be heard again and remembered.20 In the second meeting of the 
Comintern, the Bengali communist M.N. Roy gave the important 
generalization: for Europe, industrial capitalism; for the rest of 
the world, agricultural capitalism. Lenin and Bukharin loved 
this. Mao strategically had to continue to speak about the prole-
tarian revolution. The next year, Lenin is dead. Stalin hates M.N. 
Roy, who removes himself to establish the Communist Party in 
Mexico. If Marxist feminism ignores this history, it is not going 
to be able to establish anything like a generalizable movement. 
Du Bois demonstrates to us that racism is a universally avail-
able ideology to take care of the self-determination of capital.21 
My interest in the destinerrance of Capital, Volume 1 as related 
to the art and politics of Marxist feminism is not identity-based 
racism or reverse racism, but rather the global nature of capital, 
which now must repeatedly spectralize the rural in order to keep 
focused on areas of advanced capitalism as producing the best 
local endeavours in the name of a networked society. To refuse 
anything but local successes is not to be Marxist. I shall therefore 
close with some words I spoke in China on 15 April 2018, which 
attempted to inhabit a generalized Chinese subject, rather than 
the US or Indian nationalist subject, too competitive with China 
prison between 1942 and 1945, gives us a sense of the importance of Lenin’s rethinking: 
‘In Central Asia, even today four legendary ﬁgures of great conquerors are remembered – 
Sikander (Alexander), Sultan Mahmud, Chenghiz Khan and Timur. To these four must be 
added now a ﬁfth, another type of person, not a warrior, but a conqueror in a different 
realm, round whose name legend has already gathered – Lenin’ (New Delhi: Penguin, 
2004, p. 247).
20. Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution, and Leninism or Marxism?, trans. Bertram 
Wolfe, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 45.
21. This is the general argument of Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America. 
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to do so. Can a strictly European version of Marxist feminism 
imagine such a broad base, rather than taking a concern with the 
underclass migrant and a fetishization of colonialism as the last 
word?
Imperatives to reimagine the Silk Road22 
The Silk Road is one of the long-standing cultural mindsets that 
have been animated by today’s possibility of a networked world, 
to reimagine the new connectivity. An imperative is an urgent 
command, generally brought about by external circumstances; 
here the change to a global situation. Strictly speaking, we know 
that there was no one Silk Road. Indeed, the phrase was coined 
by a German historian.23 But today it is a great unifying idea, 
invoking in the imagination one of the greatest unifying trade 
enterprises undertaken by what we now call China. My connec-
tion to this part of the world is based in the fact that my city 
of birth, Calcutta, and the ancient city of Kunming have been 
trading partners since the fourteenth century CE, and that too 
can be situated within this imagined great narrative. 
One of the magnificences attached to the original Silk Road 
enterprise was the great difficulty of actual physical movement 
through sometimes seemingly insurmountable terrain. Today 
the imperative to reimagine that unifying idea comes from the 
fact that those physical difficulties have been dwarfed through 
the scientific achievements of global travel as well as network-
ing and accessibility promoted by digitality, yet complicated 
22. Cf. Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘Imperative to Re-imagine the Planet’, in An Aesthetic 
Education in the Era of Globalization, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2013, pp. 
335–50. This is the text of a talk to Stiftung Dialogik in Zurich, twenty-one years ago, as 
they were restructuring to move from rescuing Jews who had managed to escape from 
Hitler’s concentration camps during the Second World War, to providing asylum for 
refugees from Rwanda, Somalia, Turkey and the like.
23. ‘Seidenstraße or ‘silk road’ was coined by Ferdinand von Richthofen, as cited in 
Tamara Chin, ‘The Invention of the Silk Road, 1877’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 40. no. 1 (2013), 
pp. 194–219. I am grateful to Charles Armstrong for providing this reference.
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by geopolitical violence. These generate the new imperative to 
reimagine the Silk Road.
Nearly 200 years ago, Karl Marx wrote these unforgettable 
words about the proletarian revolution, which China fulfilled in 
the last century:
Bourgeois revolutions, such as those of the eighteenth century, storm 
quickly from success to success. They outdo each other in dramatic 
effects; men and things seem set in sparkling diamonds and each 
day’s spirit is ecstatic. But they are short-lived; they soon reach 
their apogee, and society has to undergo a long period of regret 
until it has learned to assimilate soberly the results of its period of 
storm and stress. Proletarian revolutions, however, such as those 
of the nineteenth century, constantly engage in self-criticism, and 
in repeated interruptions of their own course. They return to what 
has apparently already been accomplished in order to begin the task 
again; with merciless thoroughness they mock the inadequate, weak 
and wretched aspects of their first attempts; they seem to throw 
their opponent to the ground only to see him draw new strength 
from the earth and rise again before them, more colossal than 
ever; they shrink back again and again before the indeterminate 
immensity of their own goals, until the situation is created in which 
any retreat is impossible, and the conditions themselves cry out:  
Hic Rhodus, hic salta! Here is the rose, dance here!24
What Marx describes here is an imperative brought about by 
external circumstances. In globality, we confront such an imper-
ative today for the unifying imaginary of the Silk Road, brought 
about by digital and geopolitical circumstances, in order to start 
questioning what, in the name of development, the nature of 
that diversified and multifocal response to the imperatives would 
be. This can be a long-standing project, undertaken with the 
spirit of globality, with a deep language-learning that can bring 
the world’s wealth of languages in line with Yunnan’s wealth 
of languages. A new and already established destination for the 
24. Karl Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’, trans. Ben Fowkes, in 
Surveys from Exile, London: Allen Lane, 1973, p. 150. 
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Silk Road today is Continental Africa. This is where the word 
‘imagination’ is important. As we know, just before the passage 
that I have quoted from Marx, Marx says that the contemporary 
revolution will take its contents from the poetry of the future: 
The social revolution of the nineteenth century can only create its 
poetry from the future, not from the past. It cannot begin its own 
work until it has sloughed off all its superstitious regard for the past. 
Earlier revolutions have needed world-historical reminiscences to 
deaden their awareness of their own content. In order to arrive at its 
own content the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the 
dead bury their dead.25 
Marx could only imagine the imperatives of a globality where 
capital would move with Gedankenschnelle – the speed of thought 
– if and when it could or would be able to. In the twenty-first 
century, capital moves much faster than mere thought can. And 
in extensive globality old ideas have come to command develop-
ment. Hence an imperative to reimagine the past, rather than 
bury it, has emerged. I am asking European Marxist feminists 
to reimagine the Comintern beyond its European decolonizing 
past, with a memory-working feminism worked in. The poetry 
of the future. Marx uses the broad Greek-origin word poesie 
rather than the common German word Dichtung, much used by 
intellectuals of his time, to relate it to truth. Marx had a doctor-
ate in Greek philosophy and he knew his Aristotle, although he 
also acknowledged that Aristotle could not have produced the 
labour theory of value. But Aristotle did suggest that poesie was 
a better method of knowing history and prefiguring the future 
than historiography itself. I believe Marx’s use of the Greek word 
poesie, rather than the common German word Dichtung, directs 
us to that possibility. Poetry as a method, not merely a metaphor.
As China’s great allegorical Confucian tradition knows 
well, poetry is related to the very possibility of imaginative 
25. Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire’, p. 149. 
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interpretation. The imagination is neither rational nor irrational 
and holds rationality in its embrace. It keeps openings intact 
beyond the mistakes that we make with mere reasonableness, 
because we are human. In this sense, we who work in literature, 
philosophy and the qualitative social sciences come forward 
with the message that offers collaborative rather than corrective 
assistance to what mere knowledge management, as provided 
by the new digital, can perform. The digital is as powerful and 
dangerous as a wild horse. The imagination slow-trains the 
rider, to think the old in a new way so that the new can also be 
thought in an old way without baseless golden-ageism, a mere 
glorification rather than a reimagining of the past. Here I speak 
as an Asian. I speak for both the great traditions of the Chinese 
and the Indian. We have joined together in the past and I hope, 
intellectually, we can again. (How one throws off this tradition-
talk into its supplementation by sex-gender is an immense 
problem that brings us to the brink of absurdity.26)
In the same spirit, I would say in Germany that it is necessary, 
indeed an imperative today, to imagine Marxist feminism as it 
begins constantly to disguise itself or to provide a disguise for 
global colonialism. These are strong words, deeply felt, in order 
to consider the role of ourselves as we move from the European 
state to globality in the name of a critique of the Anthropocene, 
echoing Haug’s conviction: employability is not the criterion of 
dignity. I am strongly supportive of Frigga Haug’s four-point pro-
gramme that in the age of automation, rather than create more 
jobs, existing jobs should be for fewer hours and equal pay. When 
I’m in China, speaking in halting Chinese to feminist workers in 
various areas, I am always disheartened to see that the workers 
26. Dai Jinhua’s Cinema and Desire: Feminist Marxism and Cultural Politics in the Work of 
Dai Jinhua (ed. Jing Wang and Tani E. Barlow, London: Verso, 2002) is a site from which 
we can begin to scope this out. A problem commensurate with our academic capacities: 
how do we read a ﬁlm such as Woman, Demon, Human (《人鬼情, Rén guǐ qíng?’ literally 
[what is the] bond [between] person [and] ghost?) My thanks to Zhang Zhen for helping 
with the translation.
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are social scientists and that the work is often narrowly focused 
on income production. This is where Frigga and I are at one.27 
Employability is not the only criterion that moves Marxist 
feminism forward. As I have suggested, class-continuous moves 
into the global South are not going to correct anything if we 
want to go back to 1844, rather than 1818, and decide to move 
from national economy to political economy, rather than merely 
remember a nativity. Ultimately, that would be a declaration of 
family values, than which there is nothing less Marxist feminist.
Capital, Volume 1, destinerrant as event, generalizes, for example, 
London, Berlin, Kunming. The task is to generalize the subaltern 
into citizenship, not only of these cities, but of all named 
nation-states; and regulate capital to alter the global generalities. 
Gender, part larger than the whole, thrusts the event of destin-
errance into the incalculable, making the revolution of mind and 
world a permanent task.
27. Frigga Haug, ‘The ‘Four-in-One Perspective’: A Manifesto for a More Just Life’, 
Socialism and Democracy, vol. 23. no. 1 (2009), pp. 119–23. But I cannot agree with the goal 
of ‘capacity building’ that Haug shares with international civil society. My work for the 
last thirty years, mostly unsuccessful, has been in the training of the poorest children and 
the richest adults in the intuitions of the contradiction driving democracy, for they will 
vote: the contradiction between liberty (ipseity as autonomy) and equality (alterity as 
others who do not resemble me). That leads to the citizen-as-subject of Capital, Volume 1 
that has been the absurd task of destinerrance in this text.
9Subjectivation and war: 
Marx and Foucault
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Today, we reread Capital under the theoretical conjuncture of the 
most heretical readings. These send us back and forth between 
the second and third volumes of Capital, the Grundrisse and the 
missing chapter that only became available in the 1960s. More 
importantly, we reread Capital after the ‘impossible revolution 
of 1968’ (impossible in its largely Marxist–Leninist grammar) 
and the neoliberal counter-revolution that followed, under the 
command of finance capital, in the context of a financial global-
ization that intensifies all the processes of capitalist reproduction 
in such a way as to demote what was once dubbed ‘late capital-
ism’ to the ‘later stages’ of an ‘early capitalism’.1 All of us may also 
experience Capital, Volume 1 as a ‘strange’ and ‘unique’ locus solus: 
namely, as the unique and exclusive trajectory that re territorializes 
the reader of Capital, Volume 1 from the dialectical exposition 
of the autotelic machinery of capital to the ‘matter of fact’ that 
capitalism is a concept in so far as it is a historical complex on a 
world scale – capitalism as a world concept. Consequently, ‘that 
process must have had a beginning of some kind’2 – otherwise 
1. Peter Osborne, How to Read Marx, London: Granta Books, 2005, p. 2.
2. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, Introduction by Ernest Mandel, 
Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin Books, 1990, ch. 23, p. 714. 
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money could not have turned into capital in the ‘never-ending 
circle’ of an illusory liberal soft power supported by the inter-
twined concepts of ‘exchange’ and ‘contract’, as the basis of the 
market qua equivalence, equality, equilibrium theory, just price, 
and so on. If the critique of political economy shows precisely 
that ‘capital is the golden chain the wage labourer has already 
forged for himself ’,3 the particular course taken by the analysis 
has to force the ‘tearing apart of the object under investigation’, 
and ‘this’, Marx insists, ‘corresponds also to the spirit of capitalist 
production’.4
Force (Gewalt) is itself an economic power
In this very same spirit it is asserted that capitalist production 
not only produces commodity and surplus-value, but also 
continuously reproduces the social relations of production 
themselves. The worker is not only reproduced, but is produced 
in the first place, in a stage of real subsumption, including the 
‘reserve army’, this population ‘whose misery is in inverse ratio to 
the amount of torture it has to undergo in the form of labour’.5 
And the latter increases with the potential energy of wealth and 
precipitates the ‘absolute general law of capitalist accumulation’, 
according to which ‘the situation of the worker, be his payment 
high or low, must grow worse’.6 Well, then, if progress produces 
genuine misery and wealth destitution, if machinery is the 
capitalist answer to the strike and better wages, and increases 
absolute and relative exploitation, extensive and intensive 
domination, the whole of Capital, Volume 1 on the commodity-
form and its ‘flirtation with Hegel’ is somehow historically and 
violently drawn into the last part on ‘primitive accumulation’, 
3. Ibid., ch. 25, p. 769.
4. Ibid., ch. 13, p. 443.
5. Ibid., ch. 25, p. 798.
6. Ibid., ch. 25, p. 799.
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concluding with ‘The Modern Theory of Colonization’. To cut 
a long story short, one hundred years after Rosa Luxemburg’s 
reading of Capital, we have paid the price of learning that, in the 
centre as well as on the periphery, ‘so-called’ primitive accumula-
tion is in fact the continued creation of capitalism itself: behind 
the extreme mathematical sophistication of finance and financial 
globalization, there is always the ‘brood of bankocrats, financi-
ers, rentiers, brokers, stock-jobbers, etc.’7 described by Marx in the 
most ‘primitive’ context as the truth of the world market.
It is not by chance, then, that Marx finally presents here, in 
what Jameson still insists on regarding as a ‘kind of musical 
coda’ (‘History as Coda’),8 the properly capitalist systematic 
combination, one that includes ‘the colonies, the national debt 
[associated with the international credit system and joint-stock 
companies], the modern tax system, and the system of protec-
tion [of home-grown industries]’. ‘These methods’, Marx writes, 
‘depend in part on brute force, for instance the colonial system. 
But they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and 
organized force of society.… Force [Gewalt] is itself an economic 
power.’9 Nor was it by chance that Foucault would find in the 
proceedings of Capital, Volume 1 the very principle of a double 
colonization: the internal colonization of Europe and the exter-
nal colonization of America mutually reinforcing, and together 
defining, the world economy, with the ‘sort of boomerang effect 
colonial practice can have on the juridico-political structures of 
the West’.10 Yet we also understand that if the genealogy of the 
techniques of discipline and biopower is to be traced back to the 
‘launch’ of primitive accumulation, then by the same token the 
history, functioning and successive biopolitical transformations 
7. Ibid., ch. 31, p. 920.
8. Fredric Jameson, Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One, London: Verso, 
2011, ch. 3, ‘History as Coda’, p. 74.
9. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, ch. 31, pp. 915–16.
10. Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1975–1976, New York: Picador, 1997, Lecture of 4 February 1976, p. 103. 
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of these power apparatuses (dispositifs) cannot be separated from 
war in all of its forms – military and colonial wars, wars of 
class(es), race(s) and sex(es) – because, in large part, it was war 
that created them. In the different modalities they take on from 
the end of the seventeenth century, these apparatuses (dispositifs) 
are the privileged way to express the continuation of war by 
other means and to make war appear as an analyser of power 
relationships. 
This logic is at play in Foucault’s 1976 lecture series, when 
he does not reverse Clausewitz’s formula (as it is all too often 
said) but postulates on the contrary that it was Clausewitz 
who reversed ‘a principle that existed long before … a sort of 
thesis that had been in circulation since the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and which was both diffuse and specific’.11 
If this led Foucault to study the appearance and diffusion of 
a discourse that for the first time conceived of politics as the 
continuation of war, in doing so he would end up mobilizing 
against Marx something that Marx had located at the centre of 
his Communist Manifesto: namely, the idea of an irreconcilable 
antagonism – that is, class struggle – as a ‘more or less veiled 
civil war, raging within existing society’, an antagonism Marx 
would then reintroduce at the heart of Capital, Volume 1, chapter 
10, in the factory, ‘between [formally] equal rights [as regards the 
dimensions of the working day], force [Gewalt] decides’.12 If this 
confirms that ‘Force [Gewalt] is itself an economic power’, since 
it determines the division between surplus-value and wages as 
‘independent variables which set limits to one another’13 (this is 
the very place, by the way, where Negri ‘learned to do politics’14), 
and if it shows that, with its semantic extension in German that 
11. Ibid., Lecture of 21 January 1976, p. 48.
12. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, ch. 10, p. 344.
13. Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 3, trans. David Fernbach, Harmondworth: Penguin, 1991, 
Part V, ch. 22, p. 486.
14. Antonio Negri, ‘Why Marx?’ (2013), in Marx and Foucault, trans. Ed Emery, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017, p. 21.
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articulates ‘violence’ and ‘power’ with the commission of violence 
by an institution (potestas) which is invariably the state, then 
Gewalt may circulate in a rather uncontrollable way between 
politics and economics. Gewalt is above all the element of a 
dialectical negativity that expresses, ultimately, the reversal of 
domination into revolution, and the acceleration of the course of 
history, as history of the universal emancipation undertaken by 
the ‘only revolutionary class’. The industrial proletariat is in itself 
the historical subject of the tendency towards the socialization 
of production and the constitution of a ‘collective worker’, a 
tendency considered as necessary as a Naturprozess, in Capital, 
Volume 1, chapter 32, ‘The Historical Tendency of Capitalist 
Accumulation’.15
Now, we’ll all agree on this point: there is no natural war. 
That’s why we can only confirm (to better divert) this observa-
tion from Balibar: Marxism could not construct a concept of 
war, but it is certainly a problem,16 since the point of departure 
for rethinking the entire history of capitalism – even in its most 
contemporary forms – is the close, constitutive, ontological 
relationship between the most deterritorialized form of capital 
(money) and the most deterritorialized form of sovereignty (war). 
And it is precisely because the reversibility of war and economy 
is at the very basis of capitalism, that ‘wars’ (and not the war, 
which is always the perspective of the state) are the foundation 
of internal and external order, the organizing principle of society 
under capitalism. Conversely, wars – not only wars of class, but 
also military, civil, sex and race wars – are integrated so consti-
tutively in its analysis that Das Kapital ought to be rewritten on 
the basis of its last section in order to account for their dynamic 
in its most real functioning. At all of the major turning points 
15. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, ch. 32, p. 929: ‘ capitalist production begets, with the 
inexorability of a natural process, its own negation’.
16. Étienne Balibar, ‘Marxism and War’, Radical Philosophy 160 (March/April 2010), p. 9, 
www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/marxism-and-war.
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in capitalism, we do not find Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’, 
carried out by entrepreneurial innovation, but always the enter-
prise of a mutant multiplicity of military and civil wars.
With financial capitalism, what imposes itself is the con-
temporaneity of ‘primitive accumulation’, of dispossession and 
exploitation acting under cover of ‘trade’ (le doux commerce17) 
with the most modern productive/destructive processes. The true 
war machine of capital is financialization, of which ‘industrial’ 
capital is only a component, now completely restructured and 
subordinate to the demands of (so-called) ‘fictive’ capital. Leaving 
aside the political question raised by the hegemony of financial 
capital, in other words, the impossibility of distinguishing 
between accumulation by exploitation and ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (David Harvey) is equivalent to the inability to 
acknowledge the constitutive war of/in the economy.18
It is definitively no longer a question of a reversal of the 
formula ‘politics as the continuation of war by other means’, but 
of an interweaving of war in politics and politics in war adopted 
by the movements of capital in its permanent confrontations 
with a whole variety of struggles. Politics is no longer, as in 
Clausewitz, the politics of the state, but a politics of the finan-
cialized economy interwoven with the multiplicity of wars that 
drive and hold together the active war of destruction with wars 
of class, race, sex and wars of subjectivity that provide the global 
‘environment’ of all the others. Are we not living in the time of 
the subjectivation of civil wars?
In the next section, we show that the irreducibility of social 
warfare to a class struggle that dialectically pacifies it is a condi-
tion for the analysis of political power as war. We will develop 
this movement within and against Foucault: governmentality 
does not replace war. Governmentality organizes, governs and 
17. I.e. ‘the peaceful commerce’ in the English translation of ch. 31.
18. David Harvey, The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 164. 
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controls the reversibility of wars and power. This is a revers-
ibility that lends new significance to the difference in nature 
Foucault proposes between relationships of power (disciplinary, 
security and governmentality relationships) and strategic 
confrontations.19
To really escape from Hegel…
In the first volume of Capital, Marx defines capital as a contra-
dictory social relation. Contradiction implies that antagonism 
is included in or immanent to the relation, but also designates 
the effacing of the ‘difference’ between the two terms of the 
relation in the labour of the negative and the teleology which, 
in Marxism, follows from it. The working class and capital 
are opposed in virtue of their very relation, their belonging to 
a common world that is in dispute within this relation. The 
working class and capital are installed on the same plane and 
constrained to assume a common measure, labour, which is the 
basis of their struggle as they dispute its identity or non-identity: 
living labour versus dead labour. The principle that operates this 
antagonistic homogenization is that of the dialectic. Hence the 
contradiction is haunted by the annulling of the language of 
alterity in the negation of the negation that brings forth history 
as the internal product of a dynamic – a contradictory dynamic 
– that tends toward its own reversal. Is not capital in itself a 
‘self-destructive contradiction’?20
Here we appropriate, however schematically, an insight that 
brings us face to face with la pensée 68 as a whole, for it is in ’68 
that the non-dialectical character of the conflict, the ‘unsublat-
able’ nature of its differences, is affirmed as the crucible of all 
19. Cf. Michel Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’ (1982), in Essential Works of Foucault 
(1954–1984), vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion, London: Penguin Books, 2002, p. 346.
20. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, ch. 19, p. 676.
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new historical forms/forces. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
indeed, it was the break with dialectics that led to the emergence 
of that which it had forestalled: the question of war and of the 
strategic confrontation between adversaries.
It is 1971. In a volume published in homage to Jean 
Hyppolite, Michel Foucault turns to Nietzsche in his first 
attempt to thematize war as a cipher for the social relation. 
In order to do so, he defines domination not as a relation 
but, on the contrary, as a ‘non-relation’, a distribution of 
forces – the dominant and the dominated – staged in a 
‘non-place [non-lieu]’.21 The ‘non-relation’ is a pure distance, 
a gulf between forces. The fact that domination is at once a 
non-relation and a ‘drama … staged in [a] non-place’ means 
that the dominant and the dominated do not belong to the 
same world, to the same space. It is dialectics that reduces 
the absolute difference and heterogeneity of domination to a 
conflict between homogeneous instances. Now, what Foucault 
will call later ‘governmentality’ is precisely the device by which 
a non-relation as relation between adversaries is reduced to a 
‘pacified’ antagonism between governor and governed, through 
the imposition ‘of rules, obligations, and rights’. The universe 
of rules permits the game of domination to be continually 
replayed: the rule is not the manifestation of a shared world, 
but a ‘meticulously repeated … violence’.22
Extending this critique of the dialectic of capital (a critique 
of the dialectical conception of capital by the very concept of 
capitalism in its concrete abstraction), we can see that capital 
is not only an exploitative social relation, but also, and indis-
solubly, a strategic relation of war. Capital acts on both planes at 
once, shifting from one to the other. Contrary to what Foucault 
21. Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ (1971), in The Foucault Reader, ed. 
Paul Rabinow, London: Penguin Books, 1984, p. 85.
22. Ibid. 
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tells us, the establishing of governmentality does not do away 
with war, but continues it by other means. Any definition of 
conflict and of the process of subjectivation it implies must set 
out from the strategic articulation of capital, which unfolds 
as both ‘relation’ and ‘non-relation’, as both governmentality 
and war.
War, or the strategy of confrontation between adversaries, 
can become a relation of power between governors and governed 
because relatively stable mechanisms (dispositifs, rules, laws) 
enable institutions to steer the behaviours of the governed with 
sufficient certainty and predictability. But, as Foucault argues 
in ‘The Subject and Power’, every power relationship between 
governors and governed is liable to give rise to new strategic 
confrontations, and thus to transform the governed into adver-
saries, setting in motion a potential reversal of the situation. 
This is what happened at the end of the 1960s and the beginning 
of the 1970s: the politico-military victory of the USA following 
the Second World War made it possible to establish new power 
relationships within which a new generation of conflicts would 
develop, setting the scene for new strategic confrontations: the 
strange revolution of 1968. We must therefore carefully distin-
guish the conflicts, freedoms and subjectivities implied by power 
relationships (governmentality) from those implied by strategic 
confrontations. The ‘conflicts’, ‘subjectivities’ and ‘freedoms’ are 
not the same in the two cases.
The power relationships between governors and governed 
imply ‘freedom’ for both terms of the relation. The vanquished 
can only be transformed into the governed if one recognizes 
in them a ‘freedom’, a possibility of ‘resisting’ (Foucault) or a 
possibility of ‘flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari), which in reality 
is incorporated into the governmental mode of functioning. 
Conflict, freedom and subjectivity within governmentality are 
defined by the limits of the ‘within-against’: the governed are 
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‘free’ either because they enjoy a fabricated freedom encouraged 
and incited by those in power (that of ‘free labour’, of the ‘free 
consumer’, the ‘free voter’), or because they see themselves as 
‘free’ in and for the war against liberal ‘liberties’. The first is a 
conceded and negotiated freedom; the second is a hard-won 
freedom.
The capitalism of the New Deal and, in its wake, the Cold 
War created new freedoms (‘freedom of labour, freedom of con-
sumption, political freedom’) above and beyond those of classical 
liberalism, in order to exit from the economic war (following 
the 1929 crash), from the political war with communism, and 
from the war between imperialisms. With the Cold War as a new 
technology of control of the world economy, these new freedoms 
would be generalized (in the countries of the North) thanks to 
the politico-military victory over the communist revolution. This 
also explains why most of the planet remained under the yoke 
of neocolonial policies carried out by those same countries that 
‘created new freedoms’. The transition to governmentality did 
not really take place in a (post)colonial situation. The colonizers 
and the colonized remained enemies; they never participated in 
the ‘same world’, even when the ‘blacks dreamed of being white’, 
as Fanon says. It is these ‘details’ that Foucault forgets when 
he analyses (neo)liberalism.23 And the same goes for Tronti’s 
operaism.
The conflicts proper to governmentality and its ‘freedom’ are 
not enough to define the autonomy and independence of political 
movements. They constitute necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tions, because autonomy and independence presuppose a rupture 
and a subjectivation, a ‘subjective rupture’ (coupure subjective) 
that will allow the ‘governed’ to exit from the framework of 
governmentality and its ‘freedoms’ which guarantee the smooth 
23. See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1978–1979, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
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functioning of liberal-capitalist society. To exit governmental-
ity means at once to produce a subjective ‘mutation’ and to 
enter the dynamics of the confrontation between adversaries, 
where another type of ‘freedom’ begins to emerge. Once the 
injunction to be ‘governed’, to be ‘the governed’, is lifted, what 
surges forth from the rupture is a freedom and a subjectivity 
that affirms itself as ‘outside-and-against’ capitalist freedoms. 
The ‘non-relation’ is no longer passively suffered, but acted and 
insisted upon by the dominated. The critical point is, as always, 
the passage from freedoms and subjectivations ‘within-against’ 
governmentality to freedoms ‘outside-and-against’ capitalism, 
those implied in strategic confrontations. In the passage between 
these two conflicts, between these two freedoms and these two 
subjectivations, it is the revolutionary rupture that is at work. It 
is here that the war machine, and an autonomous and independ-
ent subjectivity, is constituted – or fails to be constituted.
The movements of the 1960s fully assumed the rupture 
and discontinuity between these two modalities of conflict, 
subjectivity, and freedom. 1968 sounded the death knell for 
the Leninist machine and, more generally, for a way of under-
standing the subject and activism anchored in the Marxist 
tradition. The new movements were constituted upon entirely 
different temporalities than those of the classic workers’ move-
ment, involving other processes of subjectivation and other 
modes of organization. And here lies the importance of the 
feminist movement, which interrogates in unprecedented fashion 
the question of the subject, that of time, and that of the relation 
between the two – but without yet creating the coordinates of a 
new war machine.
In the early 1970s Carla Lonzi set out the rupture with the 
Leninist and, more generally, Marxist war machine very clearly, 
in a twofold manner. She declared that the subject is at once 
not given, since it is ‘unexpected’, and that the temporality of 
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the feminist movement is not that of the future, but that of the 
‘present’. With her concept of the ‘unexpected subject’ (soggetto 
imprevisto), Lonzi had in her sights the working class qua 
subjectivation expected, known and recognized in advance. For 
Marxism, in accordance with Hegel, the revolutionary process 
consists in the passage from the ‘in itself ’ to the ‘for itself ’, from 
unreflective immediacy to existence both subjective (conscious-
ness) and objective (its real existence in the world). Instead, 
Lonzi writes in Sputiamo su Hegel (Let’s Spit on Hegel), ‘Not being 
trapped within the master–slave dialectic, we … introduce into 
the world the Unexpected Subject.’24
The Marxist revolution introduces a discontinuity with 
‘power’, but maintains the continuity of the ‘subject’ of the 
revolution. The working class already expresses a productive 
cooperation that is in itself ‘revolutionary’, whose only failing 
is that it is exploited and limited by the power of capital. Once 
liberated from these constraints, it could realize all of the 
promise it harbours. The revolution is apprehended as a realiza-
tion of possibilities that are already contained in production, 
work and cooperation. These possibilities are ‘tendencies’ that 
revolutionary acceleration will allow to be realized. But the 
movements of the 1960s had an entirely different experience, 
since they arrived after two world wars forming one total world 
war, when this illusion of revolutionary production (of produc-
tion as revolutionary in itself), the illusion of the already-in-act 
‘worker’ subject, and that of science and technics as progressive 
forces, had been belied by the identity of production and 
destruction, of labour and war, of science and nuclear death. 
Acceleration has passed and is passed – rendered passé – by 
total war, whose perspective capital adopts, with the ‘real 
24. Carla Lonzi, ‘Sputiamo su Hegel’ (1970), in Sputiamo su Hegel: La donna clitoridea 
e la donna vaginale e altri scritti, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1974; Edizione 
Economica, 2013, p. 47.
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subsumption’ of society and of its ‘productive forces’ at the 
price of an unlimited war. So much so that production, labour 
and subjectivity no longer harbour any image of the future, 
any promise of emancipation in the mirror of the revolution. 
They must be subjected to radical mutations. The process of the 
realization of (possible) tendencies remains, still, a realization of 
history subtended by a more or less veiled teleology. The reality 
of labour, of cooperation and of production trace and anticipate 
the future. And if the temporality of the revolution is that of 
the future, it is the future that is past.25
If, on the contrary, the subject is ‘unexpected’ (imprévu), its 
construction is carried out on the basis of the present and not 
that of a time to come. The future remains a promise which 
cannot be experienced, whereas the present is the temporality 
of rupture, the here and now which opens up the process of the 
active destruction of stereotypes of subjectivation – for Lonzi, 
in particular, ‘feminine’ subjectivity. ‘Presente, non futuro’, 
it reads in a manifesto of Rivolta Femminile.26 The present is 
the moment of the emergence of an unknown, unexpected 
sensibility that bears within itself the potential for new forms of 
existence impossible to conceive before they actually come forth, 
which ‘introduce discontinuity into our very being’, as Foucault 
writes in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’.27 There is no teleology, 
but only the reality of struggles, of confrontations and strategies 
that determine the passage to being, in a ‘processual creativity’, 
as Guattari says.28 In which case, putting ‘politics before being’, 
with Deleuze and Guattari,29 would mean putting strategy before 
25. See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. 
Keith Tribe, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 1985. 
26. See È Già Politica, ed. Marta Lonzi, Anna Jaquinta, Carla Lonzi, Milan: Scritti di 
Rivolta Femminile, 1977. See also the very end of Sputiamo su Hegel, with its strong 
Benjaminian resonance: ‘There are no goals, there is the present of our here and now. 
We are the world’s dark past, we are giving shape to the present’ (p. 48).
27. Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p. 88.
28. Félix Guattari, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Bloomington–
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 13. 
29. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, New York: Continuum, 
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ontology. For this rupture with history, with the subject, with 
the promises (always yet to be realized) of labour, production, 
science and technology, does away with neither power relations 
nor war.
But after ’68, the ‘movement’ – or movements – proved 
incapable of facing up to the total social war that they 
themselves had helped instigate. And, in its turn, capital, faced 
with the strange revolution of ’68, would in the 1970s launch 
an equally strange world financial ‘counter-revolution’ that 
adapted the intensity of war and civil war to the force of what 
it was confronting on a global scale: a first alter-globalization 
movement placed under the sign of the political re-emergence 
of class, race, sex and subjectivity wars, which the ‘working 
class’ could no longer subordinate to its ‘objective interests’ or 
to its specific forms of organization (parties and unions). The 
subjectivities of the strange revolution of ’68 revealed themselves 
incapable of thinking and organizing war machines that could 
hold together the break with both capitalism and socialism, 
and the confrontation with the strategic offensives and power 
relationships that capital was in the process of reconfiguring 
under the rubric of neoliberalism. Emancipation and autonomy 
must be affirmed politically and safeguarded against the 
initiative of an enemy that always acts on the twofold plane of 
relation (governor/governed) and non-relation (war). In short, the 
movements of ’68 found themselves in an impasse which we are 
far from having escaped: when they directly confronted the war 
of capital, they adopted Marxist–Leninist modes of organization; 
and when they instead explored modes of subjectivation, bypass-
ing the dialectical operation of contradiction, they abandoned 
the question of the construction of a new revolutionary war 
machine reconfigured for what Nietzsche called ‘effective’ 
2004: ‘before Being there is politics’ (p. 203).
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history (wirkliche Historie). The same weakness is to be found on 
the theoretical level.
Unlike Marxism, la pensée 68 was able to grasp the new 
relation between time and subjectivity, which it thought in 
terms of the ‘event’. But the ethico-aesthetic turn of subjective 
‘con version’ in Foucault, of the ‘production of subjectivity’ in 
Guattari, and of ‘emancipation’ in Rancière, were radically 
severed from the question of the ‘political revolution’ and the 
construction of an anti-capitalist war machine which, not having 
war as its object (according to Deleuze and Guattari’s famous 
proposition exemplifying the conversion of the power of divi-
sion into a power of connection), would be unable of thinking 
afresh and engaging with the question of strategic confronta-
tions. Without the war against capital and a new thinking of 
antagonism, the relation to self, the production of subjectivity 
and emancipation become ‘recuperable’ by capitalism’s industry 
of ‘self-transformation’, which ensures a ready supply of ‘human 
capital’.
On the fiftieth anniversary of ’68, we are still at the same 
impasse. Subjective mutation and political revolution, self-
relation, production of subjectivity and self-transformation, 
on the one hand, and strategic confrontation, on the other 
hand, must be held together in a relation of forces that can 
then be reversed. The event as ‘the reversal of a relationship 
of forces’ – this was the post-Marxist definition of the ‘event’ 
proposed by Foucault in 1971.30 For we are also celebrating the 
150th anniversary of the publication of the first volume of Capital 
and its ‘flirtation with Hegel’ (as Marx put it). Let us conclude 
by recalling Foucault’s ‘diagnosis’, in his inaugural lecture at the 
Collège de France, in the tutelary shadow of Hyppolite: ‘To really 
escape from Hegel assumes an appreciation of exactly what it 
30. Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, p. 88.
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costs to detach yourself from him.’31 This is something that, for 
our part, we have tried to think and to problematize in Wars 
[after Foucault] and Capital [after Marx, and after Deleuze and 
Guattari’s never-renounced Marxism].32
31. Michel Foucault, ‘The Order of Discourse’, trans. I. McLeod, in Robert Young, ed., 
Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 74.
32. Éric Alliez and Maurizio Lazzarato, Wars and Capital, Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 
2018.
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A year before the first English edition of Capital was published 
under his supervision in 1886, Engels issued a brief polemic 
against the pretensions of anyone reckless enough to think 
that this great work could be translated into English by a mere 
amateur man of letters. The target of the polemic is Henry 
Mayers Hyndman, identified in the essay by his pseudonym John 
Broadhouse. After reading the French translation of Capital in 
1880, Hyndman had published in 1881 a short book, England for 
All, two chapters of which were so thoroughly plagiarized from 
Marx’s work that they in effect represented piratical abridge-
ments of it. Hyndman had ventured to translate Marx.1 Engels’s 
response, titled ‘How Not to Translate Marx’, is brutal and 
1. A note at the end of the ‘Preface’ of England for All reads: ‘For the ideas and much of 
the matter contained in Chapters II and III, I am indebted to the work of a great thinker 
and original writer, which will, I trust, shortly be made accessible to the majority of my 
countrymen.’ H.M. Hyndman, England for All, London: Gilbert & Rivington, 1881, p. vi. 
Marx was incensed by the plagiarism and by Hyndman’s mealy-mouthed justiﬁcation for 
not identifying him as the author of the critique that he had pilfered. Francis Wheen, in 
Karl Marx (London: Fourth Estate, 1999, p. 372), comments: ‘Why could Hyndman not 
acknowledge Capital and its author by name? His lame explanation was that the English 
had “a horror of socialism” and a “dread of being taught by a foreigner”.’ For the history 
of this episode, see Chuschichi Tsuzuki, H.M. Hyndman and British Socialism, ed. Henry 
Pelling, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 32–4, 41–4; see also Gareth Stedman 
Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion, London: Allen Lane, 2016, p. 550.
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unsparing in its assessment of Hyndman’s bungled, conservative, 
devitalizing and mushily approximate prose: 
Marx is one of the most vigorous and concise writers of the age. To 
render him adequately, a man must be a master, not only of German, 
but of English too. Mr. Broadhouse, however, though evidently a 
man of respectable journalistic accomplishments, commands but 
that limited range of English used by and for conventional literary 
respectability. Here he moves with ease; but this sort of English 
is not a language into which ‘Das Kapital’ can ever be translated. 
Powerful German requires powerful English to render it; the best 
resources of the language have to be drawn upon; new-coined 
German terms require the coining of corresponding new terms in 
English. But as soon as Mr. Broadhouse is faced by such a difficulty, 
not only his resources fail him, but also his courage. The slightest 
extension of his limited stock-in-trade, the slightest innovation upon 
the conventional English of everyday literature frightens him, and 
rather than risk such a heresy, he renders the difficult German word 
by a more or less indefinite term which does not grate upon his ear 
but obscures the meaning of the author; or, worse still, he translates 
it, as it recurs, by a whole series of different terms, forgetting that 
a technical term has to be rendered always by one and the same 
equivalent.2
The powerful language of Capital could only grate upon so 
delicate a device as Hyndman’s ear, whose sensitivity to verbal 
dissonance and other kinds of loud noise justified recourse to a 
more mellifluous, essentially more commodious, idiom, where 
‘more or less indefinite’ equivalents of Marx’s words sound nicer 
than literal, definite equivalents. So it can be for the sake of 
harmony that in England for All Hyndman writes that ‘Capital is 
the produce of past labour devoted to present production. Capital 
is in fact the saving of past labour, for the special purpose of 
increasing the future store.’3 What do these very words do for 
the ear, what world do they signify, how delicate are they with 
2. ‘How Not to Translate Marx’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 
26, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990, p. 336.
3. Hyndman, England for All, p. 65.
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the auditory canals that are the destination of their concepts? 
The process of the devotion of what is saved sounds notably less 
perforating to the Christian ear than Marx’s emphatic, brutal, 
disfigurative description of the pumping out and sucking empty 
of what is dead. Capital, says Marx, is an Auspumper, literally a 
pumper-out, that performs the Aussaugung of the worker, liter-
ally the sucking out, or sucking hollow, of a ‘stunted, short-lived 
and rapidly replaced human being’.4 Not, then, the saving of what 
was devoted, but a hideous dredging into vacuousness. Hyndman 
might reasonably object that, after all, the idea is the same, that 
what matters is not the particular words or syntax selected to 
represent the categories, but only that the logic of categories be 
properly understood. After all, he too is in perfectly good faith 
in urging on his readers to fight capitalism. He may differ from 
Marx in his sincere belief that for ‘every Englishman’ the aim 
should be to bring about the ‘coming mobilization, political and 
social, without troublous dangerous conflict’; but this difference 
over tactics can have no bearing on the fundamental logic of 
the critique of capital or the definition of its basic categories.5 
‘You, then,’ writes the English more or less indefinite equivalent 
of a revolutionary, now addressing English workers directly, 
‘who produce the wealth in every country, consider where you 
stand; you, men who have seen your homes broken up, your 
health destroyed, and have beheld your wives and children fade 
away under the tyranny of capitalism, stop and think.’6 The 
exhortation is a direct paraphrase of the single most furiously 
condemnatory and comprehensively disgusted passage in Capital, 
4. Karl Marx, Das Kapital, MEGA, vol. 6, Berlin: Dietz, 1987, pp. 309, 245; Karl Marx, 
Capital, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, p. 380. These 
explicitly horriﬁc visions are toned down in the standard English translation by Ben 
Fowkes: Auspumper becomes the more abstract ‘extractor’ and Aussaugung becomes 
‘draining away’, a process that might occur without any intent or violence. Marx, Capital, 
Volume 1, pp. 425, 348.
5. Hyndman to Marx, 25 February 1880, cited in Tsuzuki, H.M. Hyndman and British 
Socialism, pp. 33–4.
6. Hyndman, England for All, p. 63.
206 caPitalisM: cOncePt, idea, iMage
the great bombardment of a paragraph where Marx catalogues 
the disasters of capital for working people and says that the 
wives and children of male workers are ‘dragged beneath the 
wheels of the juggernaut’.7 Marx assaults his reader with the 
image of beloved limbs ripped up and darling heads crushed 
flat. Hyndman softens the mental lighting so that these same 
beloved bodies instead more agreeably just ‘fade away’, ephemeral 
as an enchanted fairy in a forest dim by Keats. ‘Stop and think’, 
says Hyndman, and ‘take heed’. The workers who in Marx are 
crushed, sucked out, laid waste, desertified, elasticated, tortured 
and distorted into human specks, stumps and fractions, are by 
Hyndman regenerated in the language of literary respectability 
as lyric poets, ‘who now rejoice in the gleam of a transient 
prosperity, only to be cast into deeper despair on the next 
stagnation’.8 
‘This sort of English is not a language into which “Das 
Kapital” can ever be translated’, writes Engels: not the particular 
sequence of images or the general climate of representation, 
merely – not only what might peremptorily be called its ‘aes-
thetics’ – but the critique itself, the logic of categories and all, 
cannot be made to exist in English unless its translator finds the 
‘courage’ to ‘innovate upon the conventional English of everyday 
literature’. As for readers afflicted with a case of Hyndman’s 
ear, the point is precisely that these people should be hurt by 
the critique. Their comfort is the obscuring of the meaning 
of Capital, its subjectivation as anaesthetized logical thinking. 
Not just Marx’s verbal skill but the work of the critique itself is 
effectually obscured by the easy breathing of these readers, the 
safety of their ears from violence, and their every painless step 
through the logic of categories. The language in which Hyndman 
(in Engels’s phrase) ‘moves with ease’ is in effect the anti-poetic 
7. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 799.
8. Hyndman, England for All, p. 64.
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preservation of that complacency and a barrier against the truth 
of Capital. Cured of its specific poetry, the truth of Capital is 
dissipated in anaesthetized logical thinking.
Engels could not really mean this if he did not think that 
Capital has a poetics, or if he thought that the poetics of Capital 
could safely be treated as nothing but the excesses of Marx’s ma-
terialism, just a kind of getting carried away with figuration. In 
his ‘Comments on James Mill’, Marx describes the form of credit 
that the goodly rich man extends to the honest poor man who 
has given proof of his industriousness and is therefore worthy of 
philanthropic encouragement: ‘This kind of credit belongs to the 
romantic, sentimental part of political economy, to its aberra-
tions, excesses, exceptions, not to the rule.’9 The poetics of Capital 
is not its ‘sentimental part’, but its troublous instigation; it is not 
excess to ‘the rule’ of the logic of categories and value forms 
to say that capital sucks the worker empty, but the resounding 
truth of that rule. The truth that Engels spells out in his polemic 
is that the poetics of Capital goes far deeper than whatever 
images, figurations or verbal decorations of thought anyone who 
is content with the ‘limited range of English used by and for 
conventional literary respectability’ might agree to call ‘poetic’. 
Capital is poetic throughout and fundamentally. Its truth is not 
only logical and historical but at the same time and inexorably 
also poetic; and ‘critique’, in Marx’s sense, is not, like so-called 
‘political economy’, an essentially unruffled process of exposition 
only superficially studded with images and illustrations that do 
nothing but simply help make sense of the real work done with 
logical categories. Critique in Marx’s sense is the opposite of 
Hyndman’s ‘moving with ease’. It is an obstructed movement; 
that is, both an unsettling and setting in turbulent and agitated 
motion not merely of fixed or stalled ideas but of the whole 
9. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1975, p. 215.
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experience of thinking and ultimately of the whole experience of 
being alive, a running up against and slamming into impassable 
contradictions and getting stuck in hateful corners of cogni-
tively intractable paradox, and also a kind of moving by being 
obstructed, a working out of life in thought and in logic where 
the movement of the concept is identical to its paralysis, for the 
simple and infinitely incomprehensible reason that the world 
hasn’t changed yet and we are still stuck in the capital-relation, 
where thinking by itself is intrinsic to paralysis.10 
‘Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to estab-
lished, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself ’, Marx 
and Engels wrote in The German Ideology. ‘We call communism 
the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.’ 
Critique by itself is not yet this ‘real movement’; neither is it 
the fake movement or going nowhere of ‘speculative-idealistic, 
i.e. fantastic’ philosophy and its ‘theoretical bubble-blowing’; 
critique is the obstructed movement that is the logical sound of 
the present state of things not being abolished.11 Capital itself, 
according to Marx, ‘can only be grasped as a movement’. The 
poetics of Capital is the obstructed movement of thought that 
cannot by magic or fiat simply be realized into life, but must 
exert all its pressure of dissonance and every power of concep-
tion against the block of the present state of things, to grasp the 
catastrophically unobstructed movement of capital, the ‘unceasing 
movement of profit-making’.12
Engels said that political economy is ‘science’ conceived and 
developed by men who ‘could not afford to see the truth’.13 Truth 
10. ‘[Beckett] feels, he said, “like someone on his knees, his head against a wall, more 
like a cliff, with someone saying ‘go on’”.’ Later he said, ‘The wall will have to move 
a little, that’s all.’ ‘Lawrence E. Harvey on Beckett, 1961–2’, in Beckett Remembering 
Remembering Beckett, ed. James Knowlson and Elizabeth Knowlson, London: Bloomsbury, 
2006, p. 137.
11. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5, London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1976, pp. 49, 52, 56.
12. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 2, trans. David Fernbach, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1992, p. 185; Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 254.
13. Frederick Engels, Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, in Marx and Engels 
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in Capital’s critique of political economy comes at a cost that 
is more than simply financial, and more than just a crisis of 
ethical conscience. The truth of Capital makes life harder to 
live. Reading the critique and grasping its truth and its necessity 
mean being turned against the world. It is a critique of reality 
that confirms in logic the feeling that reality is fundamentally 
inimical to life, and that gives massively pressurized substance to 
that feeling, not just by articulating it in the logic of categories, 
but by tangling up that logic with another logic, harder to read 
but nonetheless unmistakably present to anyone who was ever 
actually fucked up by reading the book. The logic of categories 
is everywhere tangled up with the logic of passion. I borrow this 
phrase from the French psychoanalyst André Green, who briefly 
describes it as the logic of ‘oneness, duality, trinity, conjunctions, 
disjunctions, fusion, separations, etc.’14 The manifest proximity 
of this logic and its only semi-categorical categories to the logic 
of Hegel and the concept is not merely coincidental, but a kind 
of constitutive blurring and wavering. Marx says in Capital that 
surplus-labour and necessary-labour cannot be distinguished 
during the working day because they verschwimmen in einander: 
literally, they blur into each other as objects of sight or colours 
do in perception when the eyes are swimming.15 The two logics 
Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 436.
14. André Green, ‘Psychoanalysis and Ordinary Modes of Thought’, On Private 
Madness, London: Karnac, 2005, p. 28. Green has described the common project of 
psychoanalysis and Hegel’s philosophy in ‘Hegel and Freud: Elements for an Improbable 
Comparison’, in The Work of the Negative, London: Free Association Books, 1999, 26–49.
15. ‘Mehrarbeit und nothwendige Arbeit verschwimmen in einander.’ Das Kapital, 
MEGA, vol. 6, p. 243. As ever with Marx’s writing, it matters for our understanding not 
only of the style but of the substance of the argument where else in literature this 
phrase could be found and what particular associations Marx may have expected it 
would prompt in the ear of his reader. Verschwimmen would have been familiar to literate 
German readers as a choice item of poetic diction from the idiom of German Romantic 
poetry and prose. Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm cites 
examples of usage from Friedrich Rückert, Jean Paul, Schiller and Goethe. Marx’s satirical 
innuendo is that capital renders the brain incapable of distinguishing work done for 
oneself from work done for the capitalist in much the same way that the spiritual fatigue 
of the Romantic poet produces an obnubilation in the perceptual apparatus of that 
more reﬁned labourer on the human heart. A fair English equivalent for verschwimmen in 
einander would be ‘intermingle’ or ‘interfuse’, words that bear the stamp of Wordsworth. 
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in Capital are ‘intermingled’ like this. The analysis of the 
value-forms blurs into visions of nightmarish voided destiny, in 
which the individual worker is ‘nothing but’ a perfectly inhuman 
abstraction, ‘labour-power’, ‘for the whole of his life’. The 
analysis of the ‘separation’ of workers from each other that Marx 
says is intrinsic in the capitalist process of production blurs into 
an infernal fantasia of ‘dot-like’ human specks adrift in alien 
infinity. In the drafts of the Grundrisse, capital is experimentally 
described using a variety of predicates, including ‘stored-up’, 
‘past’, ‘objectified’, ‘materialized’, accumulated’ and ‘defined’ 
labour.16 The free variation of predicates is the record of Marx’s 
uncertainty regarding how to name not only this form of value 
but the whole fact of its domination, in the fullest sense: what 
associations should be clustered about it, how should it make 
anyone feel, to what end must it be named. Antonio Negri de-
scribes the Grundrisse as ‘an essentially open work’ and the time 
of its composition as ‘a moment of total happiness’ for Marx as a 
writer, when ‘the categories are not flattened out, the imagina-
tion does not stagnate’.17 Capital is the result of this speculative 
opening up and experimental free variation of categorical 
predicates, the critical terminus of the itinerant imagination. 
Henceforth there is only one predicate: capital is ‘dead’ labour 
once and for all. The logic of passion poetically crushes flat the 
categories whose convex and freely interchangeable character in 
the Grundrisse Negri calls ‘happiness’. The pleasurable experi-
menting with a variety of ways of representing the problem ends 
here, with this dead end. 
What might be called ‘oneness’ in the logic of passion is not 
the same as ‘unity’ in the Science of Logic, a work Hegel says he 
Fowkes mutes the speciﬁcally Romantic resonance with the more prosaic ‘mingles 
together’. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 346.
16. Karl Marx, Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, pp. 
85, 86, 134, 143.
17. Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, trans. Harry Cleaver, 
Michael Ryan and Maurizio Viano, ed. Jim Fleming, New York: Autonomedia, 1991, p. 12.
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composed in the hope of keeping alive ‘the dispassionate calm of 
a knowledge dedicated to thought alone’. Hegel’s unity, ‘an unrest 
of simultaneous incompatibles, a movement’, is actual for thought: 
it is an experience of the thinking subject.18 Oneness, however, is 
completely denied the worker in Capital. Oneness in the logic of 
passion is the future communing in the actually lived fulfilment 
of individual potentials that in the present state of things is not 
felt, not known and not enjoyed, and whose blocked intima-
tion must nevertheless somehow be made to resound in the 
obstructed movement of critique towards what critique by itself 
categorically cannot reach. Marx’s word for this state of exist-
ence is Trennung, which Fowkes translates as ‘separation’. The 
worker is separated: from other workers, from the product of his 
labour, from his future development, ultimately from life itself. 
His only contact with other workers is at the point of exchange. 
Marx says that workers ‘do not come into social contact with 
each other until they exchange their products’, that they ‘exist for 
one another merely as representatives of commodities’, and that 
they are ‘related to each other in their social process of produc-
tion in a purely atomistic way’.19 How can any of this possibly be 
true, when in reality workers have always socialized outside of 
working hours as friends, lovers and enemies, and have formed 
innumerable groups and enjoyed innumerable activities together? 
In his first published book, The Difference Between Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, Hegel writes: ‘totality at the 
highest pitch of living energy is only possible through its own 
re-establishment out of the deepest fission.’ The antithesis in 
the English here obscures Hegel’s explicit pairing of extremes: 
‘in der höchsten Lebendigkeit … aus der höchsten Trennung’ is 
not ‘highest’ and ‘deepest’ but, literally, ‘the highest or uttermost 
18. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. and ed. George Di Giovanni, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 22, 67.
19. Capital, Volume 1, pp. 165, 178–9, 187.
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livingness’ and ‘the highest or uttermost separation’.20 The 
extremes of livingness and separation really exist, for Hegel, but 
their reality cannot simply be noticed or assumed. The reality 
of these extremes must be conceived ardently, or else not really 
known at all. Marx makes a similar demand on the power of 
conception with his definition of Trennung, the extreme of 
separation, in Capital, where life in the form of ‘labour-power’ 
is boxed up in a set of logical restrictions that in effect amount 
to the transcendental impossibility of social contact between 
workers outside or beyond the transaction of exchange. Workers 
are the commodity ‘labour-power’ and like other commodities 
they are realized at the point of exchange. Whatever else they 
might also be or do is not expressible in forms of value and 
therefore has no meaning within ‘the capital-relation’ and might 
as well not exist. 
Oneness in the logic of passion is the extreme of Trennung 
‘not merely contradicted, or held in the unrest of the movement 
of propositional incompatibility, but wiped out in the future. 
Only the complete destruction of wage-labour and capital could 
ever do this; right now, every blocked advance towards that end 
must be made to resound in concepts as the specific pain of 
cancelled intimation and separation going nowhere. Separation 
must be articulated in categories in such a way that it can only 
be conceived in the logic of passion as obscene impossibility and 
pain. You never touch another human being but you only ever 
intersect as labour-power at the instant of exchange; or, if you 
do touch, life at that moment is without meaning in the only 
logic that matters. Neither is this banishment from the touch 
of others reducible to a question of desire or of some other 
capacity of the subject that is strictly speaking disposable from 
20. G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy, 
trans. H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf, Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1977, p. 91; G.W.F. Hegel, 
Werke, 2, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, pp. 21–2.
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the logic of the critique or supplementary to it. It is the tangling 
up and blurring of these ways of saying what you are, each one 
never fully resolvable without loss of truth into the logic of the 
other, that generates the extreme passion of the critique which 
is its poetics. ‘Passion is the essential power of the human being 
energetically bent on its object.’21
Trying to grasp everything that Capital means for being alive 
is itself already a resistance to being crushed: cognitive, imagina-
tive, poetic, fantastical, desiring, anxious resistance. It means 
being subject to new kinds of pain and new loud noises, and it 
means figuring out how to take that pain for the truth and the 
knowledge that it really is. The structure of domination that the 
logic of categories makes explicit really hurts. Making explicit in 
this case means making more intolerable, more unbearable, more 
absolute: things don’t get easier once they are explained; they 
get paralysing. Adorno wrote that it is a condition of all truth 
to make suffering eloquent, and Capital too has been deeply 
conditioned by this essentially poetic imperative.22 The logical 
explicitation that makes life unbearable is essential to the work 
that Capital still has to do, its living task in the world that we 
will all die in. Readers of Marx who want actually to live the life 
that Marx dreamed will be possible, who want a world of ‘free 
individuality based on the universal development of individu-
als’ instead of compulsory stultification, mass poverty and the 
systematic conversion of productive activity into boredom and 
torture, cannot avoid or hedge about with the dusty abstrac-
tions and supererogatory theoretical refinements of the salaried 
thinker, the pure horror of the reality that this critique drills 
into the head. The condition of hearing its truth is first of all 
this command, everywhere intrinsic to Marx’s thought: do not 
21. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 337.
22. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, New York: Continuum, 
2005, pp. 17–18.
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obscure the violence and the horror of reality. The truth of 
Capital hurts and reading it needs to hurt too. 
This is profoundly a question about poetics. Marx writes 
that ‘capitalist production has seized the power of the people at 
the very root of life.’23 Capital makes the paralysis of that seized 
power and the strangulation of that root resound in logically 
volatile concepts. The logic of categories is an explicit logic that 
specifies the material, social limits at which ‘free individuality 
based on the universal development of individuals’ is blocked and 
made impossible under the domination of capital. We under-
stand why individuals are not free and why they cannot develop 
when we grasp the meaning of categories like ‘labour-power’, 
‘surplus value’, ‘the wage form’, ‘subsistence’. Intermingled with 
this explicit logic, violently blurring in and out of it, cutting into 
it, is the logic of passion, an inexplicit logic, poetic and deranged, 
the logic of the ‘dotlike’ life, fucked up and distorted, adrift 
in the infinity of valorization that is a grotesque parody of the 
human subject’s own still putatively natural capacity for ‘uni-
versal development’.24 This second logic is not for specifying the 
social and material blocks on development, but for making the 
truth of blocked and paralysed life resound. The passion of this 
logic is an intense mix of pain and optimism. It really hurts to 
follow the exposition from category to category and comprehend 
the blocks on the universal development of life, to let that knowl-
edge actually sink in and pronounce its true inexorability. It is 
the pain of never living, yet forever straining to live, the life of 
universal development that (to lift a phrase from Hegel) ‘simply 
must be, and must not remain a task’, but that (as Capital makes 
unbearably clear) simply is not, and is the perpetually urgent task 
23. Capital, Volume 1, p. 380; translation revised. Fowkes has ‘capitalist production has 
seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots.’ The original is ‘die kapitalistische 
Produktion … die Volkskraft an der Lebenswurzel ergriffen hat.’ Marx, MEGA, vol. 6, p. 
272. 
24. On being adrift as a speck in inﬁnity, see Keston Sutherland, ‘Inﬁnite Exhaustion’, 
Brittle Land, ed. Rachel O’Reilly, Amsterdam: Roma, 2016.
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right now, as always.25 But the pain of this logic is at the same 
time its optimism. The pain of living with Capital always points 
beyond itself towards an explosion of the block, the repulsion 
of present impossibility and the radical enlargement of life. 
That repulsion of impossibility must actually be experienced. 
Marx writes in the Grundrisse that ‘if we did not find concealed 
in society as it is the material conditions of production and the 
corresponding relations of exchange prerequisite for a classless 
society, then all attempts to explode it would be quixotic [wären 
alle Sprengversuche Donquichoterie].’26 What is it like, what experi-
ence is it, how does it sound to us, when, through the power of 
critique, we do actually find these concealed conditions? 
‘Capitalist production has seized the power of the people at 
the very root of life.’ The poetics of the critique of capital has to 
be as hyperactive as that seizure: it has to go as deep, reach as 
far, stretch to everything, detect in every paralysis of the subject 
its potential explosion, tune into every signal of the catastrophe, 
and find a way to make the very logic of categories itself resound 
with the pain of devastated life laid waste in a wilderness of 
infinite violence. This reaching far into everything and finding 
everywhere the carnage of crushed life and binding logic up 
with madness and paradox to pinpoint the potential for eruption 
out of the world as capital has made it is the poetics of Capital, 
its resounding with paralysed thought and obstructed life and 
the future necessity of their explosion. Resounding: ‘It is now 
entirely possible’, writes Marx in the Grundrisse, ‘that consonance 
25. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p. 368. On ‘pain’ cf. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 15–16: ‘What belongs to external Nature is destroyed 
by contradiction; if, for example, gold were given a different speciﬁc gravity from what 
it has, it would cease to be gold. But mind has power to preserve itself in contradiction, 
and, therefore, in pain; power over evil, as well as over misfortune.’ The power of mind 
not only to preserve itself but to grow more deeply attached to the world and to the 
revolutionary project of overthrowing capitalist relations in pain is a poetic power.
26. Marx, Grundrisse, pp. 159, 77.
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may be reached only by passing through the most extreme 
dissonance.’27
‘Every new aspect of a science involves a revolution in the 
technical terms of that science’, writes Engels in the ‘Preface’ to 
the English edition of Capital of 1886.28 Marx had performed this 
revolution, and the tendency of Hyndman’s softening of painful 
and dissonant critical thought into ‘the conventional English of 
everyday literature’ was essentially counterrevolutionary, trading 
euphemisms in hell. But worse even than this hideous ameliora-
tion of individual words, according to Engels, was the freedom 
with which it had been exercised. This freedom of expression all 
but amounts to a counterrevolutionary methodology, an anti-
poetics. Faced with a compound noun or a grating neologism, in 
Das Kapital, whose latent or premonitory conceptual power needs 
ingeniously specifying and amplifying, Hyndman ‘translates it, 
as it recurs, by a whole series of different terms, forgetting that 
a technical term has to be rendered always by one and the same 
equivalent’. For Engels this was outright treachery, a cover-up 
of the critique and the neutralization of its poetic power to 
specify the definite unbearableness of the life that the logic of 
categories exists to magnify. And yet the only translations that 
we now have of Capital in English, including the one that Engels 
himself oversaw, are not faithful to this principle that he says is 
paramount. 
Many latent or potential concepts in Das Kapital are at best 
only flickeringly detectable in the English text. Where Marx 
repeats the same word (often a neologism he invented specifically 
to capture the twisted truth of an idea or fucked up fact that 
ordinary speech had simply not yet tried to deal with and that 
the language of conventional literary respectability had bent over 
backwards to obscure and trivialize), so that through repetition 
27. Ibid., p. 148.
28. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 111.
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the word would begin to acquire what would at least look like, 
or promise, a definite conceptual profile, his English translators 
have tended to paraphrase the word in a variety of ways at 
different points of their versions. They have in effect not only oc-
cluded the latent, potential or already definite conceptual profile 
of the individual word, but at the same time have annulled the 
specific power of the word to hurt and unpicked or softened 
the binding of the logic whose strangulation of life it helps to 
articulate. For example, Marx’s neologism Wertgegenständlichkeit, 
literally ‘value-objectivity’, is paraphrased by Ben Fowkes in the 
standard Penguin edition first as ‘the objectivity of commodities 
as values’, then as ‘objective character as values’, then as ‘objectiv-
ity as a value’, then as ‘objectivity of the products of labour as 
values’. The paraphrases may mean roughly the same thing, but 
they are not evidently the repetition of a single concept or the 
tightening of a single bind; they are not the hammering home 
or droning in the ear of that very neologism in all its grossness 
as both a technical term and the parody of a technical term at 
once; neither are they overtly tangled up in lateral lexical rigging 
of the kind that Marx threw over the heads of his German 
readers, to catch them in inexorable nets of association, when 
for example in the space of a single page of the chapter on ‘The 
Commodity’ he floods the logic of categories with a torrent 
of overtly genetically related neologisms to make the already 
grated Hyndman’s ear ring until it spins: Wertgegenständlichkeit 
brings Wertding, Wertspiegel, Wertkörper, Wertausdruck, Wertform 
and Wertgröße tumbling after it in its wake. The power of these 
grotesque words caught in the obstructed act of being incom-
pletely or parodically conceptualized to proliferate new lexical 
fields in a pastiche of logical complexity is part of the essential 
movement of the poetics of Capital. The mad dilation of the 
concept not only – as if by a kind of viral eruption – articulates 
a spontaneous, semi-parodic logic of categories, so that the 
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‘value-expression’ of the ‘value-thing’ can suddenly be read in its 
reflection in the ‘value-mirror’; the same dilation is asphyxiating, 
hateful, crazy, like being drowned in balloon animals while 
trying to knit your way out of a blizzard. This, too, is the truth 
about ‘value-objectivity’, not just its style of presentation or its 
rhetoric. Wertgegenständlich keit is the inexorable logical regime of 
the object without object relations, or, in other words, the thing 
you are, gaping at itself in the value-mirror and shouting its 
angry value-expressions in the contorted postures of an abstract 
value-expressionist. To exist in the capital-relation is to exist 
value-objectively as a value-thing with a value-body represented 
in value-expression gaping into the value-mirror, or not at all. 
If we take seriously not only Engels’s apparently deadly serious 
demand that technical terms in Capital must ‘be rendered always 
by one and the same equivalent’ and his conviction that only 
‘powerful English’, ‘the best resources of the language’ and ‘new-
coined terms in English’ will do, but also the unavoidable impli-
cation that Capital is both critique and poetics at once, and that 
the power of the poetics is the power of the critique deadlocked 
in the tangle of inseparable but irresolvable logics, then it surely 
becomes absolutely imperative to the future effect and destiny 
of Marx’s great work, its task in life, to get its poetics right. This 
has to mean: to make its whole logical power resound, both the 
logic of categories and the logic of passion, to get its energies of 
conception and disfiguration ramped up to the furthest extreme 
of dissonance, to make its explication of the unbearableness 
and infinite indignity of life under capital actually feel acutely 
unbearable, right now and at every moment, whatever it takes 
and in whatever language not only gets the categories to make 
sense but also pressurizes the experience of making sense of 
them enough for their social, psychic and individual truth to 
erupt out of their bare content of brutal logical consistency. 
11
The reflux of money: 
outlaw accumulation and 
territorialization in Breaking Bad
JOhn kraniauskas 
No le han podido agarrar 
 Le temen más que la muerte 
  No más de oírlo mentar 
   casi les pega diabetes.
‘El jefe de la sierra’, Los Tucanes de Tijuana
How are the current historical actualities of a finance-driven 
global capitalism lived, imagined and represented in the social 
experiences of everyday life in its US core? What happens in the 
hinterlands of this increasingly kenotic heartland of Western 
capital that is at once porous and rigidified? And how do the new 
forms of cultural-industrial production – the narrative poetics of 
contemporary ‘post-television television’, for example – represent 
this capitalist present to its consumer-subjects? What stories of 
the parasitic self-development of capital and its fantasies do they 
tell? And what do they show that they cannot themselves know? 
Vince Gilligan’s TV/DVD series Breaking Bad (AMC, 2008–13), 
the story of chemistry teacher Walter White’s self-refashioning 
as a drug kingpin (his name, ‘Walt’, suggests its character 
I would like to thank Philip Derbyshire, Mpalive Msiska, Peter Osborne and Thomas 
Travers for their help in the writing of this essay.
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as national allegory), pushes a black hole through both the 
domesticity of family and household – the main biopolitical site 
of social reproduction – and the future that White attempts to 
salvage for it.1 Breaking Bad thus tracks a ‘line of flight’ gone bad, 
a recurrent theme – much to their political despair – in Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s (1980) A Thousand Plateaus, as ‘war 
machines’ are either captured by state formations or escape all 
subjective or political moorings. Walter White’s bid for freedom 
risks, in their words, ‘abandoning [its] creative potentialities and 
turning into a line of death, being turned into a line of destruc-
tion pure and simple’.2 
Moreover, as the image opposite of White’s house in ruins 
(figure 1) suggests, the black hole in this family narrative also 
involves a momentary ‘catastrophe’ of the TV image itself. This 
is a shot of a living room which is no longer a living room. It is 
presented to the viewer with an exploratory depth of field, only 
to be simultaneously robbed of the mise en scène and internal 
montage that might fill it – ‘giving it room’, creating the illusion 
of three-dimensionality and habitation – as it is blackened 
and graffittied over with Walt White’s other, outlaw name: 
Heisenberg.3 From one point of view this destruction of the 
home constitutes a warning against drugs and crime: a moral-
istic demand for ‘sobriety’.4 From another, however, which I will 
1. Breaking Bad evokes the poet Walt Whitman, author of Leaves of Grass (1855), a work 
that conﬁgured the USA as a nation. And it is through Whitman and his work that Walter 
White’s criminal identity is eventually discovered by Hank, his cop brother-in-law, thereby 
underlining the dramatic importance of the family, and its symbolic order, for the series. 
In this way, the family, the nation and the state all come into view as mediated by the 
law, and its transgression.
2.  Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone Press, 1988, pp. 506, 508. It is 
against the background of the ﬁgure of the white face (of the White-man) that Deleuze 
and Guattari begin to unpack their account of black holes, which then begin to haunt the 
politics of their own text.
3. See André Bazin, ‘The Evolution of the Language of Cinema’, in What is Cinema?, 
trans. Hugh Gray, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1967, pp. 
23–40.
4. See Herman Herlinghaus, Narcoepics: A Global Aesthetics of Sobriety, London and 
New York: Bloomsbury, 2013.
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explore here, it also suggests the historical and ideological limits 
of Breaking Bad as a history of narco-accumulation, which this 
black hole dramatically registers – defining its narrative arc – but 
which it nevertheless cannot quite reflect.
First time as… farce
Episode 1 of Season 1 of Breaking Bad begins with a composite 
image of a pair of discarded trousers, flying through the air, 
against a background of wide-open blue sky, desert landscape 
and approaching police sirens. This immediately evokes three 
classic film-industry genres – comedy, the Western and crime – a 
cinematic mix that comes to define the series as a whole. It 
begins as comic farce, in a neo-Western milieu (figure 2). Who 
is this crazed middle-aged man in his underwear emerging into 
view brandishing a gun, scurrying around his camper van – 
doubling as a mobile narco-factory – whilst video-recording his 
last words for his wife and son on his mobile phone and clumsily 
building a small monument to mark his passing, and entry into 
New Mexican history, as the cops approach but then drive by 
1
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on their way elsewhere? We are about to find out. For Breaking 
Bad, a work of crime fiction, has of course another beginning. 
Looping back in time after the opening credits, we find out 
that the history it tells was in fact, first of all, a tragic one. And 
despite the repeated moments of farce throughout, it will remain 
so over its five seasons, sixty-two episodes and approximately 
fifty hours of ‘complex television’. Breaking Bad’s opening farce 
– we do not know as yet that it is criminal farce – is, in other 
words, explained by tragedy: on his fiftieth birthday Walter 
White is given a death sentence; diagnosed with lung cancer, he 
has only two years to live. And he needs money. 
Such looping back from a story that begins in medias res 
provides the show with its temporal and narrative structure, 
which it repeats episodically as it permanently catches up with 
or recovers itself – Walt’s future (death) having collapsed into 
his present bringing it to a kind of stuttering halt. Taking the 
disjuncture between ‘story’ (histoire) and ‘emplotment’ (discours) 
constitutive of detective or crime fiction as its point of departure, 
so as to experiment with narrative form – privileging plot 
construction over the chronology of the story it shows and tells, 
2
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and producing a looping narrative of development through recovery 
(first time as farce, second time as tragedy) – Breaking Bad’s dra-
matic composition figures an extended crisis in Walt’s existential 
time.5 Walt will not recover. In this respect, the filmic procedures 
of mise en scène (including time-lapse photography) and montage, 
are themselves ferociously looped into narrative and serial time, 
speeded up, slowed down and, as we will see, pulled into shape 
by the destructive logics of narco-accumulation: an infinite quilt-
like ‘patchwork’ accumulation – Walt’s line of flight – which is, 
however, captured and over-coded to produce its narco-capitalist 
black-hole effect.6
Breaking Bad thus performs ‘crisis’ (its title tells us so), 
registering the significance of the idea in many of its historical 
meanings: economic, political and medical. Walt was once a 
widely recognized intellectual, employed at the nearby Science 
Research Center at Los Alamos, New Mexico – the home of 
the nuclear bomb – where he contributed to group research 
in crystallography leading to the award of a Nobel Prize. Now, 
however, middle-aged, he has ‘fallen’ into mediocrity having 
refused – apparently for unfulfilled romantic reasons – to join 
his former research-centre colleagues in the founding of success-
ful tech company Grey Matters (it even seems to have been his 
idea). He will subsequently take his revenge upon them by using 
their wealth to hide and save his criminally accumulated own. 
5. For a structural account of detective ﬁction, see Tzetvan Todorov, ‘The Typology of 
Detective Fiction’, in The Poetics of Prose, trans. Richard Howard, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1977, pp. 42–52; and Fredric Jameson, ‘Totality as Conspiracy’, The Geopolitical Aesthetic: 
Cinema and the Space of the World System, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press and 
London: British Film Institute, 1992, pp. 9–84. For ‘complexity’, see Jason Mittell, Complex 
TV: The Poetics of Contemporary Storytelling, New York and London: New York University 
Press, 2015.
6. The programme stretches out Walt’s remaining two years of life over a ﬁve-year 
real time of TV shows (its seasons). The accumulation is patchwork ‘in conformity with 
migration, whose degree of affinity with nomadism it shares, is not only named after 
trajectories, but “represents” trajectories, becomes inseparable from speed or movement 
in an open space’. The quilt-like patchwork has no centre and is thus de-contained; it 
‘recapitulates’ smooth into striated space and striated into smooth space. It connects, 
say Deleuze and Guattari, through ‘processes of frequency and accumulation’. A 
Thousand Plateaus, pp. 476–7, 485.
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He is, moreover, permanently humiliated by those closest to him 
as he tries to make ends meet as a high-school chemistry teacher 
and part-time car-wash assistant. When a criminal opportunity 
presents itself, he seizes it immediately. Walter White goes ‘bad’. 
With little medical insurance to pay for his treatment (the story 
begins before the passing of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act in 2010, better known as Obamacare) and without 
the economic resources to ensure the future of his family, he 
makes a crucial decision, temporarily resolving his crisis, but 
leaving its terminal diagnosis intact: he turns to crime.7
It soon becomes very apparent that Walt’s decision is also 
fuelled by rage and ressentiment as his personal and professional 
failures are constantly reawakened at work and at home. We 
find out early in the first episode, as the narrative returns to 
explain Walt’s farcical actions, that his students disrespect 
him at work, whilst his brother-in-law Hank (the local Drugs 
Enforcement Agency worker who will eventually pursue him and 
die in the process) has usurped his place in the symbolic order, 
in his son’s eyes at home. So Walt decides to take back what 
remains of his life by investing his considerable but underused 
immaterial labour, his human capital (his knowledge) into the 
illegal production and distribution of narcotics (‘bad’ medicine) 
with his ex-student Jesse. In doing so, he becomes a virtuoso 
manufacturer of crystal methamphetamine, a narco-myth widely 
known in both Mexicos, new and old, by his alias ‘Heisenberg’ 
– his signature product reflecting in miniature the blue sky that 
envelopes the text’s movement images and action.8 This myth 
will eventually be Walt and his family’s literal undoing: as we 
7. ‘I don’t have the greatest insurance’ says Walt to the medics taking him to hospital 
after collapsing in the car wash, insisting they might as well just drop him off in the 
street. For ‘crisis’, see Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Crisis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 67, no. 
2 (April 2006), pp. 357–400.
8. For the idea of the sky as ‘encompasser’ of movement images, as in the ﬁlms of John 
Ford, see Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone Press, 1986, p. 151.
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have seen, returning home towards the end of the series (and his 
life), Walt discovers that it has become an abandoned burned-out 
ruin, its walls spray-painted with his outlaw name. It is as if it 
now belonged to some completely ‘other’ spatial arrangement, a 
narco-territory that has violently made itself present, at home, as 
a black hole, in his home. 
In Breaking Bad, the investment in futures guaranteed by 
capital as it becomes ‘fictitious’, banking capital – Walt’s need for 
an alternative ‘private’ bank in which to deposit his cash is played 
out throughout the series and it is eventually what he forces his 
ex-colleagues at Grey Matters to provide – recoils back on the 
present as its absolute destruction: narco-accumulation’s gravi-
tational pull absorbs Walt, drawing in both his son Walter Jr and 
his wife Skylar too. Once a short-story writer, Skylar eventually 
deploys her ‘fictitious’ talents as a criminal accountant.
As the dates of its broadcast suggest, Breaking Bad is framed 
by the recent experience of the crisis of finance capital – through 
the institutions of housing and insurance – configuring and 
dramatizing what we might today call a kind of bio-capitalist 
crisis (a crisis of social reproduction), intensified by the politics 
of austerity that followed to shore up the global banking system. 
The financial crisis of 2008, on the one hand, and the political 
transition from the Bush to the Obama government in the USA 
that same year, on the other, are textually internalized and 
reconfigured as filmic material, and narrated, as austerity bites, 
as a reproductive biopolitical crisis of medical insurance. 
David Simon’s The Wire shadowed the Bush era and the 
post-9/11 war against drugs in an emerging war against terror in 
the Northern post-industrial city of Baltimore. Gilligan’s Breaking 
Bad follows, sharing its beginning with the Obama administra-
tion, whilst tracking the same war in new contexts in the South-
ern near-border city of Albuquerque, New Mexico, where another 
kind of territory emerges. In this sense, the election of Trump in 
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2016 (construction, entertainment and neo-extractivist capital) 
has, in its declared anti-Obama stance, made much of Breaking 
Bad contemporary again – as, of course, has its spin-off series 
Better Call Saul (Netflix, 2015–). However, Breaking Bad is not a 
work of social realist long-form TV narrative. It eschews The 
Wire’s polydiegetic ambition to incorporate more and more of the 
social into its multi-stranded purview, through expansion, reach-
ing its representational limits with finance. Rather, beginning 
with the experience of contemporary forms of bio-finance capital, 
it concentrates its attention, and the TV viewers’ gaze, first, on 
the story of Walt’s tragic farce; second, like so much US TV and 
literary production (including crime fiction), on attempting to 
shore up the family as a founding institution – and failing; and 
third, on the specific New Mexican border milieu. As the crisis 
takes hold, Walt turns away from the juridical order to become an 
outlaw. In Breaking Bad, the Bildung of recent immaterial labour 
is deployed against the traditions and institutions of education 
and formation (Bildung) – with their narratives of ‘progress’ and 
‘virtue’ – (which is what has made it so exciting for so many), to 
configure a problematic hero whose new (re)search takes him off 
the rails.9
Laundering
What Breaking Bad does share with The Wire, however, is an 
insistent and intense focus on the political economy of illegal 
drugs commerce, as well as on the processes of its manufacture 
(here, of methamphetamine). Walt’s background in crystallog-
raphy is crucial to his signature product, which his competitors 
9. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the post-industrial capitalist 
subsumption of labour as ‘machinic enslavement’ – including TV as a key technology. 
I also evoke here Georg Lukács’s Theory of the Novel, especially as it is integrated into 
Fredric Jameson’s own neo-historicist account of realism in The Antinomies of Realism, 
London and New York: Verso, 2013.
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– principally ‘Gus’ Fring, under the corporate umbrella of a 
German multinational and a generic ‘Mexican’ cartel, finally 
allied with a murderous neo-Nazi gang which Walt dispatches 
just before he dies – desperately want to get their hands on and 
control, whilst eliminating ‘Heisenberg’. The key economic 
logics here have been set out abstractly by Marx in Capital, and 
redescribed more recently by Giovanni Arrighi in his long pre-
history of the hegemonic shifts in the world economy during 
the 1990s in The Long Twentieth Century (the rise of the capitalist 
East), in two simple formulae: M–C–M� (the ‘general formula for 
capital’) and what Marx calls its ‘abridged’ form, M–M�.10 What 
these describe are distinct moments of the expanded reproduction 
of capital – that is, of accumulation – here, constitutively backed 
by a proto-statist violence that gives narco-accumulation the 
social form of permanent ‘so-called primitive accumulation’.11 
In M–C–M� commodities – narcotics, for example – are made, 
bought (M–C) and sold (C–M�) illegally for profit. Crucial to 
Marx’s account of commodity exchange is that he locates the 
origins of money as capital here, in the valorization process – that 
is, in the ‘reflux of money’ as it is mediated by ‘sale’ (the ‘exchange 
value’ of methamphetamine).12 At least in the first instance. 
For this accumulative logic, in Arrighi’s development of Marx’s 
insight, is also accompanied by its important abridged – that is, 
financialized – form, M–M�, in which profits violently realized on 
the sale of narcotics (M), like a magic interest-bearing ‘automatic 
fetish’, make more money (M�), through the well-known process 
of banking and investment in ‘clean’ enterprise. This is the role 
10. See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976, pp. 247–80; and Giovanni Arrighi, The Long 
Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times, London and New York: 
Verso, 1994.
11. See in particular, Marx, Capital, Volume 1, pp. 873–940. ‘Capital comes dripping from 
head to toe, from every pore, with blood and dirt’, writes Marx (p. 926). Indeed, Arrighi 
insists that ‘destruction’ always accompanies production and the M–C–M� and M–M� 
cycle.
12. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, pp. 250–51.
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Walt eventually forces onto his old colleagues: they become his 
own ‘fictitious’ proxy bank, storing the money accumulated for 
his wife and son under pain of death – despite the destruction of 
the family – as the insurance he did not have. As with money, in 
circulation – for example, as credit – the temporality of fictitious 
capital (accumulation) is future-orientated.13 And Walt is particu-
larly orientated towards the future he will, however, not have: his 
money-capital is to outlive him – as, indeed, it will outlive us all. If 
The Wire focuses on the competitive tensions between the mercan-
tile and financialized forms of accumulation (the general formula 
and the abridged formula), Breaking Bad focuses on the experience 
of them both (as well as on drugs production); arguably in a way 
that suggests a post-Arrighian world of finance capital.14 
Of course, Breaking Bad does not have to concern itself with 
an analysis of the abstract minutia of capitalist accumulation, 
although that may help in understanding it. Rather, as I have 
suggested, it tells the story of Walter White’s experience of the 
‘biopolitical’ dimension of the financial crisis of 2008. From this 
perspective, however, the series does incorporate financialization 
– and the experience of money more generally – into its criminal 
narrative (Walt’s story), and the visual metaphorics that fashion 
its ‘real’. Crucial in this regard is the theme of laundering, which 
dramatizes the processes involved in financial abridgement, 
13. Ibid., p. 257. In this chapter Marx is referring to accumulation within ‘the sphere 
of circulation’ – labour remaining in the ‘background’: ‘surplus-value cannot arise from 
circulation, and therefore … for it to be formed something must take place in the 
background which is not visible in circulation itself ’ (p. 268). This ‘background’, the 
realm of drugs production (and labour) is constantly foregrounded in Breaking Bad – as 
is the labour involved in narcotics distribution, ‘sale’ and thus the ‘reflux of money’. 
In this sense, Arrighi would seem to privilege ‘mercantile’ capital in his account. For 
Marx’s development of these ideas of interest-bearing capital as ‘automatic fetish’ 
and ‘ﬁcticious’ capital, see Capital, Volume 3, trans. David Fernbach, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1991, pp. 515–24, 594–606: ‘In this way, all connection with the actual process 
of capital’s valorization is lost, right down to the last trace, conﬁrming the notion that 
capital is automatically valorized by its own powers’ (p. 597). See also David Harvey, The 
Limits to Capital, London and New York: Verso, 2006: ‘If this credit money is loaned out 
as capital, then it becomes fictitious capital ’ (p. 267).
14. For this aspect of The Wire, see John Kraniauskas, ‘Elasticity of Demand: 
Reflections on The Wire’, Radical Philosophy 154 (March/April 2009), pp. 25–34; www.
radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/elasticity-of-demand.
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creative accounting and banking, in which Walt’s wife Skylar’s 
‘fictitious’ accounting skills eventually play an important part. 
It does so via the conflict between two dimensions of Walt’s 
criminal life: his paradoxical desire for freedom and autonomy in 
the production of his own specific brand of methamphetamine, 
on the one hand, and his need for banking and/or financial 
(investment) services both to realize and to manage his illegally 
accumulated wealth, on the other. The hard work of laundering 
foregrounds the activity of abridgement that defines financializa-
tion as the erasure of the moment of commodity exchange (in 
M–C–M�), as it mediates accumulation, so that the circuit’s all-
important criminal middle term, the outlawed commodity itself, 
is ‘washed’ clean – including of the violence involved in securing 
its ‘sale’.15 Laundering thus becomes a key trope that organizes 
Breaking Bad’s narrative: first, when the production of Walt’s blue 
crystal meth, in its industrial phase, is hidden in a factory below 
Gus Fring’s industrial laundromat; and next, when Walt looks to 
free himself from subordination to Fring (whom he will eventu-
ally assassinate). We subsequently witness how he unsuccessfully 
attempts to ‘clean’ his ill-gotten gains through the car wash he 
used to work in and has now purchased for this very purpose – 
before he forces his ex-colleagues to become his bankers.
Walt’s critical – and criminal – decision involves ‘freeing’ his 
intellectual labour from exploitation and its humiliating sub-
sumption (he cannot exercise his thought) to the federal state’s 
reproductive logics of Bildung. However, as in Adorno’s critique 
of Kant’s abstract notion of ‘free will’ in Negative Dialectics, 
the more he struggles for autonomy, the more he finds himself 
dependent on and subsumed to the ‘invisible hand’ of the illegal 
market and commodification. So much so, in fact, that he is 
15. But which then returns, for example in Ridley Scott’s The Counsellor (2013), scripted 
by Cormac McCarthy, in London’s ﬁnancial district, to lethal effect in the fetishistic form 
of a ‘narco-bolito’.
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at times shown to be literally confronted by the object money 
(profits realized), over-coded by its financial ‘fetishistic’ axi-
omatic, ‘automatically’ to become capital (M–M�), miraculously 
become subject. In the face of this money-capital fetish, Walt 
himself becomes another ‘thing’, objectified, both cynically 
and murderously (he knows that he is doing wrong), into what 
Adorno refers to as a social logic of fetishistic ‘thingness’ (see 
figure 3).16 This ‘thingness’ constitutes another face of the drama 
of financialization as it unfolds in Breaking Bad: how is Walt to 
bank his illegal profits? It also resonates visually throughout the 
compositional procedures of the series, including as the black 
hole of his home, to foreground Walt’s real tragic and increas-
ingly farcical heteronomy. 
This is especially the case cinematographically, in the ways 
in which point-of-view shots (sujet à objet) are at times suddenly 
inverted, or evacuated of subjectivity altogether, such that 
characters – especially Walt – are looked at from the point 
16. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 
1990, pp. 211–99 (on ‘freedom’: in which Kant is shown to be blind to the social content 
of his own proposition) and pp. 183–94 (on the difference between ‘object’ and ‘thing’).
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of view of things, at which point the story told in Breaking 
Bad seems to become itself organized and focalized through 
them. Viewers are often, for example, presented with shots of 
Walt from the perspective of the money he is putting into a 
bag – which, because it resists liquidity, he carries like a burden 
throughout the final seasons of the series – suggesting its role as 
a quasi-transcendental third-person narrator orchestrating the 
film text as a whole.17 There are shots, too, of Walt and Jesse from 
inside the tank into which they are pouring their blue chemical 
mix in Fring’s metamphetamine factory.18 
Most absurd are the shots and scenes that are focused through 
and around a pink teddy bear’s false eye that lands in Walt’s 
swimming pool after an airplane explodes in mid-air – a disaster 
for which he is indirectly to blame (figure 4) – suggesting his guilt. 
17. For narrative ‘orchestration’, see Mikhail M. Bakhtin, The Dialogical Imagination: 
Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin TX and London: 
University of Texas Press, 1981.
18. There are distinct phases in the regime of methamphetamine production or 
‘cooking’ in Breaking Bad: artisanal (in a mobile camper van), industrial or Fordist (in 
Fring’s factory where both Walt and Jesse are dwarfed by both Fring’s organization and 
the machinery), and flexible or post-Fordist (in which production switches between 
houses as they are vacated during fumigation: the beginning of Walt’s brief alliance with 
a neo-Nazi gang of fumigators).
4
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The false eye then ‘travels’, peering out at Walt from under his 
bed (figure 5), ending up in the hands of the two narco-sicarios 
looking to kill Heisenberg. Finally, in a scene towards Breaking 
Bad’s denouement, the camera looks through a table and map of 
the border zone in such a way as to imprint the territory of their 
theatre of operations onto the faces and bodies of Walt, Jesse 
and the treacherous Lydia – whom Walt later poisons with ricin, 
which, along with the money and the false eye also circulates as 
another of Walt’s chemical productions (figure 6). Such camera 
work and mise en scène suggest a possible shift in the deploy-
ment of the Lacanian concept of the ‘suture’ in film analysis, 
conventionally used to refer to the ways in which the viewer’s gaze 
is ‘stitched’ into film narrative as a (stand-in) subject – into the 
impossible place, that is, of an intradiegetic interlocutor, occupied 
by the camera, in order to create the illusion of identification. In 
Breaking Bad’s narrative of financialization and laundering, such 
an illusion of subjecthood is radically transformed. For here the 
viewer is invited to occupy – or is stitched into as a stand-in – the 
impossible and illusory place of the ‘thing’ which, fetishistically, 
now becomes a ‘subject’ that confronts and subordinates the 
5
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subject-become-thing. This is the drama of the ‘reflux of money’ 
on which Walt eventually chokes.19 
According to Arrighi, ‘the two epochs or phases’ – M–C–M� 
and M–M� together – ‘constitute a full systemic cycle of 
accumulation’.20 Arrighi uses this construction to periodize 
his history of the development of capitalism, passing through 
successive imperial hegemons (Spain, the Netherlands, Great 
Britain, the USA…), particularly the passage from one to another, 
in which the moment of financialization oversees the transition. 
In this account, following Fernand Braudel’s own state-centred 
history of capitalism, financialization represent the ‘autumn’ 
of a particular epoch, and the fall of a particular hegemon (his 
alternative to the term ‘empire’) as it is replaced by another, at 
which point the cycle of production, destruction and accumula-
tion begins again in another place.21 Such a cyclical logic might 
19. Breaking Bad ’s dramatization of the autonomization of ﬁnance (as well as a possible 
preﬁguration of the disappearance of ‘cash’ money) might be its main critical advance 
on The Wire. For the ﬁlmic concept of ‘suture’, see Stephen Heath, Questions of Cinema, 
London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 76–112.
20. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 6.
21. Arrighi quotes Braudel in The Long Twentieth Century as follows: ‘“[Every] capitalist 
development of this order seems, by reaching the stage of ﬁnancial expansion, to have in 
some sense announced its maturity: it [is] a sign of autumn”’ (p. 6).
6
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be applied to the competition between first Colombian and then 
Mexican drug cartels. However, in Breaking Bad – as well as in 
such films as The Counsellor (Ridley Scott, 2013) and Sicario (Denis 
Villeneuve, 2015) – in which the actual difficulty of laundering 
is thematized, we may be presented with another situation, in 
which finance no longer represents just an ‘autumn’, but rather 
all seasons: winter, summer and spring too. It becomes dramati-
cally and violently autonomous, to subsume all other forms and 
define a cycle of its own. What we would then have in Breaking 
Bad is something like the narco-underbelly of a new ‘empire’ of 
financialized capital, characterized throughout in all its phases 
– cultivation, chains of commodity exchange and distribution, 
as well as the moment of finance upon which the realization of 
laundered surpluses depend – by cycles of production, destruc-
tion and accumulation. Violence and spectacle, production and 
destruction on an increasingly globalized scale, are constitutive 
of the outlaw narco-logic of accumulation in which Walt-as-
Heisenberg briefly participates, as they are of its territorializing 
a ‘whole way of life’: the narco-culture of narco-accumulation. 
This narco-culture of everyday life is the public secret revealed 
in Roberto Bolaño’s novel 2666, centred on the killing of women 
workers in Ciudad Juárez.22
22. This includes the destruction of their own productive forces, making a spectacle 
of the violence of a supposed ‘surplus population’, whilst putting it to work symbolically 
in what Jairus Banaji calls a ‘regime of production’. For the commodity spectacle 
of damaged and tortured bodies, see Sayak Valencia’s Gore Capitalism, trans. John 
Pluecker, South Pasadena/Cambridge and London: Semiotext(e)/MIT Press, 2018. For 
a narco-cartel’s exploitation of beauty queens, see Gerardo Naranjo’s ﬁlm Miss Bala 
(2011). For globalization and the spectacle of violence, see Don Winslow’s thrillers The 
Power of the Dog (2001) and, especially, The Cartel (2015), as well as Roberto Saviano’s 
Zero, Zero, Zero (2013) – an account of the globalization of the drugs trade centred 
on 1980s Mexican cartels. For Bolaño’s 2666 see my ‘A Monument to the Unknown 
Worker: Roberto Bolaño’s 2666’, Radical Philosophy, 200, Nov/Dec, 2016, p. 37-46 – www.
radicalphilosophyarchive.com/article/a-monument-to-the-unknown-worker – a 
companion piece to this essay. And for ‘regime of production’, see the essays contained 
in Jairus Banaji, Theory as History: Essays on Modes of Production and Exploitation, 
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011.
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Territory and ‘apache refusal’
La fama de Heisenberg ya llegó hasta Michoacán … ese material 
azul ya se hizo internacional. Ahora ya si le quedó bien a Nuevo 
México el nombre … hablan de un tal Heisenberg que ahora 
controla el mercado … el cartel es de respeto nadie se ha escapado 
ese compa ya está muerto no más no le han avisado.
‘Negro y Azul: The Ballad of Heisenberg’, Los Cuates de Sinaloa
As Arrighi’s periodizing history of hegemons suggests, the logics 
of the accumulation of capital also include a territorializing 
dimension: geopolitical arrangements that bring the state and 
its apparatus – the law and the military – into play to secure 
production, trade and finance via various historical forms of 
colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism. This – territory 
– is where his work finds echoes in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
rhizomatics of war machines, assemblages, state capture and the 
refrain, set out in A Thousand Plateaus. As we have seen above, 
Breaking Bad narrativizes accumulation, via Walt’s experience 
of the ‘reflux of money’ and laundering. It also registers the 
question of territory, but it does not internalize it reflexively 
into its narrative space. Land- and sky-scape, however dramatic 
7
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and symbolic, for example as ‘encompassers of the West’, remain 
mere ‘settings’ in which actions only take place. The black hole 
in Walt’s ruined home symptomatizes this lack – or hole – in 
the text, which uncannily looks out at the viewer. It registers 
Walt’s tragic existential crisis, as well as his farcical bid for 
freedom, subsumed to the ‘thingifying’ effect of the outlaw 
narco-economy of money and laundering. The latter, however, 
has a territorial dimension, which increasingly insists and comes 
into view – although merely indexically – but which Breaking Bad 
cannot quite reflect as narrative experience. In this sense, the 
black hole in the text remains an enigmatic horizon, demanding 
interpretation: what does the series know and show, and what 
does it not know but show? I propose to refer to the spectral 
presence of this ‘other’ territory, and its geopolitical history as it 
pulls Walt into its lethally over-coded space, as ‘Apache refusal’ 
(figures 7 & 8).
Although the production and sale of illegal drugs have 
produced huge wealth for a relatively small number of Mexican 
cartel bosses (a narco-bourgeoisie), it is also a mass phenom-
enon, a form of illegal popular capitalism of small producers 
and sellers, as well as of a large ‘mule’ precariat-proletariat, a 
8
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baroque economy gone ‘bad’, so to speak.23 In this sense, it might 
be considered an example of what Verónica Gago describes, 
biopolitically, as the conatus of baroque economies – the affective 
affirmation of a strategy of life and survival – along the lines of 
Bolívar Echeverría’s work on the cultural history of a popular 
baroque ‘ethos’ that emerged in seventeenth-century Latin 
America in the context of colonial appropriation and commod-
ification and its ‘civilizing’ mission to remake Catholic Europe in 
Latin America via the capture and conversion of native peoples 
in ‘reductions’ and reservations. Gago extends and adapts this 
analysis to the contemporary, neoliberalized informal economies 
of the region. Unlike the community markets analysed by Gago, 
however, which are located in quite delimited territories – on 
the outskirts of La Paz and Buenos Aires (one could find their 
equivalents in the tianguis of Mexico) – the narco-economy may 
be defined by its relative nomadism and mobility, producing a 
‘way of life’ (and death), a cultural formation, not as it is ‘lived 
authentically on the spot, in places’, but rather along the histori-
cal lines of a ‘coming and going’ of the illegal commodity, across 
the Mexico–US border that is constitutive of its territory of 
accumulation.24 
Of course, the narco-culture of narco-accumulation includes 
towns and cities – or, rather, bits of towns and cities (as head-
quarters and recruitment centres), even rural haciendas (estates), 
as well as bits of states turned or reprivatized by corruption – but 
these are all subordinated to the strategic, elastic vectors of 
narco-accumulation and their territorializing effects, along with 
23. It is important to note that the cartels probably earn more money from other 
activities – such as extortion, protection, migration and people trafficking – than they do 
from drugs trafficking itself.
24. See Verónica Gago, La razón neoliberal: economías barrocas y pragmática popular, 
Buenos Aires: Tinta Limón and Traﬁcantes de Sueños, 2015; Bolívar Echeverría, La 
modernidad de lo barroco, Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2000 (Echeverría and Gago’s 
perspective involves a community-centred and culturalist reading of the use value – for 
example, labour and cooperation – of all exchange value). For cultures ‘on the move’, see 
Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 2–3.
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the violent inter-cartel competition this involves: a competi-
tion for the routes and other pathways, including cross-border 
tunnels, along which the merchandise is moved. As Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest, such movement occurs not along develop-
mental lines, but transversally, from the middle and through the 
middle, establishing a ‘logic of the and’: a quilt-like patchwork 
accumulation. The outlaw ‘nomadic’, capitalized.25
What is a territory, especially such a violent one, an elastic 
transnational narco-territory that is mobile and strategic, 
mediated at one end by the land and commodity production 
(M–C–M� in the all-important middle), as well as by media 
technology, so fundamental to its military operations, as well as 
by finance (M–M�), at the other? A territory that now includes a 
virtual dimension too? And how is it imagined and inhabited? 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, territory is the result of an 
act of ‘territorialization’ that – minimally – connects actions, 
milieus and rhythms. (‘Action occurs in a milieu, whereas rhythm 
is located between two milieus.’26) This is the space–time of what 
they refer to as the ritornello or refrain: acts of assemblage or an 
assembly of acts that ‘knit space and time together’ to assume 
‘form as an ethology of affects in accordance with the concrete 
ways we inhabit a milieu and transform it into territory’.27 It is 
also a way of thinking about how cultural formation works as 
subject formation or affective interpellation. Inhabitation, they 
suggest, and they open their discussion referring to the human 
infant (they go on to refer to birdsong), is intimately connected 
with modulated sound (the refrain) that simultaneously opens 
and enfolds in a milieu-in-the-making, subjectivizing, and 
eventually producing what they call a nomos, which ‘as a custom-
ary, unwritten law is inseparable from a distribution of space, 
25. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 25, 477. See also note 6 above.
26. Ibid., pp. 313–14.
27. Anne Sauvagnargues, Artmachines: Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon, trans. Suzanne 
Verderber, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016, pp. 136, 133.
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a distribution in space’. This is precisely the kind of bandit 
territory – with its ‘bandit’ codes, laws and traditions – referred 
to here: the narco-culture of narco-territory. This is a territori-
alization that ‘leaps’, marking ‘the movement from a pre-existing 
milieu to territory’ (for example, narco-territory), crossing ‘state’ 
with ‘war machine’ and vice versa.28
As well as laundering money through financial institutions, 
the drugs cartels also wash their money through industrial 
forms of capital (construction for example), as well as entertain-
ment capital: bars, nightclubs, brothels and the like (for which 
see Bolaño’s 2666). Spectacle, of all kinds, as I have noted, 
including the spectacle of exemplary founding and maintaining 
violence, is fundamental in this regard. Most important for 
narco-culture as an enfolding and inhabited formation, however, 
are the culture industries, especially popular music. From 
this perspective, the narco-ballad or corrido arguably provides 
narco-accumulation with its jaunty, repetitive, territorializing 
refrain, whose rhythms return over and over again, opening up 
and closing down pathways, within a soundscape that remakes 
the traditional octosyllabic verse-form in its image, whilst 
providing listeners in an ever-growing informalized economy 
with stories of outlaw possibilities, mixed with love and betrayal. 
The corrido has become a hegemonic cultural form, not only 
narco-accumulation’s refrain – enfolding, subjectivizing and, 
indeed, ‘resonating’ like a state – but also its archive, narrating a 
living tradition, projecting ‘individual existence into the weft of 
a collective narrative’, to use Balibar’s words, affectively making 
and remaking ‘a people’ of sorts.29 Narco-territory, however, 
28. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 312; Anne Sauvagnargues, 
Artmachines, p. 131.
29. In contrast to primitive societies, Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘state societies 
behave as apparatuses of resonance’, ‘the organization of resonance’: the ‘State, 
therefore, is a resonance chamber for private as well as public powers’ (A Thousand 
Plateaus, pp. 211, 536 n6. For the narco-corrido, see Elijah Wald, Narcocorrido: A Journey 
into the Music of Drugs, Guns and Guerrillas, New York: HarperCollins ebooks, 2002. For 
the narco-culture of everyday life and death, see Roberto Bolaño, 2666, trans. Natasha 
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unlike that of Balibar’s important reflections, is not contained 
by the nation-state and its limits as a juridico-political form. 
Rather, it is a transnational cross-border hinterland whose raison 
d’être is precisely the illegal crossing of borders: the territory of 
a narco-accumulation that captures the overlapping transversal 
routes of migrant labour and illegal distribution and exchange. 
As in the film Sicario, the latter fold back on and subsume the 
former: cross-border migrant tunnels that have been poached by 
the cartels are in their turn re-functionalized by CIA black-ops.
In this regard, the lyrics from a verse of ‘Negro y Azul: The 
Ballad of Heisenberg’, with which I have begun this section, 
maps this mobile bandit territory, the border hinterland, quite 
precisely. Its performance in the style of a music video makes up 
the pre-credits prefacing Season 2 episode 7, giving the episode 
its name: ‘Black and Blue’. Addressing the now ‘international’ 
Heisenberg myth – which has him dressed in black – as well as 
his blue product, the corrido enfolds them into a narco-territory 
that extends from the Mexican state of Michoacán (the ‘home’ 
of the Familia Michoacana Cartel) to the US state that includes 
Albuquerque – Walter White’s (and Heisenberg’s) base, in New 
Mexico – whose name, the song insists humorously, since it is 
part of the same spatial fix, now ‘fits it just right’. As in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s account of the refrain, the rhythm of ‘Negro y 
Azul’ assembles two milieus, fragments of nations, into one 
territory. Finally, the name of the group that sings the ballad, 
Wimmer, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2008 (especially Part 3). For spectacle, see 
Valencia, Gore Capitalism, and for ‘founding’ and ‘maintaining’ violence – as well as their 
combination in the police – see Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in One-Way 
Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, London: New 
Left Books, 1979, pp. 132–54. On imagining a people, see Étienne Balibar, ‘The Nation 
Form: History and Ideology’, in Étienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, 
Class: Ambiguous Identities, London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 86–106. Other forms 
lean on the corrido for their artistic materials. This is especially the case for the Mexican 
‘narco-novel’, Yuri Herrera’s Kingdom Cons (2004) for example, which is set in a kind of 
medieval narco-fairyland. Narrated by a corrido composer who becomes a member of the 
‘King’s court’, his function is to provide the King with an archive that narrates him into 
history. 
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‘The Friends from Sinaloa’, evokes Mexico’s most well known and 
powerful cartel, the Sinaloa Cartel (whose boss is the infamous 
– now prisoner-celebrity – el chapo Guzmán).30 The last part of 
the verse – a repeated chorus – insists that the Cartel demands 
‘respect’ (that is, submission to the logics of narco-accumulation 
it manages) and that, in fact, Heisenberg is ‘already dead, it’s just 
that no one has told him’ yet. The irony here, of course, as the 
viewers know, is that in fact he has been told, when diagnosed 
with cancer; and that it is this knowledge that has motivated and 
empowered him; so much so in fact that he feels he can chal-
lenge (disrespect) the Cartel. This is the lethal ‘other’ territory, 
a narco-nomos, into which Walt falls as crisis hits, projecting a 
black hole into his life as he is captured by it.
Returning to Walter White’s existential crisis, his farce and 
his tragedy: Walt wants to make history, but does so – of course 
– in circumstances not of his own choosing. It so happens that 
in the beginning of Breaking Bad he is in fact scurrying about 
on a New Mexican reservation, native Indian land.31 As I have 
hinted above, Breaking Bad registers this presence: Indian people 
appear on screen giving Walt a helping hand; another works as 
a cleaner in his school, for example. But this presence – full of 
history – appears to be only registered indexically, as if part of 
the landscape in which the story unfolds. This quasi-indexical 
presence, however, demands to be addressed. Although unreflect-
ed narratively, it is here on Indian land where, before he briefly 
becomes a globalized semi-industrial producer (with the help 
of Fring’s Pollos Hermanos), he ‘cooks’, making product with his 
ex-student Jesse in their camper van. Indeed, he will repeatedly 
return there, to use the land and its smooth, diagonal pathways 
that cut across the striated routes of the US and Mexican states, 
30. The epigraph at the beginning of this essay is a verse from another corrido whose 
title also refers to Guzmán: ‘The Boss of the Mountains’. 
31. Due to contemporary forms of neo-extactivism, the right of native Indians to their 
land is being violated again, under Trump.
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old infrastructure now re-functionalized. Finally, before he 
forces his old, wealthy friends to become his private bank (and, 
as we have seen, give what remains of his wealth a future), he 
goes back there to bury the cash-money he has accumulated 
(having escaped Fring’s control he can no longer launder it). At 
which point, with the killing of Hank, the neo-Nazi gang, Walt’s 
enforcer Mike, and finally, with Walt’s own death, Breaking Bad 
begins to reach its end. Indian land thus frames and subtends 
Breaking Bad’s narrative, as well as the narco-territory it maps, 
to constitute the subaltern limits of its text, on the one hand, 
and the history of the black hole in Walt’s home that narco-
accumulation symptomatizes but does not quite exhaust, on the 
other. For this territory has a history, one that reaches back into 
the past (the past of ‘Apache refusal’), when native Indian war 
machines, including (but not only) Apaches, struggled against 
encroaching empires and nation-states, resisting the destruc-
tion of their societies. As in Mario Tronti’s notion of ‘worker 
refusal’ – whose threat spurs on capitalist development through 
technology (so as to rid itself of capital’s dependence on living 
labour) – Apache refusal is also constitutive here of the processes 
of nation-building in both Mexico and the USA, which it never-
theless resists.32 
In a recent history of the state of Chihuahua, in Northern 
Mexico, Luis Aboites Aguilar describes a territory whose vectors 
of communication and commerce run not from South to North, 
like the modern railway system (which today narcos raid for 
‘mules’ – labour – to carry drugs across the US border), but, in 
his words, ‘West-to-East, from the highlands to the lowlands 
… in which relations of exchange between the peoples of 
Chihuahua, Indians and non-Indians stand out … the Western 
Sierra Madre is a geographic corridor that has been in use from 
32. Mario Tronti, ‘The Strategy of Refusal’, Italy: Autonomia, Post-Political Politics, 
Semiotexte, vol. 3, no. 3 (August 2004), pp. 28–35.
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prehistoric times to our present.’ Aboites Aguilar goes on to note 
that a later postcolonial 
war against the nomads took place in a territory very different from 
that of the previous century [the colonial period – JK]. Towards 1830 
[that is, after Mexican independence – JK] … a numerous though 
dispersed population from the US began to move into the lands of 
many Indian groups, both nomadic and sedentary… These began 
to emigrate South [and after 1848, across the new Mexico–US 
border instituted by the Treaty of Guadalupe – JK]… [M]any of the 
war-making groups [such as the Apaches and Comanches – JK] 
discovered in this US expansion a market for the products they 
had robbed in Mexico. In other words, the Apaches – and the 
Comanches, new protagonists in this violent scenario – obtained 
horses, alcohol and weapons in exchange for the heads of cattle obtained 
in their attacks on Mexican ranches and haciendas.33 
I would like to highlight two points here: Aboites Aguilar 
refers specifically to the beginnings of a second, long period of 
Apache Wars – led by the wealthy landowning Terrazas family 
of Chihuahua – that lasted well into the 1880s in the region 
and that ended in the defeat of the Apaches and Comanches 
across most of Northern Mexico. Second, he underlines at the 
same time a relation of cross-border exchange that might be 
considered almost structural, endowing the territory I have 
been tracing here with a persistence over a time – a historical 
effect of ‘refusal’ – that reaches both back into the past and 
33. Luis Aboites Aguilar, Chihuahua: historia breve, Mexico City: El Colegio de México 
and Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2011, p. 117 (my translation and italics). Victor Hugo 
Rascón Banda, author of the classic narco-novel Contrabando, writes about the presence 
of the Apache in Santa Rosa de Lima de Uruáchic, Chihuahua: ‘Those of us who when 
young lived in the Northeast of Chihuahua could feel the presence of the Apaches on 
seeing the inﬁnite green plains surrounded by the blue mountains, where they told us 
barbarians hid after their attacks on caravans or lone-riders travelling from one mine 
to another in Chihuahua … to Paso del Norte, Tucson, Albuquerque or Our Lady of Los 
Angeles… The Apache nation was extinguished by the riflemen of Joaquín Terrazas so 
that he could, they say in Chihuahua, build himself a railway, the railway that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century went from the South to the North up to the new 
frontier… Not in vain was the phrase coined that we still use today to describe the 
danger, the anxiety, the fear: “We’re in Apache territory”.’ ‘Prologue’ to Manuel Rojas’s 
Apaches … fantasmas de la Sierra Madre, Chihuahua: Instituto Chihuahuense de la 
Cultura, 2008, pp. 2, 4; my translation.
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forwards into the future, but that also shifts and mutates in a 
more or less continuous transcultural process of transformation 
or over-coding as a combination of formal subsumption and 
re-functionalization. 
The history of the territory of Apache refusal is thus the 
history of its over-coding and capture, but also, to an extent, its 
resistance to them such that, however subsumed, the spectral 
moment of the non-identity of what Deleuze and Guattari call 
‘war machine’ and ‘state capture’ remains present.34 An example: 
according to the historian Friedrich Katz, the anthropologist 
Daniel Nugent and the cultural critic Jorge Aguilar Mora, the 
long wars against the Apache and Comanche transformed the 
peasant-soldiers of Northern Mexico (who had originally been 
given land to defend on the frontier in the colonial presidio 
system) as they acquired the knowledge of their enemies (in-
cluding the knowledge of their ‘comings and goings’ along the 
transversal routes through their territory) and, in the words of 
Aguilar Mora ‘became Indian’. In this account, although militar-
ily defeated, a war machine was captured and incorporated into 
what was to become the bandit forces of Pancho Villa’s army 
during the Mexican Revolution. This was an army that occasion-
ally ‘freed’ itself, to become outlaw again and raid across the 
Mexican–US border, and that itself had eventually to be defeated 
34.  Deleuze and Guattari derive their notion of ‘war machine’ from the work on 
primitive societies by Pierre Clastres. He deﬁnes these as societies without and against 
the state. Primitive war – the nomadic war machine – thus becomes a strategy, 
associated mainly with the Apaches, for inhibiting the emergence of both inequality and 
a state-like centre of authority, each connected to the other. Geronimo, who might be 
considered the great representative of ‘Apache refusal’, was a warrior who would not give 
up the war against the Mexicans. He was abandoned by his tribe, however, because his 
persistence threatened the creation and consolidation of a speciﬁcally warrior class, and 
thus of a state of unequals. Deleuze and Guattari are critical of Clastres’s deﬁnition of 
primitive societies, suggesting that they were not immune to state formation (as indeed 
Clastres himself suggests); it was a matter, rather, of ‘degree’ – the speciﬁc moment 
when a war machine and primitive society turned, and became a state. Despair at black 
holes is one of the results. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, trans. Robert 
Hurley, New York: Zone Books, 1989, especially pp. 189–218. There is thus a war-
machinic dimension to narco-accumulation, but it has been over-coded and subsumed by 
a proto-state pursuing a violent logic of permanent primitive accumulation, sometimes in 
alliance with and sometimes against the Mexican state, but mainly both at once.
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by the new post-Revolutionary Mexican state, which conceived of 
villismo as its barbarous ‘other’.35
In summary, then, the historical sequence of state capture and 
the reterritorialization of Apache territory includes: colonial and 
postcolonial conquest and racist containment (in reservations, 
for example), and the private appropriation of native lands and 
– particularly in the mountains of Chihuahua – the extension, 
industrialization and early-globalization of silver-mining. As 
the routes of Indian territories were abandoned as the economy 
shifted – that is, as they were hinterlanded – they were also 
reoccupied and their pathways re-functionalized in bandit 
cross-border overcodings (as with villismo). This is the outlaw 
territory – originally the creation of Apache refusal – that is both 
subordinated and re-created once more by narco-accumulation 
as a proto-state form qua ‘model of realization’ (or capitalist 
valorization) with its own repressive and ideological apparatuses. 
In Breaking Bad, it provides Walt with the ‘land’ – the territory 
– on which he ‘cooks’, a place where he can pursue his desire 
for wealth and his bid for freedom. Then it passes through his 
house, ruining it.
35. There are other examples during this period: the cross-border alliance of the 
anarchist Flores Magón brothers and the ‘Wobblies’, the International Workers of 
the World, for example. For villismo, see Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho 
Villa, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1998; Daniel Nugent, Spent Cartridges of 
Revolution: An Anthropological History of Maniquipa, Chihuahua, Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993; and Jorge Aguilar Mora, Una muerte sencilla, justa, 
eterna: cultura y guerra durante la Revolución Mexicana, Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1990.
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